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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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Commentary Previews Arms Talks Involving Cheney

LD1510141390 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Commentary by Moscow military observer Colonel Vadim Solovyev]

[Text] The talks which the U.S. defense secretary, Dick Cheney, is scheduled to have with Soviet leaders here in Moscow can be expected to focus, among other issues, on cuts in strategic offensive weapons. Radio Moscow's military observer Colonel Vadim Solovyev comments:

[Solovyev] The negotiating parties must see to it that the future treaty be stringently complied with by the signatories. In the final analysis there is the key requirement which determines the very possibility of signing a treaty of this kind. Any chance of skirting agreement would give one side an advantage over the other and make the desired strategic balance on a worldwide scale much too precarious.

The Soviet Union sees quite a few reasons for concern. The American negotiators at the Geneva talks have been warned about the likely consequences of Washington's possible decision to transfer its submarine based D-5 ballistic missiles of the Trident-2 class to Britain. The Soviet side insists on ruling out this possibility altogether. In the meantime, it wants the combat potential of the missiles proposed to be transferred to Britain to be compensated for. The D-5 is a missile tipped with a nuclear warhead capable of splitting into eight separate ones; therefore, due attention should be given to its opposite number, the SS-18, at the Soviet Union's disposal.

Under the initial plan, the arsenal of these heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles was to be reduced by this country by half and the rest was to be mothballed. Now that strategic parity is being threatened by the nuclear missiles transferred by Washington to its allies, the solution is obvious—the already scrapped SS-18's should be compensated for by scrapping an appropriate number of Backfire [as heard] bombers in the United States. That's how Moscow sees a way of restoring parity.

Both sides have to work hard for agreement on that point and Mr. Cheney's visit to the Soviet capital opens up a good opportunity for that. After all, the future treaty's main goal is to scale down international tension and the degree of military confrontation.

U.S. Stand on Nuclear Missile Treaty Questioned

LD1510211190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1343 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Oct (TASS)—A noisy discussion on the Soviet-produced OTR-23 [SS-23] missiles, which are among the weapons of the armies of the GDR, the CSFR, and of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, has again unfolded in the United States. A number of officials in Washington have made accusations against the Soviet Union. They say the USSR demanded during talks on medium and shorter-range missiles the elimination of the West German "Pershing-1A" shorter-range missiles, while at the same time wishing to remove from the equation the reduction of such missiles among its own allies.

As THE WASHINGTON TIMES reports, Maynard Glitman, the former head of the U.S. delegation at the talks on medium-range nuclear forces, stated that the elimination of shorter-range missiles among the weapons of the allies of the USSR and the United States is envisaged in the treaty on medium and shorter-range missiles.

What can be said about these statements being made in the United States?

First. The USSR has never insisted at the talks on the elimination of the West German "Pershing-1A" missiles. When the issue of strategic-tactical missiles was raised in Geneva, the problem of the nuclear warheads for these systems was also raised. The Soviet Union demanded in particular the elimination of U.S. nuclear warheads for the West German "Pershing-1A." I repeat, the U.S. nuclear warheads, but not the West German missiles.

Strange things happened with regard to the "Pershing 1A's" in 1987, which resembled a joke. Soviet diplomats kept saying at press conferences and in the press that the USSR did not insist on the elimination of FRG missiles, only the U.S. warheads for them. Meanwhile, U.S. officials, including the head of the U.S. delegation, Max Kampelman, pretended to be deaf, and protested indignantly in their public appearances against "USSR encroachments on the missiles of a third party."

The affair concluded when FRG Chancellor Kohl announced his decision unilaterally to eliminate West Germany's "Pershing-1A's" by May 1991.

Since it did not insist on the elimination of the missile installations of the U.S. allies, the Soviet side, naturally, did not raise the matter of eliminating the missiles of the GDR, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian armies, which were supplied to those countries before the start of the talks on shorter-range nuclear missiles (from 500-1,000 kilometres). It is important here to note that unlike the "Pershing-1A's," the missiles of these three countries did not, from the very beginning, and still do not have, nuclear warheads. Fitting these missiles only with non-nuclear warheads is stipulated in the agreements with Czechoslovakia and with Bulgaria, and indeed with the GDR, which has now become part of the FRG. In other words, these missiles and the conventional warheads for them have become the property of the three countries.

Second. In the case of OTR-23 missiles handed over to East European countries, there can be no talk of any violation of the treaty on medium and shorter-range missiles by the Soviet Union. THE WASHINGTON TIMES is either misquoting Glitman in saying that the treaty provides for the elimination of the missiles of the USSR and U.S. allies, or Glitman has already forgotten the subject of the talks he conducted in Geneva.

On the matter of observing the agreement, there are other, genuinely substantial difficulties. The United States and the USSR were meant to eliminate their own missiles with a range from 500-1,000 kilometres 18 months after signing the treaty. That period has passed. However, "Pershing-1A" missiles are still on U.S. territory. The U.S. side claims that these missiles belong to the FRG. However, no proof of this, apart from the freshly painted inscription "FRG" on the installations, has been submitted to the Soviet side.

Deputy Minister Proposes UN Monitoring Agency

LD1610075190 Moscow TASS in English 0711 GMT 16 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Maslov]

[Text] United Nations October 16 TASS—The concluding decade of the twentieth century should become a period of joint creative activity, the co-development of states, and consensus on the key issues problems of our time, a decade of law and order and joint efforts to ensure its stability, Vladimir Petrovskiy, Soviet deputy chief delegate and deputy foreign minister, told the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

"The events of the past year, which finally buried the cold war and drew the line under the Second World War, convincingly showed that new political thinking, which is the basis of all foreign policy initiatives and actions by the Soviet Union in the age of perestroika, has become firmly established in the fabric of international politics," he said.

"What happened in the Persian Gulf is a serious warning to civilisation," Petrovskiy said. "At the same time this is an indicator of new political thinking's margin of safety.

"Suffice it to imagine what would have been the outcome if this had taken place during the cold war, when confrontational logic would have been applied.

"The Gulf crisis has become a sort of watershed in mankind's recent history: Only yesterday, an aggression would have had the potential of splitting the world into opposite ideologically-oriented camps and putting it on the brink of a new world war. Today it has only united mankind further on the basis of a commitment to international law and the goals and principles of the United Nations," Petrovskiy said.

On behalf of the Soviet delegation Petrovskiy proposed instituting a U.N. control authority that would monitor the implementation of agreements to ease international tension, to reduce arms and would follow the military situation in conflict- ridden areas.

"Such an authority, with space-based monitoring facilities at its disposal, could be set up as an auxiliary agency of the U.N. Security Council. It should be vested with the right to carry out on-site inspections," Petrovskiy said.

"This authority's conclusions would be brought to the notice of main U.N. agencies. In certain cases, the authority's conclusions could be used by the world court, the importance of which should be sharply raised as one of key components in the strategy for a peaceful resolution of disputes.

"Openness and international control are the mainstays of the new peace structures that are being built," Petrovskiy said. "At the same time, and this has been vividly shown by the latest developments, the United Nations organisation, in order to be effective in the maintenance of peace, should also have at its disposal means to suppress aggression.

"This taken into account, the U.N. military staff committee should be transformed into an effective agency for cooperation. The Soviet Union suggested holding a committee meeting at the level of the chiefs of the general staff of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as is directly stipulated by the U.N. Charter, and discussing an entire range of organisational matters aimed at countering acts of aggression.

"At the previous session of the U.N. General Assembly, the international community designated the 1990s as the decade of international law.

"During the coming decade," Petrovskiy emphasised, "the United Nations organisation is called upon to take the central place befitting it as a 'university of cooperation' and a unique equitable mechanism for post-confrontation actions."

Military Spending Figures Submitted to UN

LD1510211990 Moscow TASS in English 2102 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Mankes]

[Text] New York October 15 TASS—The Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations two major documents setting out a detailed account of the Soviet military potential.

This is a realization of President Gorbachev's promise to publish, in a comparable form, data about Soviet military spending. Figures characterizing the Soviet military budget for 1989 have been transferred to the U.N. standardized accounting system containing information about military spending. They will be published.

At last year's 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly, the Soviet union announced its intention to make known to the United Nations, on an annual basis, the number and the main kinds of armaments at the disposal of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Figures characterizing the state of the Soviet Armed Forces on January 1, 1990 were transferred to the United Nations today, pending publication.

While presenting the documents, the deputy head of the Soviet delegation to the 45th session, of the U.N. General Assembly Vladimir Petrovskiy told a news conference here today: "The document will make clear to you that the Soviet Union adheres to high international standards of openness.

"The data we are submitting to the United Nations are comparable in the degree of precision with the data submitted to the United Nations by the United States and other leading countries in the military field.

"For the first time, the documents reveal the earlier classified information about the cost to the Soviet Union of the upkeep of land forces, the navy, the air force and other military forces, the cost of management and free aid to other countries, as well as of the supplies of aircraft, missiles, nuclear warheads, ships, artillery pieces, armored vehicles and tanks to the Soviet Armed Forces.

"The Soviet Union's total budgetary outlays for military purposes in 1989 reached 77.9 billion roubles, Petrovskiy said. The Soviet military budget for 1990 was cut by eight per cent—to 71 billion roubles, he recalled. This step by the Soviet Union, apart from facilitating greater openness and trust, opens the possibility for further international agreed military cuts.

"With this in mind, we propose to hold consultations under the U.N. aegis to work out methods making comparable military spending by different countries.

"The Soviet Union has illustrated by action its readiness to promote openness as a universal norm of international life.

"We hope that other states will soon submit to the United Nations full information about international arms sales. We are confident that in its entirety this information will enhance the role of the United Nations as guarantor of stability in the post-confrontational world," Petrovskiy stressed.

TASS Reports on Gerasimov's 15 Oct Briefing

Soviet Military Experts in Iraq

LD1510153690 Moscow TASS in English 1458 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—There are still 85 Soviet military experts in Iraq, as well as 15 staffers in the office of the chief military specialist and 40 interpreters, according to updated figures made public here today by Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov.

Recent Events in Jerusalem

LD1510152190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1351 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev: "Representative of USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on UN Security Council Resolution on Events in Jerusalem"]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Oct (TASS)—The Soviet Union voted in favor of this UN Security Council resolution and supports the idea of sending a UN secretary general's mission to investigate the circumstances of the recent tragic events in Jerusalem and other illegal acts on the Arab territories occupied by Israel. This was stated at a briefing today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As is well known, more than 20 Arabs died and more than 150 people were injured as a result of violence on the part of the Israeli occupiers in al-Haram, al-Sharif, and other holy sites in Jerusalem at the beginning of October this year. Commenting on the position of the Government of Israel, which has rejected the unanimously adopted Resolution No. 672 of the Security Council and the statement on this matter by the UN secretary general, the Soviet diplomat stressed that under the UN Charter "all member states of the organization must comply with the decisions of the Security Council." He expressed hope that Israel will "correct" its attitude to the decision of the international community.

President Bush's UN Speech

LD1510163890 Moscow TASS in English 1620 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] The discussion at the U.N. General Assembly session that ended recently reflected the world community's firm desire to strengthen the world order, create a single structure of global partnership and increase the United Nations' contribution to the process, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

Commenting on the outcome of the discussion, the Soviet spokesman noted that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait cast a shadow over the session. The invasion was described as "a major regional threat and potential detonator of an outburst of global national and religious strife".

During the discussion of disarmament issues, Gerasimov said, participants felt that the disarmament process had been set on firm foundations. It is important, he said, to consolidate the process and expand it to cover new fields.

The spokesman said that "perestroyka in the Soviet Union, judging by the debate, is seen as an issue of global significance". The positive development of the world and the normalisation of international relations are uniformly connected with the success of perestroyka in the Soviet Union.

Gerasimov decribed President George Bush's speech at the session and the joint Soviet-American statement in support of the United Nations as illustrating a positive tendency in international relations.

These facts, Gerasimov stressed, point to wide opportunities that will be offered to the United Nations as a universal centre for coordinating efforts by individual states.

Gerasimov noted that thanks to the cooperation of the United Nations "confidence in the predictability of politics is emerging".

Role of UN in 21st Century

LD1510163590 Moscow TASS in English 1607 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Leonid Timofeyev and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The Soviet memorandum on the United Nations in the post-confrontational world suggests the formation of a global partnership into the 21st century, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

The memorandum has been distributed at the 45th U.N. General Assembly session.

Gerasimov said the strategy should be based on a balance of interests and freedom of choice, political realism and strict observance of the U.N. Charter.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the ideas contained in the memorandum and connected with consolidating the success of the Security Council in settling regional conflicts and the use of its permanent subsidiary body—the Military Staff Committee, Gerasimov said.

The Military Staff Committee should study the whole range of organisational issues to counter acts of aggression and practical aspects to provide national army contingents at the Security Council's disposal. The Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to sign a corresponding agreement, Gerasimov said.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that "the ideas contained in the memorandum will promote the development of a fruitful multilateral dialogue on the United Nation's [as received] role in the forthcoming peaceful period of civilisation's development," he said.

Cambodia Conference's Resumption

LD1510162490 Moscow TASS in English 1615 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Alexsandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Mocow October 15 TASS—The Soviet Union welcome the agreement on the resumption of the Paris international conference on Cambodia before the end of the year, reached by conference co-chairmen Indonesia and France, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told a briefing today.

Gennadiy Gerasimov said the "framework document, approved by the U.N. Security Council and all interested parties, has laid the foundation for the conference's resumption".

He attached particular importance to an early beginnig of practical work by the Supreme National Council in Cambodia.

This, he said, would help achieve a qualitatively new level of work to solve the Cambodian problem both at the United Nations and the Paris conference.

"The Soviet Union is ready to make its active contribution to collective efforts by participants in the Paris conference to ensure its successful completion and the implementation of its accords on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian issue".

TASS Reports Burlyay's 15 Oct News Conference

Dialogue Urged in Nicaragua

LD1510180990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1338 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry official today called on parties to the national dialogue in Nicaragua for "tolerance, well-balanced approaches and readiness to place national interests above those of parties and groups."

Yan Burlyay, deputy head of the ministry's Latin America Department, expressed hope that "all parties to the dialogue would seek peace and national accord in Nicaragua and proceed from criteria supported by the people of the country at last year's elections."

He said the goal of the dialogue, in which the government, political forces, business circles and trade unions are taking part, is the "achievement of accord among all sections of Nicaraguan society on ways too solve political, social and economic problems facing the country."

Burlyay welcomed the fact that the past two rounds of talks had produced a "trend towards mutually acceptable compromises on a number of major aspects of the government's economic policy, which provoked fierce resistance from trade unions."

"It can, probably, only be welcomed when the resolution of complex issues is sought by the sides, not by way of emotional confrontation, but by way of dialogue in the interests of achieving national consensus," Burlyay stressed.

Argentine President To Visit

LD1510160890 Moscow TASS in English 1452 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—President Carlos Saul Menem of Argentina will pay a working visit to the USSR at the invitation of President Mikhail Gorbachev between October 24-27, to discuss important aspects of Soviet-Argentinian cooperation, a Soviet official said here today.

Yan Burlyay, deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Latin American Department, said that a meeting between Presidents Menem and Gorbachev would crown the visit.

The programme of the visit also provides for Menem's meeting with Soviet parliament Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov and other Soviet statesmen.

"We hope that the sides will achieve understandings on some important aspects of Soviet-Argentinian cooperation," Burlyay said.

"We believe that the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union by the president of the friendly Argentinian republic will give new impetus to our political interaction and raise bilateral relations to a higher level," he added.

The USSR and Argentina established diplomatic relations in June 1946.

An Argentinian president visited the Soviet Union in October 1986 for the first time in the history of the two countries' bilateral relations.

Argentina leads Latin American countries in the volume of trade with the Soviet Union.

Relations With Chile, Cuba

LD1510173190 Moscow TASS in English 1705 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The Soviet Union will do all it can to make the best possible use of the potential for expanding mutually advantageous cooperation with Chile, Soviet Foreign Ministry's Latin American Department deputy head Yan Burlyay told a briefing here today.

Asked what importance Moscow attaches to the development of cultural and other ties between the Soviet Union and Chile, the spokesman said that Chile was one of Latin America's most important countries.

Recalling that relations between the two countries were resumed this year after a democratic government headed by President Patricio Eilvin took office, Burlyay said "We spoke in favour of expanding relations between our countries in all spheres. We believe that despite the great distance between the two countries, there exists great potential for mutually advantageous cooperation in the interests of the peoples of the two countries. We shall make every effort to realise this potential most effectively".

A Brazilian journalist asked about Soviet relations with Cuba. The spokesman noted that they were developing on the basis of the principles laid down in the treaty of friendship and cooperation, signed by Pesident Mikhail Gorbachev and Cuban leader Fidel Castro last year.

"These principles envisage mutually advantageous cooperation, political dialogue and interaction in the world arena," the spokesman said.

"We favour active development of new forms of cooperation and believe that the establishment of direct contacts between Soviet and Cuban enterprises can result in a considerable increase of trade and cooperation between the two countries".

Burlyay pointed to the notable role played by Cuba in international relations. "Elected to the U.N. Security Council, Cuba demonstrates the constructive character of its foreign policy. We maintain interaction with Cuban comrades concerning all problems of importance for the peoples of the world and will seek to further develop this interaction".

Consulate in Rio de Janeiro

LD1510154290 Moscow TASS in English 1439 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The exchange of notes on the establishment and functions of the Soviet consulate-general in Rio de Janeiro is an important landmark in Soviet-Brazilian relations, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said today. The exchange was held at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry recently. Deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Latin American Department Yan Burlyay told a briefing here that relations between the two countries are steadily developing in the spirit of the 1988 Soviet-Brazilian declaration on the principles of interaction for peace and international cooperation.

"The dynamic of bilateral relations, boosted during a meeting between the Soviet and Brazilian presidents in Moscow in January, promotes positive changes in international relations under the influence of the new political thinking," he said.

Greenpeace Ship Sails for Norway After Expulsion

LD1310161190 Moscow TASS in English 1444 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Text] Murmansk October 13 TASS—The Soviet State Security Committee reported today that the Greenpeace ship, apprehended several days ago near the Novaya Zemlya Islands for the violation of the Soviet border, was expelled from the Soviet territorial waters after the investigation carried out by the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office together with Frontier Guard troops. According to the Greenpeace captain, the ship is steering towards the Norwegian port of Tromso.

United States & Canada

Gerasimov Previews Cheney Visit

LD1510175290 Moscow TASS in English 1719 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Alexander Kanishchev and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—U.S. Defence Secretary Richard Cheney is due to arrive in the Soviet Union on his first official visit on October 16, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov announced at a briefing here today.

He is expected to meet Soviet state and military leaders and public figures and visit some military installations. On the last day of his visit, October 19, Cheney and the Soviet Defence Minister are scheduled to hold a joint news conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry press centre.

Gerasimov said that Cheney's visit to the Soviet Union was a new step on the road towards strengthening mutual understanding and trust between the two countries, another step away from confrontation towards partnership in the vein of the political dialogue at the summit level. The military sphere is one of the most important aspects of this dialogue, Gerasimov stressed.

He noted that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States along military lines had been placed on a firm basis lately. The countries exchange visits by warships and delegations of military school cadets, military historians and military physicians. A military orchestra of the Soviet Defence Ministry has toured the United States and a U.S. Marine band has visited the Soviet Union.

Meetings of top military leaders of the two countries are becoming routine. The Soviet and American defence ministers met three times in 1988—once in Bern and twice in Moscow. Soviet Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev visited the United States in the same year and then U.S. secretary of the Air Force, Edward Aldridge, paid a visit to the Soviet Union.

In 1989, U.S. Admiral William Crowe, the then U.S. Air Force minister [title as received], paid an official visit to the Soviet Union. During his visit, the sides signed an agreement between the Soviet Government and the U.S. Administration on suppressing dangerous military activities.

A few days ago, Soviet Chief of Staff Mikhail Moiseyev concluded an American visit during which he signed plans for contacts between the Armed Forces of the USSR and the U.S. in the next two years.

Asked about the possibility of transferring to the American side "certain secret information about Iraq" during Cheney's visit to the Soviet Union, Gerasimov said that the rumours were a propaganda ploy. He stressed that the Soviet side had no intention to share with anybdoy classified military information subject to protection under agreements with third countries.

"We do not intend to violate respective agreements in any way," Gerasimov said, "if these agreements contain clauses stipulating that the signatories pledge to keep specific information secret."

Gorbachev Meets U.S., Canadian Businessmen

LD1510173490 Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev today received a group of visiting Canadian and U.S. businessmen.

The meeting was held in an atmosphere of "well-wishing, mutual understanding and sincere interest."

The businessmen included Albert Reichmann, president of the Olympia and York Company, and the heads of pension funds of major North American corporations—P. Aldrich, R. Burns, T. Croft, R. Cavano, W. Deck, D. Dutson, B. Eagle, S. Hudson-Wilson, M. Palmer, H. Ochoa-Brillemburg, R. Olson, and K. Patterson.

The pension funds alone control a total of three thousand billion dollars.

At the businessmen's request, Gorbachev commented on major problems facing perestroyka and spoke about principles of economic stabilisation and the transition to a market economy, and prospects for the country's reorganisation.

Specifically, he spoke about the need to combine "all-important criteria of the country's organic participation in world development and a thorough account of its historical peculiarity and peculiarities of society."

The sides discussed possibilities for economic cooperation in the new conditions, which include legal guarantees for the activity of foreign investors and businessmen, accepted throughout the world.

The businessmen expressed their readiness to establish mutually advantageous ties with and render consultative and other services to Soviet organisations.

Northeast Asia

DPRK Denunciation of USSR-ROK Ties Noted

SK1610044790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Article by IZVESTIYA political commentator Aleksandr Bovin on the Results of a Visit to the PRC, DPRK, and Japan by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze; from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Excerpts] The dialogue held in Harbin was a working-level dialogue designed to explore ways to draw the two

Great Powers close to each other. For example, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and China agreed to continue talks to discuss issues on establishing consular offices in Khabarovsk and Shenyang, on strengthening military trust in areas along the Soviet-Chinese border and on mutually reducing armed forces. [passage omitted]

However, talks held in Pyongyang had a somewhat different background. The Korean Peninsula still remained as the most dangerous area for clashes in Asia due to the division of the nation. A war had already swept over Korea and reduced it to a wasteland. There seems to be no further desire to start a war. However, North Korea, which should be held responsible for the 1950- 53 war, is still maintaining an enormous armed force with assistance from our country. About 40,000 U.S. troops in South Korea confront them.

During talks with Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam, not only the issue of USSR-DPRK cooperation but also issues of practical dialogue for Korea's reunification, of the UN membership, and of the prospect for development of the USSR-ROK relations were discussed.

The Pyongyang side told the Soviet foreign minister that it is making efforts to remove distrust between the North and the South of Korea by putting forward a plan for the democratic confederal republic of Koryo.

On the other hand, NODONG SINMUN wrote that No Tae-u's call for gradually forming the Korean national community is not realistic but is a cruel and deceitful trick designed to perpetuate the division.

Aleksandr Bovin, political commentator for IZVESTIYA, continued: As the result of such assertions, the prospect for dialogue for reunification, even if it is held, does not seem bright. Furthermore, the North and the South of Korea are keeping away from each other instead of trying to mutually come close.

The Soviet foreign minister told the Korean comrades that in view of the interest of his own country and the situation in Asia, he sees no obstacles which hinder, in principle, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul.

The DPRK leadership is frantically opposed to such a view. Our foreign minister received a memorandum from the Korean side. The memorandum indicated the grounds for opposing the establishment of between the Soviet Union and South Korea.

Although details of Shevardnadze's talks were not revealed, the grounds put forward by Pyongyang appeared to be unreal because the Korean side evaluates the situation with a dreamy prospect for reunification.

Immediately after establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Seoul, NODONG SINMUN, an organ of the Workers' Party of Korea, attempted to draw an overall conclusion. The paper stated that establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea showed that the Soviet Union is captured by (?selfish) ideas and chaos, that the Soviet Union will run into a blind alley according to its line of reform, and that this is an act of betrayal, a hypocritical act adhering to double-dealing tactics, and an act of a degenerate. Thus, the paper denounced us.

When we read various colorful [saekchae tayanghan] words of NODONG SINMUN, we recall the days which the Soviet Union has driven into the past. There is no need for refuting the grounds put forward by the Korean side because such an act is simply meaningless.

Aleksandr Bovin, political commentator, wrote that the wind of reform, which will blow on the land of North Korea without fail, will refute such grounds. [passage omitted]

Near East & South Asia

Iraqi Threat to Soviets 'Psychological Diplomacy'

LD1510181190 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Mikhail Mayorov commentary]

[Text] Baghdad has threatened to block the exit from Iraq for those Soviet nationals who are still staying in that country. The warning was issued on the eve of the U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's visit to the Soviet Union starting on Tuesday. Mikhail Mayorov with more details and this is what he writes.

For the first time since the Gulf crisis began Baghdad warned it may use the total about 5,000 Soviet nationals staying in Iraq as hostages. This may happen if Richard Cheney is given information about Iraq's military potential. This warning by the Iraqi authorities came rather unexpectedly since the departure of Soviet citizens for home had been settled between Moscow and Baghdad. Just over a week ago talks on this matter were held in the Iraqi capital by a special envoy of the Soviet President, Yevgeniy Primakov. Following the talks, two groups of Soviet specialists have already returned home. So what has actually happened?

Indications exist that Baghdad is on its guard over the Soviet-U.S. contacts in the military area. In that case such a warning should have been made during the Baghdad talks with Yevgeniy Primakov, since at that time the chief of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, was staying in the United States. I assume, writes Mikhail Mayorov, that Saddam Husayn has warned Yevgeniy Primakov about the possible delay in the exit of the Soviet people. and so, if accord on this matter was reached, the two sides had likely made definite commitments. But why should Baghdad issue this public threat later? I think this is a psychological diplomacy, a war of the nerves that are present in the current situation in the Gulf. Grim as such threats might be, this is still a bloodless war both for the Arabs and for the people of other nationalities, including those who found themselves in Iraq and Kuwait. Hopefully the tension won't rise above this mark and the crisis will be resolved in a hard and painful but bloodless way.

Commentaries View Israeli Reaction to UN

Actions Add to Saddam's Image

LD1510215490 Moscow TASS in English 2135 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS political observer Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] Moscow October 16 TASS—Tel Aviv's reaction to U.N. Security Council Resolution 672, which denounced the killing of Palestinians in Jerusalem, and the Council's decision to send a U.N. mission there to investigate the circumstances of this incident, was Israeli-style.

Israeli officials said no assistance would be given to U.N. envoys, who would be regarded as "tourists".

The Israeli leadership has challenged U.N. resolutions for more than 25 years. However, this time Tel Aviv has chosen a very unsuccessful moment.

The world press accuses Israel of "playing into the hands" of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and "adding fuel to the Middle East fire".

Israeli politicians are promoting in every way, by word and deed, the implementation of Baghdad's thesis intended to justify its aggression against the neighbouring peaceful country, namely that this aggression stemmed from a profound deadlock, at which the Middle East has been for years.

Tel Aviv's actions undermine diplomatic efforts to settle the acute Persian Gulf crisis, make Arab "hawks" toughen their stands and increase the international isolation of Israel.

However, this does not stop Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir. He and the Iraqi dictator continue to rock the "Middle East boat", each pursuing his own aims.

Both of them seek to earn as many dividends as possible by exploiting the "the worse, the better" situation.

Saddam's popularity among Arab extremists is based on his ability to convince them that he is a "staunch fighter against Israeli expansionism and the occupation of Arab lands".

The Jerusalem massacre and Tel Aviv's reaction to the Security Council's resolution have only added to this image of Saddam. But who stands to benefit from this?

Solton Sees Challenge to UN

LD1510165890 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Yuiry Solton Commentary]

[Text] The Israeli Government has rejected the United Nations Security Council resolution which condemned Tel Aviv for the recent reprisals against Palestinians outside the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. At its Sunday session Israel's Council of Ministers decided to give no aid to the UN mission, dispatched by the United Nations Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to investigate on-the-spot the circumstances of last Monday's bloodbath. Besides, the Council of Ministers decided to step up the construction of housing for immigrants in the Muslim sector of Jerusalem [which] Israel seized in 1967. There are plans to spend on these needs part of America's loan, though earlier Tel Aviv promised not to use this money on the settlement of immigrants there.

The decision taken by Israel's Government is another challenge to the United Nations. Moreover, Israel's toughening anti-Palestinian policy might become the detonator of an explosion in the Middle East and southwest Asia. In any case it has turned into a serious obstacle to the efforts to resolve the Persian Gulf crisis. In my view, writes Yuriy Solton, this raises a legitimate question. If the United Nations imposes, and quite justifiably, tough sanctions against Iraq for having occupied Kuwait, why cannot it and its member states act as effectively against Israel, which seized Palestinian lands, has retained them by force, and pursues a policy of terror there?

It can be presumed that connivance at Israel and impunity with which Israeli authorities stage reprisals against Palestinians influenced to a certain extent Baghdad's decision to invade Kuwait. Not without reason is Saddam Husayn now trying to link a settlement in the Persian Gulf to Israel's departure from Palestinian lands, and his stance has found support in certain Arab circles. I don't think such linkages are fully justified, but one thing is clear—Israel's anti-Palestinian policy not only tramples on the lawful rights of Palestinian Arabs but also destabilizes the situation in the region as a whole. No matter how the crisis in the Persian Gulf is resolved it's essential to defuse the Israeli detonator. Without this, tranquillity in the Middle East and southeast Asia is impossible.

UN Reaction Defended

NC1510215090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] Iranians are extremely agitated and indignant at the repression and killing of Palestinians by Israeli forces in Jerusalem. Fundamentalists are expertly directing their outrage by talking of double standards in the international community's approach to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and the bloodstained abattoir near the al-Aqsa mosque.

The fundamentalists claim that the UN members' approach to the events in Jerusalem is relatively tepid compared to the reaction to Baghdad's deeds. Some of Iran's newspapers are of the opinion that the hue and cry the international community has raised regarding the fate of Americans in Iraq or the occupation of foreign missions in Kuwait by Iraqi soldiers is disproportionate to the cautious attitude toward the Israeli actions.

The insinuation of double standards is unjust as the UN members have categorically condemned Israel's savage act. The Soviet Foreign Ministry has vehemently castigated the Israeli authorities' action. The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement said that the UN Security Council should display the same unanimity and decisiveness in its approach to the situation in the occupied areas that it exhibited on the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry has also expressed its support of the dispatch of a UN team to investigate the incident as a first step. Even the United States, Tel Aviv's closest ally, has condemned the sanguinary killing. For the first time in many years, Washington has overtly, and on its own initiative, condemned Israel in its proposed resolution.

Even if the U.S. draft resolution did not satisfy the UN members, it cannot be said that the United States has ignored the new trend currently prevailing in the world which is characterized by the international community's active abhorrence of the use of force. It is obvious that, in light of such an approach by the UN members toward the Israeli military forces' savagery, charges of double standards are unwarranted.

Perhaps the Iranian fundamentalists expected the same sanctions would be implemented against Israel, or the multinational force would be expanded and stationed against it, just as was done against Iraq. However, such expectations are not realistic. Yes, the basis of the events in Kuwait and Jerusalem is the use of force. But the two situations are not similar or analogous. In the Iraqi case, not only were crimes committed against diplomats, it was an attempt to trample over the sovereignty of a government, massacre hundreds of Kuwaitis, and use foreign citizens as hostages.

Of course, it is more difficult to resolve the situation in a region where there is not one problem but many. It becomes relatively more difficult if, instead of resolving the situation on the basis of UN charters or resolutions, efforts are made to resolve it only by means of religious considerations, narrow-minded nationalism, and for the sake of political benefits.

The UN members do not have any recourse except to unite to combat the use of force and killing, wherever it may be. The United Nations is able to, and should, play an effective role in eliminating the sources of tension in the Near and Middle East.

Correspondents View Future of Gulf Crisis

91UF0041A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 41, 10 Oct 90 p 14

[Gulf forecast by four correspondents: "Persian Gulf: War Begins on 15 October?"]

[Text] **On the Eve of "D-Day"**
by Igor Belyayev, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA political commentator:

War has in fact already begun there. Was not Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the occupation of this sovereign Arab state—a member of the United Nations—a military action? Is not the confrontation between Saddam Husayn, president of Iraq, and the rest of the world, which is becoming increasingly tense with every passing day, a series of military actions? Are not his statements concerning Iraqi tanks being thrown against Riyadh, about the "punishment" of Israel, and about firing missiles against Saudi Arabia and other states around the Gulf signs of a "big" war in the region which could engulf large territorial areas?

Dragging on the confrontation in the Persian Gulf region for weeks and months is profitable to just one person—Saddam Husayn—who already considers himself the "conqueror of Iran" and "leader of the Arab world." The recent incident in the United States involving Gen. Michael Dugan, who was fired from his position by Pentagon boss R. Cheney (with the consent of President G. Bush, of course!), was food for serious thought. Why did the incident suddenly arise? After all, nothing similar had happened with high-ranking military persons in the United States since 1949 (at that time President H. Truman in the same way and for the same sin dismissed Adm. Louis Denfeld). I am sure that M. Dugan has not suffered in vain. He was simply passing on a secret of President G. Bush's. Incidentally, he has recently been speaking openly of a strike against Iraq unless Saddam leaves Kuwait. I would note that the language of ultimatums anticipates, as a rule, the "go-ahead" for "other (that is, decisive and, consequently, military) actions" stipulated by the M. Gorbachev-G. Bush statement following their meeting in Helsinki. What today is the outlook for events in the Persian Gulf region?

The first question is whether Saddam Husayn will attack the military grouping of 26 countries, including the United States, which are opposed to him and deployed on the territory of Saudi Arabia and certain other Gulf states. He will not now. This insane step on the part of the Iraqi president would be a direct pretext for a retaliatory military strike against Baghdad and Iraq's Army both frontally and in the rear.

The second question is how to explain the escalation of Saddam Husayn's threats, specifically, to bomb the oil fields of the Near East and Israel, and his recent words to the effect that his Armed Forces are ready to fight for virtually a thousand years? Primarily it is endeavor to demonstrate that he is not frightened either by the military confrontation with America or the economic or air blockade of Iraq. To judge by everything, the dictator is thickly surrounded by people—military men and politicians—telling him only what it is pleasant and profitable for him to hear.

The main question is whether compromise with Saddam Husayn is possible. I am convinced that compromise with the Iraqi dictator is unlikely. Why? Primarily because accepting the demand of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the majority of states of the international community that Iraq leave Kuwait and restore its sovereignty and the legitimate government which existed there prior to 1 August would mean political suicide. Although....

The Soviet Union demands the unconditional restoration in Kuwait of the ruling al-Sabah family toppled by the aggressor. For Saddam Husayn our demand is unacceptable since it reduces to nothing all excuses for the aggression....

What does Saddam Husayn have to oppose the rest of the world? A big army: strength of more than 1 million soldiers and officers, 430,000 of whom are on the border with Saudi Arabia; on the border with Saudi Arabia south of Basra alone are 3,500 tanks; quite a substantial air force; chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems—missiles and rocket launchers of various classes. Some of them have a range of more than 1,000 km. It should be considered that the Iraqi Army waged war with Iran for eight years. Consequently, it is battle-hardened. Saddam Husayn (by virtue of the above-mentioned factors included) is confident that confrontation would not be a catastrophe for him.

Still, the Iraqi dictator is putting particular hopes in the "hostage war." He has placed captured citizens of the United States, Britain, France, and other countries in troop deployment locations, at other strategically important points, and even near oil fields. Saddam Husayn recalls quite well the large political costs for J. Carter as a result of the "hostage war" in Tehran in 1979. It was, after all, because of this that he lost any chance of being reelected president of the United States. The same fate has been prepared for G. Bush also. So Saddam Husayn believes....

On the other hand, who and what confront the Iraqi dictator? A 26-state coalition unprecedented since the war. There are in Saudi Arabia more than 170,000 U.S. soldiers alone. They have at their disposal ultra-modern M-1 tanks, F-15 fighters, AWACS, F-16 and F-17 fighter bombers, Stealth, more than 1,000 Air Force units altogether. Ships of the U.S. Navy carrying nuclear weapons are concentrated in the Persian Gulf. Such countries as France, Britain, Canada, Italy, and others are more modestly represented in the military attack force.

Alongside the American and other soldiers of NATO armies in Saudi Arabia are Muslim soldiers of Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Pakistan, and other Islamic states. Saddam Husayn has declared a jihad against his enemies. But he had, after all, no right to do so! The declaration of a jihad is the prerogative of the highest spiritual authorities of Islam, not politicians or generals. The Iraqi president has committed sacrilege. For this reason Saddam Husayn's jihad arguments are a reckless game, nothing more....

His calls for the toppling of the Saud dynasty, which does not, allegedly, have the right to guard the holy places of Islam—Mecca and Medina—are disgraceful. Further, the absurdity of such demands is the fact that in threatening Saudi Arabia with invasion Saddam Husayn is subjecting to the most serious danger Muslims' holy places themselves, which also is sacrilege.

A question of considerable importance is the nature of the "other actions" which were at issue following the meeting in Helsinki. To judge by what the Soviet Union has done in recent weeks, the Kremlin initially preferred diplomatic efforts and political actions. The special mission of Ye. Primakov, member of the USSR Presidential Council, was an example of these efforts, perhaps?

Addressing the 45th session of the UN General Assembly, our foreign minister spoke about Iraq having perpetrated a "terrorist act against the emerging new world order" and called for actions "without delay."

What could the Soviet Union do? Yes, following the resumption of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, which is for an intensification of our role in confronting the aggression, send its soldiers there to participate in a military action against Iraq?

Such a question arose earlier also, and E. Shevardnadze declared that we would do so only under the UN flag, after the Security Council had voted for it. The Soviet Union voted in favor of an air blockade of Iraq, which had already been announced. But the international community has not yet expressed a readiness to launch an assault against Iraq. Perhaps the UN Security Council will indeed pass a resolution on military intervention this week?

I would like to put to the USSR president the following questions: Should not Moscow be studying the question of the Soviet Union's participation in patrols of the waters of the Persian Gulf by its warships? Should we not be responding to the proposal concerning our transport aircraft being made available to transfer soldiers and military equipment to the front zone?

Perhaps agreeing to the denunciation of the friendship and cooperation treaty with Iraq? After all, Saddam

Husayn has ignored it twice—before the invasion of Iran (1980) and before the invasion of Kuwait.

One further consideration. It will be very difficult for us to remain aloof if the United States and its allies agree to military action against Iraq in accordance with a decision of the Security Council.

Finally, the question of questions: Will the United States and its NATO allies attack Iraq? I believe that they will. Washington is not saying that time is working for Saddam Husayn just for the sake of it. The meaning of such statements is obvious. I would like to be mistaken.

One further question: Would not this step on G. Bush's part evoke a storm of American anger? After all, casualties, considerable casualties, are inevitable. I recently put this question to someone who had just arrived in Moscow from Washington. The answer, frankly, surprised me:

"Yes, there will be casualties, but they are inevitable. The goal, however, will be achieved—Saddam Husayn, as a source of danger to everyone, U.S. interests primarily, will cease to exist."

"When will the United States and its allies hit Iraq?"

"Mid-October...."

Is so bold an assumption at variance with the assumptions of our top people? No, it is not. E. Shevardnadze declared in the United Nations: "War in the Persian Gulf region could begin any day or hour...."

The View from Washington: Priority Operation
by Carlo Rossella (PANORAMA, Rome, abridged):

"It is necessary to strike quickly and decisively crush Saddam Husayn's forces since time is on his side...." Prof A.M. Codevilla [name as published], expert at the Hoover Institute (Stanford University, California) and adviser to the Pentagon and the U.S. Senate, is ranked among the "hawks."

"What would you advise President George Bush at so dramatic a time?"

"I would advise him not to delay: Saddam Husayn is already prepared. He has taken Kuwait. Unless he is driven out at once, he will ultimately extend his military power to the whole region."

"What must the United States do to win?"

"It must oust the Saddam regime by any means: In my view, diplomatic niceties are inappropriate here. Either we win or he does."

"A naval blockade?"

"For this weapon to be effective not only time but also international solidarity are needed. Extending the time is dangerous, and solidarity is hard to achieve and unreliable. It is not known, for example, how long the Soviet Union will display its 'solidarity.' Moscow's interests are contrary to ours. Cracks could appear after a certain length of time in the solidarity of certain Arab countries also."

"Is the United States capable of winning?"

"Undoubtedly. We have manifestly preponderant air and missile forces and could deflect the Iraqi side's threat of military victory, deprive the Iraqis of any confidence in themselves, and even force them to turn their backs on Saddam. A price in human lives would have to be paid for this, naturally."

"What about the Western hostages? Saddam has turned them into a living shield...."

"War is war. We should view the hostages as soldiers at the forward edge. Were I president of the United States, I would not be that uneasy over the hostages: We should, after all, be launching the main assault against the Scud-B mobile missile launchers, which could hit our forces and cities of Saudi Arabia with chemical agents. In addition, we must destroy the armored units in the desert."

"Could you not sketch in general outline the scenario of a possible conflict?"

"We would need to begin by bombing the Scud-B bases and air bases. The former would seem more difficult inasmuch as the launchers are mobile and their deployment is difficult to determine with the aid of satellites. But electronic observation and the use of reconnaissance aircraft have produced good results in recent days. Simultaneously with an attack on the aircraft and missile bases we would conduct an offensive against the armored forces and artillery. Tanks in the desert are a convenient target, as the Six- Day War showed. Bombers would drop 250-kg bombs—these electronic monsters are capable of blowing up any tank within a radius of 50 meters. A veritable deadly barrage would rain down on the Iraqis from the skies...."

"What if the Iraqis, for all that, manage to launch some of their Scud-B missiles or even the Chinese Silkworms which they captured in Kuwait?"

"In that case these missiles would be within the range of our Patriot antimissile launchers. AWACS electronic eavesdropping would enable us to intercept Iraqi missiles in flight and to attack them. As you can see, we have the means to win. We have to get results.... Otherwise the Western world could find itself in the power of a tyrant capable of dictating his terms to us. And he would not do this through negotiations in OPEC but with weapons."

"Would this firestorm force Saddam Husayn to acknowledge his defeat? Would it smash his army? Would it force his generals to refuse to obey orders?"

"I believe it would. Overwhelmed by the superiority of our air forces and electronic facilities, Baghdad's generals would ultimately falter and do away with their tyrant...."

The View from London: Decisive Say for the "War Cabinet"

by TASS correspondent Dmitriy Voskoboynikov for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA:

"The war in the desert has not yet begun and, possibly, never will. But the war behind the scenes will make it possible later to write some of the best memoirs since World War II." These are the words of British journalist Peter Grieg, DAILY MAIL correspondent in the United States, and it seems that he is right.

Shortly after the Iraqi Army's seizure of Kuwait, British Prime Minister M. Thatcher allied herself fully with U.S. President G. Bush. Subsequently London was the first of Washington's allies to respond to U.S. Secretary of State Baker's call and sent the 7th Armored Brigade from the Rhine Army to the area of conflict. However, the positions of Britain and the United States on the issue of how to settle the crisis are not, for all that, wholly identical.

Although British Defense Secretary Tom King recently agreed with his American colleague Richard Cheney that the tactical command of the British forces stationed in the Persian Gulf area would be transferred to the "elder brother," London, as may be judged from scattered reports, is privately nurturing a more subtle plan. First, it wishes to gain the United States' consent to an Arab muslim general exercising overall command of the forces of the states which have transferred their subunits to the territory of Saudi Arabia and adjacent areas. Second, to establish here a kind of "war cabinet" (under UN aegis, say....).

Britain is clearly apprehensive that, in the event of the start of military operations, Iraq will launch a concentrated attack on Israel and that this would trigger the inevitable retaliatory actions from Tel Aviv, and the Arab world would be polarized—some states now condemning Iraq would declare a "holy war" on Israel and those which support it....

In the opinion of British commentators, the defeat of Iraq in the anticipated war would mean "the end of Arab military power" and could in the near future cause an explosion of Islamic fanaticism and hatred of the West....

I do not wish to give the impression that London considers war inevitable. Hardly anyone wants it to begin. The propositions constantly being reiterated by both M. Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd may be formulated approximately as follows: "We need to arm ourselves with patience and wait until the UN-imposed sanctions begin to take their toll on Iraq. But the use of military force against the aggressor cannot be ruled out." The country's largest opposition party, Labor, supports the actions of the Conservative government. The conflict in the Persian Gulf will never acquire in the eyes of the British the same significance as the "battle for the Falklands." The vast majority of them approve the government's decision to send troops to the crisis area, but on the question of what to do with these troops next there is no unity.

Conservative Party Chairman Kenneth Baker, whom I asked to give his opinion on ways of settling the crisis in the Persian Gulf, preferred not to mention military operations directly. "In my opinion, we all need at this time to seek to accomplish three tasks," he said. "First, to ensure that Saddam Husayn is, as before, isolated; second, to ensure that the economic blockade puts pressure on Iraq; third, to guarantee the inevitability of S. Husayn's defeat."

The View from Paris: Logic of Dangerous Paradoxes

by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Kirill Privalov

Jean-Francois Deniau, deputy of the Union for French Democracy, former minister and now deputy chairman of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission, is a politician who does not sit in his office. His is a "rare specialty" among his deputy colleagues—the world's "flash points": Nicaragua, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, South Africa....

Leaders of the French state and government have paid close attention to his opinion repeatedly.

Jean-Francois Deniau shared his thoughts in connection with the events in the Persian Gulf with your correspondent.

"The crisis in the Persian Gulf cannot, in my view, be considered without linking it with the events in Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. The problem of this region is that too many people are right, and only each has the 'truth.' And in resolving a dispute it is this, as you suspect, which is the most frightening thing. The intifadah—'war of the stones' in Palestine—continues, the elections in Israel have produced nothing new, and the Americans have essentially broken off the dialogue with Yasir Arafat. Not one of the factors of the Near East crisis has been removed for many years. In addition, not even a prototype of a procedure for resolving the conflict has been found!

"Eighteen months ago, while on a mission for the French Government in Tunis, I told the leaders of the Arab League: After Lebanon, the next on the list of victims of aggression is Kuwait. And, in fact: two-thirds of Lebanon has been occupied by Syria, and 10 percent of its territory, by Israel, and the Arab League, the USSR, and the United States have swallowed this. A dangerous precedent had already been created, consequently.... But what was possible yesterday is utterly impracticable today....

"I do not wish for the umpteenth time to expatiate on the oil interests of the Americans and West Europeans in the

Near East region—this is obvious. I will emphasize something else: Regardless of the extent of our participation in the military escalation in connection with the events in Kuwait, we Europeans are already in one way or another indirectly involved in this conflict....

"From the very outset the French Government emphatically opposed one state treacherously attacking another. The French Government's position is clear: Before negotiations with Saddam Husayn, we demand the release of the hostages and the evacuation of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. I personally, however, take a somewhat longer view than the official one (whether it is more consummate is another matter). Simultaneously with a solution of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict we need to find a way out of the Lebanon crisis and the Palestinian impasse. The Gordian Knot cannot, of course, be cut all at once. But we need to adopt a decision on Kuwait which at least does not conflict in the future with a solution of other Near East problems.

Iraqi Link To Cairo Terrorist Attack Mooted

PM1610092990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Oct 90 First Edition p 5

[Correspondent V. Belyakov dispatch: "Murder in Cairo"]

[Excerpts] Cairo, 13 Oct—Yesterday Rif'at al-Mahjub, speaker of the Egyptian People's Assembly, was murdered in the Egyptian capital. [passage omitted].

It is, of course, still too early to say with certainty who sent the assassins. However, the first thing that comes to mind in connection with this crime is the large amount of material published in recent days in the local press, where it was claimed that a group of terrorists had slipped into Egypt from Iraq on false passports with the aim of organizing assassinations of Egyptian political figures. Some of these terrorists have been unmasked and arrested; the others, according to information in the press, are still hiding from the authorities.

Paper Reports Lebanese 'Rebel' 'Awn Ouster

PM1610093990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Lashkul report under the "Events, Facts, Opinions" rubric: "Downfall of Rebel General 'Awn"]

[Excerpt] Yet another military dictatorship has fallen. General 'Awn, former head of the transitional military cabinet in Lebanon, who for over two years has refused to obey the country's lawful government, has called on troop units loyal to him to obey the orders of Armed Forces Commander Emile Lahhud from now on. The order to surrender was sent to them from the French ambassador's residence in East Beirut, where the rebel general has now taken refuge.

Let us recall that 'Awn found himself in power after vain attempts by the Lebanese to find a compromise during the election of a lawful president in September 1988. The cabinet he headed rejected all Arab League proposals for a settlement in Lebanon, giving as the reason for this rejection an unwillingness to have Syrian forces in the country.

Republic President Ilyas al-Hirawi, wishing to put a decisive end to the anarchy in the country—one of the causes of which was the refusal of 'Awn's supporters to obey the central authorities—sent a request to the command of the Syrian contingent of the inter-Arab armed forces in Lebanon for military support in restraining the rebels.

After government forces surrounded 'Awn's group, and the Syrian Air Force bombed the presidential palace in B'abda and the Defense Ministry in al-Yarzah, which had been taken over by 'Awn supporters, the rebel chiefs were forced to flee with their inner circle in a tank to the French Embassy, where they requested political asylum. [passage omitted].

'Awn's Defeat Blow to Saddam

LD1510203790 Moscow TASS in English 1957 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS political analyst Albert Balabanov]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The elimination of General 'Awn's armed group in Lebanon is an event of signal importance to a country torn apart by a civil war lasting more than 15 years. It will surely affect the situation both in Lebanon and the entire Middle East.

President Ilias al-Hrawi's appeal to Syria for help in suppressing 'Awn's rebellion illustrates that country's considerable influence in Lebanon. The impression is that Lebanon's leadership has concluded that it will never be able to end the enmity between the country's religious communities without outside military assistance.

The Lebanese Government was compelled to use force in East Beirut in order to normalise the situation in the country. The government armed forces acted fast and effectively with active support from Syrian troops which are already in control in both parts of the Lebanese capital, convincingly showing that their presence is a stabilising factor.

The routing of the army led by General Michel 'Awn, whose activity was leading Lebanon towards complete disintegration, offers actual chances for the step-by-step implementation of the plan for a political settlement in the country, approved by Lebanese parliamentarians in at-Ta'if.

'Awn's rebellion cost the country very dearly: Thousands of people have been killed or wounded, colossal material damage has been inflicted on Lebanon, the peace process has slowed down.

'Awn's defeat illustrated Lebanese determination to press for overcoming the crisis by building up the authority of the national reconciliation government, consolidating respect for the constitution and reviving the capability of all state bodies paralysed by the civil war.

Lebanon needs today, as never before, to rally its people around the central government—the only legitimate power in the country in order to help the prompt reconciliation of antagonistic groups and the pooling of their efforts to restore the economy shattered by the war.

The United Nations can play a considerable role in this as they have repeatedly proclaimed themselves in favour of Lebanon's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within internationally recognised boundaries.

Yet another aspect should not be overlooked: 'Awn's downfall is a major success of the forces denouncing Iraq's forceful annexation of Kuwait. President Saddam Husayn has lost one of his trump cards: Baghdad generously supplied arms to Michel 'Awn in exchange for his support for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

Gorbachev Cable to Syria's Al-Asad Marks Treaty

PM0910105790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Message from President Mikhail Gorbachev to Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad on the 10th anniversary of the Soviet-Syrian friendship and cooperation treaty]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Hafiz al-Asad, president, the Syrian Arab Republic.

On the 10th anniversary of signing the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Syrian Arab Republic, I send to you, Comrade President, as well as the friendly people of Syria, my sincerest congratulations.

I wish to express satisfaction with the level of the Soviet-Syrian relations. I am certain that, on the basis of the 1980 treaty, the partnership between our countries must continue to be strengthened and improved during the current international conditions to serve the interests of the Soviet Union and Syria.

I wish the people of the Syrian Arab Republic happiness, prosperity, and the attainment of peace and stability in the Near East.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev.

West Europe

Gorbachev To Visit Spain, France 25-29 Oct

AU1510164590 Paris AFP in English 1554 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow, Oct 15 (AFP) — Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev will visit Spain and France between October 25 and 29, the spokesman for the president's office, Vitaliy Ignatenko, told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE here Monday.

He said Mr. Gorbachev would visit Spain first, then France, but would not give specific dates and times.

According to recent statements from Soviet officials, Moscow wants to conclude a cooperation treaty with France which takes account of recent power shifts in Europe, similar to a Soviet-German treaty now being finalised.

Mr. Gorbachev has been planning to visit Spain for some time, but the trip has been postponed several times.

Shevardnadze Postpones Swiss Counterpart's Visit

LD1510184190 Bern International Service in English 1530 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] The Soviet Union has postponed a visit to Moscow by Swiss Foreign Minister Rene Felber which was scheduled to begin later this month. A Swiss Foreign Ministry spokesman said Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had informed Mr. Felber about the postponement in a letter. The spokesman said Mr. Shevardnadze wrote that he had learned last Friday that he would have to accompany President Mikhail Gorbachev on a foreign trip. Mr. Shevardnadze said he was sorry to postpone the visit at such short notice.

The Swiss spokesman said the Foreign Ministry in Bern was considering several alternative dates given by Mr. Shevardnadze to reschedule the visit before the end of this year.

Laptev Receives Nordic Council Delegation

LD1510204190 Moscow TASS in English 1957 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The chairman of the Soviet parliament's Council of the Union, Ivan Laptev, today received a delegation from the Nordic Council, led by President of the Council Presidium Pal Petursson.

The delegation had arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet parliament.

The sides discussed the development of contacts between the Soviet parliament and the legislatures of Nordic countries and some European issues connected with the forthcoming summit of countries participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Civil Defense Delegation Ends Visit to Sweden

LD0810053190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1439 GMT 7 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Taras Lariokhin]

[Excerpts] Stockholm, 7 Oct (TASS)—The visit to Sweden by Soviet civil defense experts was devoted to the development of bilateral cooperation on such humanitarian matters as protecting the population during and in the aftermath of natural disasters and accidents. The delegation was led by Army General V.L. Govorov, USSR deputy minister of defense and civil defense chief.

The Soviet representatives learned of the activity of the national rescue department. During a trip around the country, they visited rescue training centers and attended demonstration exercises, including units of Stockholm's fire department. The Soviet delegation were greatly impressed with the skill of units of the Swedish rescue service and the level to which they are technically equipped. Army General V.L. Govorov was received by Roine Carlsson, the Swedish defense minister. [passage omitted]

The Soviet delegation left for home today.

Latin America & Caribbean

More War Veterans To Receive Treatment in Cuba

PM1510152990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Cuba Receives Internationalist Servicemen for Treatment"]

[Text] Dushanbe—Thirty internationalist servicemen from Tajikistan who were seriously injured in the Afghan war left for Cuba today to undergo rehabilitation.

In accordance with a bilateral agreement between the Cuban Republic and the USSR, over 300 former "Afghans" from many cities in the country have already undergone such treatment in the big Franco Pais Orthopedic Clinic in Havana. The Cuban side is bearing all the costs of treating the Soviet internationalist servicemen.

Frolov Receives Former Mexican President

PM1210153990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Meeting in Editor's Office"]

[Text] Yesterday I.T. Frolov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and chief editor of PRAVDA, received Miguel de la Madrid, director general of the Mexican Economic Cultural Foundation and former Mexican president. A discussion took place on problems regarding Soviet-Mexican cultural and scientific contacts and on perestroyka's progress in the Soviet Union.

New Ambassador to Chile Appointed

LD1510094290 Moscow TASS in English 0806 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—Yuriy Pavlov has been appointed to serve as Soviet ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Chile.

A Russian born in 1931, he graduated from the Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 1954.

Pavlov served as an envoy-counsellor in the Soviet Embassy in Australia between 1976-1980, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry's Second European Department between 1980-1982, ambassador to Costa Rica between 1982-1987, and head of the Foreign Ministry's first Latin American Department between 1987-1989.

In 1989, he was made chief of the Foreign Ministry's Directorate for Latin American Countries.

Supreme Soviet

Shevardnadze Addresses Supreme Soviet 15 Oct

LD1510223590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1840 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Report on the address by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on the work of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 15 October—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Opening the joint session of the Supreme Soviet session today, Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov informed the deputies of the issues examined at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and has reported on the schedule of the parliament's work for this week. After that the deputies began to examine the question of the present international situation and the USSR Foreign Ministry's work to ensure the country's interests and security. Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze made a report.

[Shevardnadze] Today's processes and tendencies have demanded a very complicated and at the same time very tough schedule of movement by foreign policy. Falling behind means not simply falling away from the world's general current but also losing the opportunity to ensure our own interests in solving the problems that are vitally important to our state. I do not want it to be thought that this is forcing us to hurry and to adjust to someone else's timetable. We have not done this and do not intend to do it.

At the same time, however, one cannot ignore the fact that there is the objectively—I stress this—objectively defined pace, the rhythm of international life we too should follow if we want to fully realize our interests. In the world much is being determined by the natural development and regular logic of events. The processes that have developed in Europe—whether it is the changes in its eastern part, the unification of the two German states, or the formation of new concepts about ways of ensuring European security—have precisely this objective, historically determined character.

What has happened in Europe and the world is what should have happened. I must repeat: A great nation cannot forever remain divided. The East European countries could not help but restore their full sovereignty and move toward democratic forms of government. That these processes are taking place in a controversial and very often a painfully difficult way is a different question. With such historical developments the task of current foreign policy is to defend the interests of the state, the Soviet people, and the Soviet citizens to the maximum possible degree.

At all stages of the negotiating process their voices were louder for us than all the others. The voices of the living and the fallen, the voices of our fathers and of our children. At all stages the factor of the historical past predetermined views of the future. Let no one think that feelings stemming from their personal experience and from the historical fate common to the whole people are alien to politicians. We are not the only ones to speak openly of this. It would be no bad thing also to listen to those who, apart from feelings and (?opinions), have for more than 40 years lived with the complex of a divided nation. They speak of the wave of gratitude to the Soviet Union that has arisen in Germany, and particularly noticeable in this feeling, by the way, is the joy regarding the fact that this process, I am quoting Willy Brandt, this process is proceeding without conflicts, and with a strong Soviet Army, for everything could have occurred quite differently. I would also like you to take note of the statements of the chancellor, of Genscher, and of other serious politicians in Germany. Indeed, everything could have taken place differently. Under the old ways, it would have been fraught—let us call a spade a spade—with military confrontation, and that means with a catastrophic undermining of the country's security. We did everything to prevent this from happening.

What we did is to be assessed and accepted by you, and only by you, the supreme gathering of people's power. In the coming days—Anatoliy Ivanovich [Lukyanov] has spoken of this—the government will submit treaties, and other agreements and documents relating to the German settlement, to the USSR Supreme Soviet for ratification. These are a treaty on a settlement with regard to Germany; a treaty that was developed within the framework of the two-plus-four mechanism; a treaty on partnership, good-neighborliness, and cooperation between the USSR and Germany—this is the so-called grand treaty; a treaty with Germany on developing wide-ranging cooperation in the field of the economy, industry, and science and technology; a treaty with Germany on the conditions for the presence and planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territory; and on agreement on transitional economic measures in connection with the unification of the FRG and the GDR.

The Foreign Ministry is prepared to provide any explanations required, orally or in writing, on any questions, and to furnish relevant information and documentation in response to requests from the Supreme Soviet, committees, and individual deputies. First of all I can and must say this: The settlement with Germany could only be achieved, and was achieved, solely within the framework of the transition to a new model for the arrangement in Europe, one that differs substantially and qualitatively from the postwar arrangement. May I remind you that previously it was based on a split in Europe, on a military confrontation. Face to face, right next to each other, were forces having battlefield nuclear weapons at their disposal. Until the very recent past, Europe's security was in practice based on the doctrine of balancing on the verge of a war involving nuclear weapons. Acute conflicts would arise periodically over West Berlin. To reckon that the system of security that took shape in the years of the cold war was totally in line with our interests or guaranteed peace for our people would, therefore, either mean telling deliberate untruths or deluding oneself and failing to see the real dangers. A radical change in the military-strategic and political situation in Europe is being brought about by the German settlement. This means that a dispersal of troops is taking place, and after Soviet troops have been withdrawn from East Germany there will be no military stand-off anywhere in Europe. The numbers of Bundeswehr troops will be reduced substantially, to 370,000 men, and the numbers of U.S. troops in Europe will be reduced considerably. In November, at a summit in Paris, a declaration will be adopted—please note, this is a particularly important point—on new relations between states that are part of the military-political unions confronting each other, and which, as the draft says, will not view each other as enemies, will not be the first to use force or threaten force, will build new relations of partnership and stretch out the hand of friendship to each other.

The transformation of NATO has started and is being implemented. The strategy and doctrine of this bloc are being subjected to review, including the doctrines of flexible response and forward-based defense. The number of military exercises is being reduced. Talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will start. According to the treaty on the settlement of Germany, there will be no foreign military presence on the territory of the former GDR after the departure of Soviet troops; neither nuclear arms nor any other type of weapons of mass destruction will be deployed there. The renunciation by a united Germany of the production, acquisition, and possession of such forms of weapons is confirmed.

According to the so-called grand treaty with Germany, which has already been initialed and which will soon be signed, the parties take upon themselves far-reaching obligations in the sphere of mutual security. Since deputies are raising the German question so intensively, I want to stress especially that apart from Germany's legal and treaty obligation to conduct its affairs in such a way that no threat to peace arises from its territory, we are also receiving material and physical guarantees of this: the low—in particular—the low numerical strength of troops and weapons, and the renunciation of the more dangerous kinds of weapons.

At the same time new all-European security structures are being set up. These are based on levels of troops and weapons throughout Europe which are consistently being reduced, and on broad measures to strengthen trust in the military sphere.

An all-European center to avert and regulate conflicts is being established—you recall that these initiatives on forming such a center have been repeatedly advanced by our leadership, in particular by our president in the course of various visits—which, by means of a special mechanism, will acquire the fullest possible information about the military activity of European states.

The institution of regular summit meetings and conferences of foreign ministers of CSCE participant states is being introduced. These conferences are acquiring the character of permanent institutions, of permanent mechanisms.

Other bodies of the Helsinki process will be created, too, including a secretariat and a parliamentary assembly. All these are not simply proposals, they are not simply ideas, but a draft agreed in New York by the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries participating in the Helsinki process.

The working out of a treaty on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe is now nearing completion in Vienna at the talks among 23 countries. Here one can talk about a genuine breakthrough, one can talk without exaggeration about a genuine breakthrough which has been achieved thanks to Soviet-U.S. cooperation and to cooperation with all our partners. During talks with Secretary of State Baker in New York the last obstacles have been overcome—the main obstacles have been overcome to the conclusion of a treaty. The levels of a major reduction of tanks artillery systems, armored fighting vehicles, aircraft, and helicopters have been established. In other words a firm foundation is being laid down for what we have been striving for since 1986 when Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev put forward the idea of a common European home. This is being built and will be built, esteemed deputies, and if I speak about this, if I speak about this absolutely frankly and directly, if we cope with our internal difficulties we will be able to be worthy partners of others in this truly historic cause. If internal instability does not undermine this process, then we shall have every reason to talk about moving toward a new civilization.

I know that questions have also occurred to deputies about how social problems linked with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany are being resolved. In accordance with the agreement between the governments of the USSR and the FRG which was signed in Bonn on 9 October of this year concerning certain transitional measures, Germany is making available a total sum of 15 billion marks to finance the temporary presence of Soviet troops, transport costs in connection with their withdrawal, and also the construction of housing for Soviet servicemen. This includes 12 billion as an outright contribution and 3 billion as an interest-free credit to be repaid in five years' time.

This is the breakdown of these sums. Perhaps we need to have an idea about the structure of these allocations, as it were. For the maintenance of Soviet troops, their personnel, and members of their families during the period from 1991 to 1994—3 billion marks without repayment and 3 billion as credit. For the implementation of a special program of housing construction on the territory of the European part of the USSR amounting to 4 million sqaure meters of housing space during the period 1991-94—7 billion German marks without repayment. These funds are intended for special purpose projects, the expansion of towns, of town-type settlements, and the construction during 1991-92 of four housing construction combines with a capacity of 100,000 square meters per year each. It is envisaged that within the confines of this sum and of the Soviet side's own contribution different variants of construction of residential housing, housing combines, and enterprises for the production of construction materials might be implemented. The main task is to build as many well-equipped flats as possible for our servicemen and the members of their families.

In addition, 200 million marks are being allocated without repayment for the training and retraining of Soviet servicemen who have been discharged into the reserve and of members of their families with the aim of teaching them a skill in the motherland. The detailed conditions of implementing the retraining program which will be carried out in training centers located as a rule in the territory of the USSR will be defined by a mixed working group taking account of the requirements of the Soviet labor market. The USSR Ministry of Defense, jointly with the Ministry of External Economic Relations, has already begun the competitive selection of proposals by foreign firms for the construction of housing. The deputies will, of course, receive all the documents relating to the German settlement. But we would ask you to judge it not just on the basis of the merits of the accords that have been attained, but in the context of the transformations which are taking place in Europe as a whole within the context of the Helsinki process and mutual relations between the two alliances.

The approval of the treaties with Germany cannot be assessed otherwise than as the approval of our general policy in European and world affairs.

[Announcer] Then the USSR minister of foreign affairs dwelt in detail on the issues linked to the situation in the Persian Gulf.

[Shevardnadze] The current moment of foreign policy is a traditional one, a kind of set expression. It would be more correct to say a turbulent, explosive moment with unpredictable consequences. It was made so by the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait and by the annexation of this sovereign country. About five years ago we could not act the way we are acting now, and it is unlikely that we would want to act in such a way. Throughout the cold war, all means were considered acceptable; now that this war has come to an end, the time spent on global confrontation has been cleared for cooperation and interaction. We are cooperating and interacting in full conformity with declared principles, and together with the entire civilized world. Our position of principle is known, comrades. There are statements by our country's president and by the Soviet Government. I talked about the attitude to the crisis at the Supreme Soviet while expounding on the results of the meeting between the USSR and U.S. presidents in Helsinki. There were also speeches by the Soviet minister in New York at the UN General Assembly session and in the Security Council. I know that what I said about the possibility of using, in principle, a Soviet military contingent in the composition of the multinational forces—if they are formed on the decision of the UN Security Council—this has evoked a question. It is not surprising that questions have arisen. With regard to this I can state the following: The Soviet Union, as a permanent member of the Security Council and according to the UN Charter, bears particular responsibility for upholding international peace and security. The same responsibility was also laid upon other members of this international body. But none of them, including us, can act outside its own national legal practice. This is specifically stipulated in a number of documents, and it is an axiom. In other words, the decision whether to send a contingent or not is made by the highest legislative body of this or that country. There is also a decision of the Congress of People's Deputies with regard to this. I did not consider it necessary to cite these elementary provisions.

Now about the particulars of a matter of no small importance. We should have a full picture of these particulars, these details. I mean the formation of the necessary security systems and structures for the future. So far not all the provisions of the UN Charter have been realized. For example, the work of the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council which should be formed from the chiefs of the general staffs of the five permanent members of the council or their representatives has not received further development. This is a very important body. I shall attempt to say something about this. The Military Staff Committee is called upon to prepare recommendations for the Security Council in all those cases where the matter under consideration represents a threat to international peace and security. The Charter contains a provision according to which the Security Council with the help of the Military Staff Committee should conclude a special agreement with the five permanent members of the Security Council about placing at the disposal of the council military units which could be used in efforts to supress aggression and restore peace.

If you do not mind, I am passing all the questions to my assistants who are classifying them because there are repeats sometimes. By the way, this is also an issue, it seems that we should be perfecting this practice. I know for example that when the ministers of foreign affairs, finance, justice, and so on are speaking before the parliaments. And in commissions, accordingly there are prominent specialists—lawyers, experts and so on—sitting nearby. There is nothing awkward about this. I do not want to say that I am not capable of answering all the questions, but it never hurts to get an extra consultation. This will not be possible today, they are simply classifying. But generally we should, by the way, introduce such a practice in the future. Is this right? And now I am still continuing to make my position more precise.

What does the Military Staff Committee deal with? What should this committee deal with? After the conclusion of an agreement with the states the appropriate formations are placed at the disposal of the council and can be used for actions to crush aggression and restore peace. This is enshrined in the Charter, this is stated in the Charter. These units can consist of volunteers or they can be formed on a contractual basis. I repeat: this whole machinery, comrades, can be created only in accordance with the constitutional legislation of each country. Any minister of foreign affairs knows this as the legislator of any country knows it. It is hardly necessary to try to convince anyone that they do not know it.

This is not 1979, the year of a big tragedy, of the dispatch, when the decision was made to dispatch our troops to Afghanistan. Any use of troops outside the country will require the decision of the Supreme Soviet. This is the only way, the only way; there is no other way. Until such time as the Military Staff Committee fulfills the functions defined for it by the Charter, and the Security Council concludes the appropriate agreements with the five permanent members of the Security Council, this machinery does not function.

Before the question of the participation of Soviet troops can theoretically arise, I wish to say straightaway that there are no plans on the part of the Soviet leadership to take part in military operations, and there is no intention to do so either. Regarding events in the Persian Gulf—before the question of the participation of Soviet troops in a UN operation to curb aggression can arise in theory, the machinery envisaged by the Charter must be created, and all the decisions must be made with your consent. As a permanent member of the council, the Soviet Union has the right of veto, and can block any use of force via the UN organization.

The Charter ensures for each state the right to collective defense. Applied to the present crisis, this means that the United States and other states juridically, I stress juridically, can use force on the basis of the request by the legitimate government of Kuwait. Kuwait appealed with such a request to the United States. If any machinery existed for the collective repulsion of aggression, then Kuwait could count on this machinery, on the Security Council, on the appropriate structures of collective security. Thus, what is of concern today is the future model of behavior in situations the potential of which was so tragically displayed in August of this year. This is too cruel a lesson, comrades, for us to leave unchanged the present structures of maintaining the peace.

We have to determine our position, to see what is more sensible and reliable—collective actions within the framework of the Security Council, or unilateral measures which arouse a feeling of non-acceptance among many. You know about this, too.

Our principled line has consisted and continues to consist of the view that it is preferable to maintain just law and order in the world, from any point of view, by collective efforts on the solid legal foundation of the UN Charter. The Soviet Union is taking part in them. Our officers act in the capacity of UN observers and it is a practice that already exists. We extended businesslike support to the UN Namibia operation, thanks to which the people of that country won their independence. Perhaps the question will be raised of our participation in a similar UN operation for establishing peace in Cambodia. Perhaps the contours will appear of prospects for holding free elections in Afghanistan. As yet mutual understanding on an accord has not been reached. But if this prospect, this idea, is realized, then certainly the participation of the United Nations will be needed. Perhaps, in this connection, a similar question will arise. Whether we like it or not, real life convinces us that in certain situations, for the maintenance of law and order in the world, force can be required, force founded on law, force (?which takes away from the world the right to use force). At the very least, a mechanism for the use of force and for enforcement measures, a mechanism which is legitimate from the point of view of international law, ought to be in force. For the past five years we have aspired by word and deed to establish the primacy of the force of politics over the politics of force. I have in mind the norm. But when we come up against an anomaly, or even pathology in international affairs, as minister of foreign affairs I have the right and obligation to propose such a form of action as meets the interests of the country, together with my colleagues.

The country's interests demand the defense of the life, health, honor, and dignity of its citizens wherever they might be. Even more necessary are measures for the sure defense of those citizens who find themselves in a zone of potential military conflict. At no stage in the development of events in the Persian Gulf zone has our attention to the situation, to the safety of Soviet specialists in Kuwait and Iraq slackened—the attention of the whole Soviet leadership and of the president of the country, that is. All possible political and diplomatic means, direct talks with the representatives of Iraq and contacts with third-countries, are being used. As you well know, the commission headed by Comrade Igor Sergeyevich Belousov is working actively. In this respect the results were undoubtedly important. Important results ensued from the visit by Comrade Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov and Comrade Belousov to Baghdad. I must say, for the sake of objectivity and fairness, that the Iraqi side is showing its well-known understanding of our anxieties and concern. We shall continue to act firmly and objectively.

[Announcer] Not all of the deputies consider the almost hour-long speech by the head of the foreign affairs department exhaustive, and Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze had to answer many questions. A number of deputies put forward a proposal to limit themselves to the adoption of the resolution based on the report by the USSR minister of foreign affairs and make do with no debate, but this was not supported. Nine deputies spoke during the afternoon sitting. For the first time a serious, sharp discussion went on in parliament on all the fundamental directions of Soviet foreign policy. Deputy Petrushenko expressed the view that the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union are today guaranteed by means of unfounded, one-sided concessions. The speaker gave the examples of the thousands of millions spent on the withdrawal of forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and the loss of the Krasnoyarsk radar station. The speaker complained that Army political workers cannot keep pace with the reshaping of political views, of the Foreign Ministry. Other deputies spoke of the official Soviet line on foreign policy in a less categorical, but on the whole negative, way. Deputy Alksnis, on the issue of German unification, devoted particular attention to the underrating of the danger of calls by German revanchists to reestablish the borders of the Reich of 1937. In the opinion of Deputy Kogan, the Soviet Union's participation in military operations against Iraq within the framework of the United Nations would bring about a marked worsening not only of relations with this country, but also with a number of Arab and Muslim states. Deputy Kim stressed that the judgements expressed are not in accord with the viewpoint of the deputies' group Soyuz. He put forward a series of concrete proposals on how best to organize joint action between parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Deputy Yablokov raised the question of the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in tackling ecological problems. He stressed the need to join international conventions on conservation of the environment and to alter foreign policy in connection with these international decisions. Deputies Borovik, Suleymenov, and Velikhov spoke in defense of the Soviet Union's current strategy in international affairs. Deputy Starovoytova stated that if the people support anyone in the government today, then it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its line that it supports. The discussion demonstrated that the Supreme Soviet is able not only to take cognizance of already adopted decisions, but is capable of taking the responsibility upon itself—and in connection with this, quite a few suggestions were put forward on how to ensure that deputies are kept fully informed about the steps which the ministry is undertaking or planning.

Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze made a closing speech. He replied to a number of questions raised in deputies' speeches, and expressed his conviction about the need to establish close and systematic cooperation between parliament and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Discusses Foreign Policymaking

LD1510125190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 15 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] We begin this bulletin with a report from the Kremlin where the two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet are in joint session. [passage omitted]

USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze delivered a report. Among other things he said the following:

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] The starting position which I have stated more than once in my report and speeches to you remains unchanged. The foreign policy of our state is structured in the way the country's Supreme Soviet decides. This is why it is exceptionally important for us to establish and maintain the greatest possible mutual understanding on world development trends and on the aims and possibilities of foreign policy from the viewpoint of ensuring the country's interests. At the last meeting this was seen in terms of maintaining international peace and security, developing constructive cooperation and maintaining civilized contacts with other states.

The distinctive feature of our time—the great dynamic of change—demands that we pursue a very mobile and at the same time comprehensively considered and intelligent foreign policy. If lagging behind the demands of life costs a lot in domestic policy, its external price is simply inordinate. [end recording]

Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze answered numerous questions from the deputies, after which the parliamentarians began discussing the issue. The session continues.

Calls for Nuclear-Free Baltic Sea

LD1510112590 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The Soviet Union could renounce the peacetime deployment of nuclear weapons on its ships and warplanes in the Baltic Sea and air space over it "on a permanent or temporary basis", Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told parliament today.

Explaining Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free Baltic Sea, he also suggested that Western countries, for their part, renounce "without any exception" visits by surface ships and submarines with nuclear weapons on board to the Baltic Sea and flights by air force planes with such weapons over it.

"We are convinced that such a decision would help further increase stability in Europe as a whole, especially in its north," Shevardnadze said.

He recalled that as a first unilateral step in this direction, the Soviet Union has pledged to destroy all ballistic nuclear missile subs known in the West as Golf's, which are deployed in the Baltic Sea, by the end of 1990.

"We have fulfilled this commitment: The last of such submarines was destroyed several days ago," Shevardnadze said.

Details Conventional Arms Limits

LD1510200190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Announcer] What does the principle of arms sufficiency mean for our country? The figures have been given for the first time.

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] According to the treaty, the highest levels of sufficiency for one country in Europe will be established for the USSR. In other words, no one in Europe will have more arms than we do. I have in mind countries taken separately.

These levels look like this: For helicopters, 37.5 percent; for tanks, 33.3—if you are interested in the quantitative level, that is 13,300 units; for armored combat vehicles, 33.3—20,000 units; for artillery 34.3—over 13,000; for aircraft, 35 to 36 percent, or 5,150 units. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Discusses Kuril Islands Issue

LD1510113390 Moscow TASS in English 1108 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—There are neither legal nor historical grounds for transferring the four Soviet islands in the smaller Kuril chain to Japan, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told parliament today.

The four islands are Kabomai, Iturup, Kunashir and Shikotan.

Answering questions from members of parliament, Shevardnadze said that talks are under way on a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan, which covers the issue of the location of the border.

"As far as these islands are concerned, the issue of their transfer does not stand. We are not considering such an option," he said.

Reminding deputies of President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan, Shevardnadze said that the programme of the visit, which is currently being prepared, "does not include this issue because we believe that there are neither legal nor historical or any other grounds for laying claims to the Soviet Union".

On the joint exploitation of these islands with Japan and the creation of joint ventures there, Shevardnadze said: "This is another matter."

"Such issues can be considered in relation to these islands and other territories of the Soviet Union," he said.

Shevardnadze Holds News Conference After Speech

LD1610015690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 15 Oct 90

["Excerpt" of a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists by Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze at the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin in Moscow on 15 October—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Today at the USSR Supreme Soviet a news conference was held for Soviet and foreign journalists by Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, the country's minister of foreign affairs. Listen to a small excerpt from this news conference.

[Begin recording] [IAN correspondent] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY. The conviction exists that the Warsaw Pact has in fact ceased to exist. At the same time, it has been reported that there is soon to be a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. What would you evaluate as being the main long-term task at the next meeting?

[Shevardnadze] The Warsaw Pact has not ceased to exist. The pact does exist. It is another matter that a great deal of work—very painstaking and complicated, I would say—is under way to transform the Warsaw Pact. Considerations have been drawn up, especially with regard to the military aspects. They will be discussed in the next few days, at an expert level, in Warsaw. And then these considerations will be presented at the meeting in Budapest. At this summit meeting, we will ultimately clarify our positions—I mean all the allied countries; we will define at a summit meeting what the Warsaw Pact will be like, what its nature will be, and how the process of transformation will go ahead in the future.

[Zaripov] Zaripov, KOMSOMOLETS. Today, on the part of some deputies in uniform, criticism was heard that was levelled at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Is that a direct indication of the fact that differences have begun to show between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense? And what lies at the root of them, if that is the case: the loss of orders profitable for the military-industrial complex, or are there other reasons? Thank you.

[Shevardnadze] As far as differences between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense and other ministries are concerned, you know, I would not like to talk about differences. This is our routine everyday work if we have discussions, or if we have arguments. I did not have the opportunity today—and time limits do not allow me—to comment on all the treaties and agreements that have been concluded over the last few years on issues of security and disarmament. All the positions implemented by Soviet delegations were defined with the participation of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives of the Defense Council, and all other interested departments. I would particularly like to note as a positive phenomenon the participation of our leading scientists—major specialists in the process of forming the Soviet Union's negotiating positions. So let us not talk about differences. But we do have discussions, and I think it is a good thing that we have discussions.

[BALTIMORE SUN correspondent, in English with superimposed Russian translation] BALTIMORE SUN newspaper. As you know, the point of view exists in the West among some people that the new political thinking emerged as a result of economic weaknesses in the Soviet Union. Can you answer, or comment on this theory now?

[Shevardnadze] That is not right. That is not correct. The new political thinking is our conviction, our philosophy. That is our view of the world, if you like. This is the policy achieved by us, through much suffering, in the process of perestroyka. It is another matter that it does indeed correspond to the interests of economic, social, and cultural development both in our country and in all other states.

[AFP correspondent, in French with superimposed Russian translation] AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE. Eduard Amvrosiyevich, this morning you found yourself under a barrage of fairly serious criticism on the part of the deputies. That was resolved fairly unexpectedly with the announcement of the award fo the Nobel Peace Prize to Mikhail Sergeyevich. How do you appraise a paradox like this, such a contradiction between the foreign policy assessments from within and from without? Thank you.

[Shevardnadze] I do not like the words: under a barrage of criticism, and so forth. You live in Moscow. You know what kind of criticism we have, so to speak, and the level of criticism and the atmosphere and all the rest. I think that that is a completely normal state of affairs when deputies express their comments—including critical ones, and very often in a fairly pointed form—with regard to such a sensitive sphere as foreign policy. Why does that still occur? There was much that follows, perhaps, from the fact that not all the deputies have the necessary information. It seems to me that discussion—including heated discussion on these problems, the problems of foreign policy—is a completely normal phenomenon. We strove for this when we spoke about democratization, about a rule-of-law state. Now we are receiving the corresponding reaction. True, that is not always pleasant. But this is what happens in all civilized, democratic countries. There is pointed criticism. But there was not only criticism: there was support, very active support.

On the fact that Comrade Gorbachev has been awarded the prize, the Nobel prize—I have already spoken about that, about the fact that it reflects the general mood in the world and the mood of the world community. It seems to me that this is a recognition of the good foundations, of the objectivity, of the scientific nature of the foreign policy that the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership, is conducting in the world arena. [end recording]

Remarks on Gorbachev's Nobel Prize

LD1510162190 Moscow TASS in English 1514 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov and Boris Zverev]

[Excerpts] Moscow October 15 TASS—The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Mikhail Gorbachev was described as "a great event" by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today.

Shevardnadze was speaking at a news conference following his report to the Soviet parliament on the work of his ministry.

The award signifies "a very high appraisal of Mikhail Gorbachev's personal contribution to the formation of a new political order on earth, the shaping of the Soviet Union's new foreign policy and the promotion of new relations between the states and nations in Europe and the whole world," Shevardnadze said.

The award, Shevardnadze said, will "stimulate the president to more persistently pursue the perestroika policy aimed at the renewal of our society, at reforming it." [passage omitted]

Asked about the Soviet stance on the Gulf crisis, Shevardnadze said he favoured the activity by the five permanent U.N. Security Council member-countries, as well as by other countries within the framework of the resolutions already approved by the Security Council.

On Presidential Council member Yevgeniy Primakov's talks in Iraq and prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis, he said "I do not want to expand on the matter and discuss it in public at this point."

On Mikhail Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Spain, Shevardnadze said that "the problem has been solved in principle, but the date will be announced later." He added that the "question is being worked upon."

Supreme Soviet Approves Foreign Ministry Policies

LD1510184490 Moscow TASS in English 1824 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The Soviet parliament today approved, by a majority vote, the international policies being implemented by the Foreign Ministry.

The vote came after Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze spent a total of two hours briefing deputies on the policies. Judging by the number of questions following his nearly one-hour report, far from everyone found it exhaustive enough.

Most questions concerned the ministry's position on the Gulf crisis, German reunification and Soviet-U.S. relations.

The occasion was far from a walk-over for Shevardnadze, who received a grilling from some deputies critical of the Soviet Union's "concessions" on a number of issues.

Nikolay Petrushenko claimed that national interests were being jeopardized by "unwarranted unilateral concessions".

Deputies Yevgeniy Kogan and Viktor Alksns were also critical, this time on the official line on German reunification.

The vast majority of deputies' backing for present foreign policies and new thinking, however, was vividly demonstrated by the general applause greeting the news of Mikhail Gorbachev having been awarded the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize.

Genrikh Borovik, Yevgeniy Velikhov and Olzhas Suleimenov, in particular, argued in favour of present policies.

Parliament then approved in principle a draft resolution on international policies, instructing the Foreign Ministry to continue to ensure national interests and security now that the cold war is over. The document will be finalised with account taken of deputies' suggestions.

Deputies Approve Local Government, Economy Bill

LD1510185790 Moscow TASS in English 1830 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov, Boris Zverev, Ivan Ivanov, and Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The Soviet parliament today approved the first reading of a bill amending the earlier-adopted law "On Fundamentals of Local Self-Government and Local Economy".

The bill proclaims decisions of superior councils of people's deputies, taken within the range of their competence, binding for subordinate councils.

The amendment became necessary after many new local councils, elected in spring, declared their independence from superior councils, provoking numerous conflicts.

The chairman of the parliamentary committee for councils, administration and self-government, Nikolay Pivovarov, told parliament that the proposal to amend the law had been made by the Russian parliament after it on Wednesday adopted the law "On Relations Between Councils of People's Deputies and Executive Bodies During the Economic Reform".

Pivovarov said that the amendments "in no way contradict the law but only make it clear-cut and specific".

He emphasised that councils' independence was possible "only on issues included in the range of their competence, established on the basis of legislative acts and democratic procedures".

After a brief discussion, during which no objections were raised, the parliament approved the first reading of the bill.

The legislature then discussed the request of Aleksandr Sukharev, the country's prosecutor-general, to relieve him of his post.

This issue sparked a heated debate in parliament. Finally, the parliament met Sukharev's request, which is yet to be approved by the Congress of Peoples Deputies.

The parliament instructed some of its standing committees to "give an assessment to the legal situation in the country and submit proposals on the issue".

In the next two days, parliamentary committees and commissions will discuss a draft programme for the Soviet economy's transition to market realtions.

On Thursday, a number of committees will have a joint meeting to discuss the draft.

Parliament chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov told legislators that President Gorbachev is expected to address parliament on the draft programme on Friday.

Lukyanov Criticizes Deputy for Comments on Cuba

LD1510131890 Moscow TASS in English 1300 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—A Soviet parliamentary deputy today called the Cuban regime "totalitarian" but was immediately rebuked by the parliament speaker.

After Deputy Olzhas Suleymenov from Kazakhsan in Central Asia made his remarks in a Supreme Soviet debate on foreign policy issues, speaker Anatoliy Lukyanov stepped in to dissociate parliament from the statement.

"This pronouncement by Deputy Suleymenov is insulting to the friendly Cuban people, and Supreme Soviet members strongly condemn it and dissociate themselves from it," he said later.

Gorbachev Briefs Chamber Leaders on Economic Plan

LD1510210490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] A conversation took place today in the Kremlin between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and chairmen of the country's Supreme Soviet committees and the permanent commissions of the chambers and other members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, during which the participants in the meeting were informed about the key points of basic draft guidelines for the stabilization of the national economy and the transition to market relations, which have been drawn up under the guidance of the president.

An exchange of views took place on the procedures and forms of studying the draft being presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the setting up of an efficient mechanism of introducing market relations while simultaneously settling the issues relating to drawing up the plan for the budget for 1991. These are measures for the recovery of the country's economic situation, the consolidation of all the democratic forces in our society in the complicated conditions of the present-day state in its development.

Taking part in the meeting were Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Laptev and Nishanov, the chairman of the chambers.

Gorbachev To Submit Economic Plan 16 October

LD1510165190 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov, Boris Zverev, Ivan Ivanov, and Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow October 15 TASS—The programme for the USSR's transfer to the market will be submitted to committees and commissions of the Soviet parliament on Tuesday, parliament chairman Antoliy Lukyanov told parliament today. Previously it was planned that the deputies would begin to discuss the document today.

In reply to one question, he briefed lawmakers on the course of work on the programme. Lukyanov said that on Friday the document was handed to "leading committees" of the Supreme Soviet. Committees worked together with Academician Abel Aganbegyan (who was instructed to make a single programme out of the provisions of several programmes) and drafted several amendments. Amendments to the document were also made after Saturday's meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and leaders of Union republics.

Today, Lukyanov said, Gorbachev met members of the parliament presidium and (?chairman) of parliamentary committees and commissions to discuss this issue. They also made new amendments.

Gorbachev will sign the programme later today, Lukyanov added.

Work of Supreme Soviet Committees Reported

PM1510135590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Oct 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Committee Session"]

[Text] A session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions was held in Moscow 11 October.

Reports were heard from the commission for the study of statements made in the press by O.D. Kalugin and also from committee members examining the statement by USSR People's Deputy S.V. Belozertsev and the articles in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and PRAVDA about movements of units and subunits of airborne troops.

A broad exchange of opinions took place. The speakers made a whole series of proposals on the work of the USSR KGB, which it was recommended be taken into account when drafting the law on USSR state security organs.

Members of the Committee for Questions of Glasnost and Citizens' Rights and Appeals and representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, and the mass media also spoke about S.V. Belozertsev's statement.

The discussion will be continued.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Awarded 1990 Nobel Peace Prize

LD1510121290 Moscow TASS in English 1142 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Oslo October 15 TASS—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev won the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize, the Norwegian parliament's Nobel Committee announced today.

Gorbachev was cited for his "leading role in the peace process which today characterises important parts of the international community".

"The greater openness he has brought about in Soviet society has also helped promote international trust," the citation said.

"During the last few years dramatic changes have taken place in the relationship between East and West. Confrontation has been replaced by negotiations.... These historic changes spring from several factors, but in 1990 the Nobel Committee wants to honour Mikhail Gorbachev for his many and decisive contributions," it said.

Gorbachev Interviewed on Award

LD1510170290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 15 Oct 90

["Television interview" by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to foreign and domestic correspondents with an unidentified moderator; in Moscow on 15 October—recorded; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [E. Sagalayev, State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, Gosteleradio] Mikhail Sergeyevich, we have found out—look, present here are four of the biggest television companies in the world, beginning with the Norwegian, which was the first to discover that this had happened; also here is the Japanese company NHK, the U.S. company ABC, and Gosteleradio, Soviet Television, the program "Vremya." We have all found out that you have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and every journalist has questions of his own. But we would like to find out your feelings, your impressions, and the way you feel and think about this magnificent piece of news.

[Gorbachev] Well, the first thing that I would like to say is to confirm that this news is indeed true. I have just received the ambassador of Norway, and he informed me of the decision of the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize Committee, and of the fact that behind this decision, as he said, there are certain reasons. It was published at 1100 Oslo local time, at 1300 Moscow time.

What can I say? At a time like this it is difficult to find the right words. Nevertheless, I will try to do so. First and foremost, as a human being, I am profoundly moved and thrilled about this decision, and I do not want to hide this. But I interpret this action taken by a most prestigious organization of the world community not in personal terms, but above all in terms of the recognition of the immense value and of the immense importance that the cause which we call perestroyka has for the future of the whole world. I think that this was of decisive importance for the adoption of this final decision. This very important committee, as we know, always reaches its decisions in a thorough way. That is the first thing.

Second, when we embarked on our perestroyka, we thought... [Gorbachev changes thought] Above all we wanted at that time to be understood correctly. We wanted it to be understood that above all we ourselves need this perestroyka. We reached the conclusion that we could not go on like that any longer, that we needed deep transformations in all walks of life. Such was the will of the people. Taking it as our starting point we began to elaborate our policy and to take action. But already then we wanted it to be understood correctly that what we would do was and would be of enormous importance for all countries and the whole world, because this is happening in a vast country such as ours, a country which plays an enormous role and which shoulders a special responsibility before the world community.

[G.-V. Steinfeldt, Norwegian Television] Mikhail Sergeyevich, three years ago I filmed you on the streets of Prague, which was a quite different Prague from today, and the people shouted to you: Misha, stay with us! Well, Misha, are you coming to stay with us in Norway on 10 December, when the Nobel Prize is awarded?

[Gorbachev] Yes, like all Nobel Prize winners, I do not lay claim to any exceptions, and I will be in Norway.

[Steinfeldt] Do you think that you, nevertheless, represent a continuation of the intellectual tradition represented by Sakharov, who was the first Soviet Nobel Prize winner?

[Gorbachev] I would like to reply to your question, approaching it from broader positions. I think that in recent years there has been a very profound, crucial, anxious, intellectual quest under way in the world for answers to what life itself has put forward. What has been occurring in the world, in every country, has been of concern to all peoples, and primarily the intelligentsia, as those who give expression to every nation, as their spiritual mentors, and it seems to me that the reason why perestroyka itself, the new thinking, was received with such solidarity, and gained such powerful support, which was unexpected even for all of us at first, was because the world had become ripe for changes.

It had become tired of the cold war, of the arms race, of those burdens which are connected with the overload of problems, of the contemporary problems of our world community. It needed new policies, a new direction, new aims, and I think that this is the main thing. I value highly everyone who has made a contribution toward this, to the search for such an answer to the question. I consider that academician Sakharov was among their ranks, in the first, as it were, ranks of these seekers for answers to the questions worrying people.

[Moderator] NHK, go ahead.

[K. Kobayashi, NHK-TV Japan] Mikhail Sergeyevich, I congratulate you. tell me please, this question is a little early, but who would you recommend as candidates for the next peace prize—I mean the Nobel one—for next year.

[Moderator] You do have the right, as prize winner, to make recommendations.

[Gorbachev] You know, I would put it like this. Both last year and this year there were candidates—to my knowledge, as far as I know, as in this capacity over the past three years the news has reached me in one way or another—all of the people were worthy. I think that the Nobel committee is an organization that will make the correct decision next year as well.

[J. Laurie, ABC-TV, in English, with superimposed Russian translation] As you know, many economic problems exist in the Soviet Union. What do you think, in what way, to what extent will your award, the Nobel award, influence the situation in the country? Will it help people in any way, and in what way should it have an influence? What do you think?

[Gorbachev] I think first and foremost it will undoubtedly have an influence on an emotional and intellectual level. For this is, generally speaking, an evaluation, as I have already said, of the matters with which we are engaged. All the more so as this prize coincides in time with a most crucial stage of perestroyka. We are on the eve of profound changes and reforms in relation to life itself, and in as far as the economy's transition to the market is concerned.

We are now on the threshold of profound changes and reforms of life itself as well as the transition of the economy to the market. We are on the threshold of profound changes in our Union. Now, as we debate a great deal, and toughly and mercilessly raise questions regarding all these spheres, I think that these decisions we are now working out and what we are going to do are so fateful, that any question can justifiably be asked in any, even the toughest manner. Because it is our destiny, that of such a huge state, it is the destiny of the whole world, too, in view of the role about which I have spoken. We cannot simply copy someone. Therefore I have said that the award of the prize is support for our efforts, and this action, this act, is inspiring. I am confident, I am confident. This sustains my position, my mood, my intellectual, emotional, and physical feeling that we are on the right road. But the turn we are taking, the changes which we are implementing, are very profound. You know, it is only the superficial painting and plastering work that can be done without changing anything in the house, but when it is a question of capital overhaul then one needs to think a bit and change a lot. Here too, it will not be done easily, without pain, but it is necessary. We now have the understanding that these decisive steps must be taken in a tight schedule, and then the process of the build-up of positive changes will get under way. I hope that our people, as a result of thought and realistic appraisal of the situation, will continue on this road, and—this nation has been fated to undergo trials repeatedly—will do this so that in the next few years, in the near future already the road may be cleared for positive changes in society.

[D. Kiselev, Gosteleradio] Thank you. Mikhail Sergeyevich, you are the first Communist to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, and you are the first East European politician in power to have received such a lofty prize. Hitherto this prize was received in East Europe by politicians in opposition, like, say, Lech Walesa or Andrey Sakharov, whom my colleague mentioned. How do you feel in this company of laureates?

[Gorbachev] I feel all right because the award of this outstanding prize to me coincides already in time with what we call another Europe, another Soviet Union, another world, and because it is with these changes that the award of the latest Nobel Peace Prize is connected, that is, what has happened today should already be regarded in the context of today's real world. Despite all the drama of the events that are taking place within the framework of these changes, which already embrace not only the Soviet Union and East Europe, but the whole of Europe, and we may say the entire world, people have even started saying in the United States that we, too, should be thinking about what needs to be restructured.

[Correspondent] Is it infectious? [laughter]

[Gorbachev] No, I think that it is a matter of those changes that are taking place on a basis of common human values, the things that unite people, and this is evidence that people realize that they can move toward a better life together by cooperating. I have to say that this is true here, too. If you just look or, perhaps, if someone has just arrived in our country, he might be confused by it. There is such a variety of views, so many different views, and yet, at the same time, there is already a realization, a realization that the changes must be continued, that this course must be adhered to, that we must be rid of negative tendencies and reinforce and give strong backing to positive changes, both in the economy and in the transformation of the multinational state and in all other areas. Consensus, consolidation: These today are the most—well, I do not want to use thse words, but I will, since it is hard to find the right words off the top of my head—are the most fashionable words, but it is not just a fashion, and I hear them from all sides, from all sectors of public opinion in our country.

[Correspondent] Peace within the country?

[Gorbachev] Peace within the country. Peace within the country. This realization is a source of great inspiration to me, so I look upon this calmly, but with great satisfaction, too, and I think that this event is shared by all those who are now sincerely in favor of our great cause being successful.

[Correspondent] There is less fear both in the world and in our country. People who are less frightened at heart are different people, who live slightly differently. What more do you intend to do, Mikhail Sergeyevich?

[Gorbachev] To continue with the cause and the course we are taking now. To continue. Moreover, on this day I am more conscious than ever of my responsibility to make perestroyka within the country succeed in the interests of our people, and to ensure that the new thinking yields fresh and wonderful fruit.

Gorbachev Issues Decree on Higher Education

PM1610101090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

["Decree of the USSR President on the Status of Higher Educational Establishments"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text]The success of the profound social and economic transformations under way in the country, and the moral and spiritual progress of society depend to a large extent on the culture and constant creative development of the personality of every Soviet person. The solution of this task demands a free and efficient functioning of the whole public education system, including that in Higher Educational Establishments [VUZ].

In the new social and political situation brought about by the transition to a market economy, the quality of training of specialists and academic teaching cadres, and the effectiveness of the scholarly and teaching work of the VUZ's are determined by their level of legal and economic security, stable support from the state, and an increase in the public value of education and professional training.

With the aims of creating the necessary conditions for a growth in the intellectual potential of society, and for an increase in the people's level of education and culture, I consider it necessary:

1. At the invitation of VUZ's to grant them the status of self-governing (autonomous) organizations, functioning on the basis of their own rules elaborated in accordance with the legislation of the USSR and the union republics.

Such status may be granted to a VUZ by means of its accreditation through a decision of the Union or republican body administering public education, with the rules being registered in accordance with the established procedure.

2. To hand over the basic assets and other state property in use by those VUZ's which have gained autonomy in accordance with Article 1 of the current decree as their exclusive property, having defined the status of the latter in conformity with Article 17 of the USSR law "on ownership in the USSR."

3. To recommend that the USSR Supreme Soviet acknowledge the provisions of the present decree when examining the draft foundations of USSR and Union republican legislation on public education.

4. When drawing up a state program for the development of higher education in the USSR, the USSR Council of Ministers is make provisions for a procedure for accrediting VUZ's, the extent to which higher education is to be funded out of the Union budget, the establishment of standards for education and development, and the conditions for financing Union educational, social, and scientific programs.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow, Kremlin
12 October 1990

Soviet German Official Detained in Moscow

LD1510144190 Berlin ADN International Service in German 1343 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The press center of "Renaissance," the Union Society of Soviet Germans, said today that the detention of Alfred Schollenberg is an intimidation and discrimination campaign against the society. The deputy executive chairman was detained on the previous day by eight members of the KGB state security service in the Moscow hotel "Molodezhnaya". Schollenberg is accused of a particularly grave case of looting state property and of violating foreign currency regulations.

A press center spokesman for the society told ADN they rejected the charge of foreign currency violation. There is nothing specific regarding the other accusation. Alfred Schollenberg was badly beaten up. He will soon be taken to Novosibirsk, his place of residence. Criminal proceedings against him have already been instituted.

The spokesman of the Soviet Germans said that shots were fired at the window of the detainee's apartment last week. Heinrich Grouth, chairman of the "Renaissance" Society, considers the incident to be "a component part of a political scenario" shortly before the Society's Union congress in Moscow 11-15 December this year.

Further Reportage on Speeches at CPSU CC Plenum

Kirov's Osminin Questions Market

PM1610085690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 First Edition pp 5-6

["Text" of speech delivered at 9 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by S.A. Osminin, first secretary of Kirov Oblast Party Committee]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] In our view, the proposed program for the transition to a market economy correctly identifies the key link which should be grasped in order to draw forth a whole chain of events—namely, improving economic relations. Only by improving economic relations is it possible to accelerate technical progress, the provision of incentives for labor, and the utilization of the resources at our disposal. But one thing is not clear: Why is the proposed program described as a concept for the transition to the market? If it all boils down to the market, this is patently a mistake that is giving rise to many doubts, contradictions, and opinions. The market has always been nothing more than a means of achieving a certain goal. It served the slave-owning system, the feudal system, and the bourgeois system, and clearly could also serve socialism.

The transition to the market has been received cautiously in the localities. Some people interpret the transition as a return to capitalism. They even contrast October 1990 to October 1917, regarding it as a revanche. Others foresee a flourishing of unbridled economic activity and scope for initiative and enterprise within the framework of a socialist formation.

I think the Central Committee should state clearly and definitely that the market is not an end in itself, but only a means of renewing the socialist society's economic relations.

The party has been left behind in the course of the search for ways out of the crisis. I do not think that this was done maliciously, but I agree with those who have spoken here who think that this was a very serious political blunder on our part. Such major transformations require a comprehensive interpretation, and, most importantly, active support. Otherwise they are doomed to failure, which has happened before. After all, we are talking about the country's future, profound structural changes in the economy, and ultimately about our social system.

Today more than ever before we need a well-tried party position on the innovations that have begun. Do we support them unequivocally, or do we make substantial amendments to them?

I think it is necessary critically to evaluate the scale and time scale for privatization. The program proposes in the space of 400 days or so to hand over to the ownership of entrepreneurs 56 percent of fixed capital in industry, 75 percent of construction potential, 65 percent of agricultural property, and 80 percent of property in the trade and service sphere. Privatization on this scale is hardly realistic, or indeed necessary. It is necessary to take into account the obvious fact that the production base of many state enterprises grew up, in general, in a nonmarket form. The country is like a huge plant where production, supplies, and sale of output form part of a single manufacturing cycle and a very complex infrastructure has been created. I think no more than one-third of state ownership can be subject to privatization in the planned time frame. That will be a guarantee of the stability of our social formation.

Privatization should take place on a strictly voluntary basis, which is not mentioned in the program, with the consent of the labor collectives through the local soviets. In other words: First the property subject to privatization should be handed over to the local soviets, and then the question of the future of that property should be resolved. First the sovietization of ownership should take place, and then privatization should be tackled. This measure will make it possible to strengthen the role of the soviets at all levels and rule out possible mistakes in the implementation of the reforms.

There is particular concern about land. This has already been mentioned here, and I fully support the speakers' position to the effect that the land, like the air and water, being the people's asset, cannot be subject to buying and selling. It is immoral to break up a common asset into private plots and sow dissension and inequality among people. The problem is not that the land has no master, the problem is that our peasant has no rights. Give him the freedom to manage, give him the freedom to enjoy the results of his labor, give him a guarantee of unlimited possession of the land—and he will show himself worthy both in collective farming and in personal or private [fermerskiy] farming. It is not the plowman who wants land to be bought and sold, it is the speculator and the adventurist. And indeed, we are not ready, comrades, to sell off the land. We have no land survey data, and consequently there is no objective cost evaluation of the land, and this cannot be done in the next six months, as the program stipulates. The value of the land cannot be established in that time, still less the value of what lies beneath it.

At major turning points in history the party should say honestly that the renewal process will be complex, that the entire burden of reforms will fall on the working people's shoulders, and that everyone will have to adapt rapidly to the new conditions. At the same time people should be confident that the party will staunchly defend our citizens' social rights. The fact is that many of the social guarantees in the program look merely declarative. There are many interesting ideas in the package of urgent draft legislative acts. But there is only one document about employment—or rather, unemployment—aimed at protecting the working person's social rights; no other urgent documents are proposed.

There are no proposals on the procedure and time scale for introducing a minimum consumer budget, which should form the basis of the reform of labor remuneration and pension provision. I would even say that we should begin the reform and all the associated actions by establishing and introducing a minimum consumer budget which would guarantee in our country a minimum level of hire for anyone and a minimum standard of living for anyone, student or pensioner, invalid or large family.

Social guarantees are not on offer for students and graduates of vocational and technical schools, technical colleges, and higher educational establishments. Nor are there any guarantees, comrades, for the working person. The concept of wage indexation is being introduced, but whenever wages are increased in line with market forces, this wage increase is to be funded by the enterprises. But do the enterprises have such funds? For instance, in Kirov Oblast one-third of kolkhozes and sovkhozes [collective and state farms] are today on the brink of economic collapse. Is there any possibility of carrying out this index-linking at the expense of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz and bringing wages into line with the price situation on the market? There are no guarantees on this score, and nothing is mentioned in the program on offer.

It would be apposite to put to the government a legislative initiative for strengthening the social protection of particular strata of the population, particularly young people, women, veterans, and workers in agriculture and industry.

The report correctly formulated the party organizations' tasks in the conditions of the new economic relations. It is particularly important to prepare Communists, and indeed all the working people, to accept the coming changes.

Some work is being done in Kirov Oblast, we have already printed the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program, held conferences with the aktiv, and assembled the propagandists, and work is now in progress in the party organizations. But it must be said that the tension and anxiety are not declining. People are asking very many worrying questions. All this is because the level of knowledge of the substance of the problems which we are discussing and which we are planning to introduce now is very low in the labor collectives. We are well aware that all this is only the start of the complex work of emerging from the crisis. After all, with the renewal of economic relations, people themselves must be renewed. And that is always a difficult task. It is even more difficult because we have no time for a slow start and no room to maneuver.

Think about it, comrades, this is the situation: If Communists reject the reforms without proposing an alternative, they will inevitably find themselves in the conservative camp. If the reforms grind to a halt, once again the full force of the blow will fall on the Communists, because they are the country's leadership. This means that there is only one path for us—the path of energetically improving economic relations for our people's sake.

Armenian Speaker on Party's Role

PM1610105490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 First Edition p 7

["Text" of speech delivered at 9 October session of CPSU Central Committee plenum by Yu.I. Mkrtumyan, head of a Yerevan State University Department]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The most important question to have been raised at this plenum is the problem of the transition to market relations. Many Communists in Armenia unequivocally think that it is necessary to transfer to market relations. But the point is that concrete mechanisms—organizational, political, and economic—have to be elaborated to ensure that the transition to the market is effected in the interests of all society, in the interests of broad strata of working people. If working people's situation deteriorates still further as a result of the transition to the market, this naturally cannot bring our party honor or prestige.

I think that the transition to market relations is necessary today and may be the economic foundation for the implementation and realization of the new political course in our society. That is why I think that we should vote in favor of the market, which would bring positive results in a comparatively very short time. Provided that shadow economy bigwigs who have accumulated vast capital by dishonest means do not take possession of all the key positions during the transition to the market and become even richer while working people's position deteriorates still further.

Broaching the question of the market, people here have rightly noted that it is in some ways a return to the NEP [New Economic Policy]. Over the last 70 years we have artificially tried to promote the formation and development of a new socioeconomic formation. Practice has shown the bankruptcy of that concept and today we must develop our own models on the basis of life's realities and not on the basis of any ideological and political dogmas. I do not think that there is any need to expand on these theses. We understand one another well here. The fact that many of our concepts and many of our plans were cut off from life's realities has brought failure and disaster.

A word about my attitude to social and political organizations—both formal and informal. I must voice my dissatisfaction here at the fact that many people have very frequently described the actions of many formal and informal organizations as extremist, nationalist, and separatist. We are very willing and very eager to pin labels on many organizations and describe them as destructive. Tell me please, was not our Communist Party's activity in the sphere of leadership of our country's economy—and not only the economy—destructive, causing the economy to disintegrate, did we not bankrupt ourselves politically and effectively discredit the ideas of socialism and communism? The ideas of socialism and communism are a panhuman achievement, the achievement of the civilized world, but we desecrated and discredited them by the way in which we implemented these lofty ideals espoused by mankind, and many people today want to absolutely renounce these ideas.

We must take a very well-considered approach to these opinions, we must not rush to pin labels on various formal or informal organizations. A number of informal organizations in Armenia whom the central press, PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and others, described as extremist, nationalist, separatist and so on hold power in Armenia today and are backed by many strata of working people. Now when we compare our articles of a year ago with those of today, we are conscious of our bias because we were trying to discredit them rather than to understand what they want. I would like to point out that many informal organizations are also trying to help our society escape from the crisis. There is no need to seek enemies among them, there is no need to seek adversaries. We must agree with them in criticizing the past and cooperate with them in the future. That is why I urge you to ensure that we stop pinning these labels on organizations in our documents so that we can consolidate all our positive forces to extricate society from its current situation. [passage omitted]

Armenia is in the throes of a very harsh blockade, all vitally important products are running out. Neither the general secretary nor any of the participants in the current plenum have said a word about this at the plenum. This causes dissatisfaction. You realize that this concerns all of us. I sincerely want those people who read the plenum materials to understand that a Communist, particularly a member of the CPSU Central Committee—whatever republic he represents—has an objective perception of various peoples' concerns and problems. Otherwise it looks as though each of us is still taking a narrow view, acting in the interests of his own people. Then each of us willy-nilly becomes a "separatist," a person who only raises various questions on the basis of his own national interests. Yet if questions are raised here by Communists from other republics, it would be possible to discuss both general and specific questions in a more fruitful and well-considered way.

That is why I think that our speeches should touch on the highly acute problems troubling our peoples in various parts of our country—in the Baltic, the Transcaucasus, and other regions of our country—irrespective of our nationality.

Another important point. Let me say a word about intraparty life. We have said here that a very great deal of attention must be devoted to intraparty work today; what are we going to do to boost our party's prestige and ensure that our decisions are of vitally important significance and benefit to the people? The people will understand and appreciate this. At any rate I must point out that the intraparty system is very sick today. Through our actions we often wreck intraparty work and party organs' activity. For instance, how can we be indifferent to the fact that party rayon committees [raykoms] in Nagorno-Karabakh are being disbanded as a result of a decision adoped by republic organs. We have not said anything about these issues today. Party raykom first secretaries are being expelled from the party. They are totally out of the picture. Organizational committees are replacing both soviet power and party organs, and so on. Under these conditions we have no right to be indifferent to these questions. I think that the new party Central Committee has something to say in this respect.

Here are a few suggestions. Mikhail Sergeyevich, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the party Central Committee should become an active effective organ. It should not meet for a day or two twice or three times a year to discuss issues. We should meet for longer. This will make it possible to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the situation and formulate constructive proposals.

A party Central Committee plenum should also be prepared by the Central Committee commissions that will be elected at our plenum today. Every commission will submit its proposals regarding the agenda and we will then have a chance to have a more reasoned discussion here.

Finally, I think that when we meet for a short while, Politburo and Secretariat members should speak less (they do this at Politburo and Secretariat sittings) and rank-and-file Communists and CPSU Central Committee members speak more; they can raise and comprehensively analyze highly diverse problems in the life of the party and society, thus democratizing the Central Committee and rendering its activity more topical.

Labor Leader Opposes Privatization

PM1510134390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Oct 90 First Edition p 5

["Text" of speech delivered at 9 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by A.A. Pigarin, director of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions All-Union Scientific Center for Labor Organization]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! The fate of our people, the fate of socialism, and the fate of the party depend on the decisions the country's leadership will adopt in the immediate future. It seems to me that today we are underestimating the danger hanging over us, first and foremost the danger of anticommunism. At the same time mistaken decisions, it is my profound conviction, could lead to a situation in which in a year's time a plenum of another party could be gathering here in this hall. I do not wish to frighten either myself or you, but it seems to me that this is the reality. I am convinced that to ensure that our party remains a vanguard, ruling party and does not move into opposition and, even worse, cease to exist, as has happened in many East European countries, we need to fulfill three conditions. The first is to immediately halt any further decline in the people's living standard. The second is to restore executive power while we still have this power in our hands. The third is to adopt a precise political position on all questions of the country's life.

First, the preservation of living standards. No matter what programs we adopt or what we say, it is perfectly clear in my view that the party will not remain in power unless we do this. You may ask: Is this possible?

Throughout the last year I have been putting this absolutely naive question to the most diverse economists and cannot get an answer. Who of our leading economist-leaders—Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, for example—can explain to me why the people must pay for perestroyka and why, on top of everything else, we have to suffer yet another period of declining living standards. Experts on the government program estimate that as a result of the implementation of the Shatalin program popular consumption will decline by 20-30 percent, while their opponents say the same about the government program. But why is this necessary at all?

For in the final analysis the people's living standard depends not on the level of prices or the level of wages but on the total volume of goods and services the country has at its disposal, that it produces.

Pushkin once said through one of his heroes that he knew "...what makes a state rich and why it does not need gold when it has a simple product." So surely we are not planning a reduction in consumer goods production this year? Maybe we are planning one for next year? What is going on?

Of course it is necessary to impose order in the economy. It therefore seems to me that instead of the unlimited hyperinflation toward which the implementation of the Shatalin program will lead us, and instead of the regulated inflation that the government is urging upon us, we need the immediate implementation of stringent anti-inflation measures. First it is essential to restore disrupted economic relationships, and I fully support the presidential decree adopted on this question. Second, it is necessary to impose stringent anti-inflationary restrictions on prices and incomes growth. Third, there is a need for monetary reform aimed against the nouveau riche who have accumulated hundreds of thousands and millions of rubles.

It seems to me that the Shatalin program is unsuitable on precisely this criterion because it will inevitably lead to a decline in living standards over a protracted period, notwithstanding the loud promises made in its introductory paragraphs. The government program is considerably more flexible and milder, but ultimately it too fails to provide guarantees against the same result.

I would put it as follows: The party's fate and the people's fate are inseparably linked at precisely this decisive point. This is true not only ideologically but also literally because if the party prevents a deterioration of life it will continue to be linked with the people but if it fails to resolve this task the people will go their own way.

On executive power: I believe that we can level the most serious complaints against the president and the government for failing to fulfill their duty to maintain law and order in the country and support the norms of the constitution. In the context of executive power it is absolutely impossible to pose the question as to whether it is democratic or not democratic. Legislative power and the country's societal life must be democratic, I would say most democratic. But executive power must be mild or firm precisely to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation of adopted laws.

I would therefore support the granting of emergency powers to the president in the sphere of executive power, although I am not opposed [PRAVDA Second Edition for 14 October carries a note on page 8 correcting this passage to read "I am opposed"] to emergency powers in the field of legislative power, particularly in terms of changing the ownership laws. However, I would like to remind Mikhail Sergeyevich that at the first plenum after the 28th congress he also informed us with satisfaction that he had signed a decree which will make it possible to impose order in the mass media and television. But what has been happening in the last few months? Is yet another decree really necessary? Fine, provided only that it works.

Yesterday I listened enthusiastically to Comrade Nenashev's speech; he told us that in his view a wave of common sense is building in society. And those who watch television, which Comrade Nenashev is in charge of, can see this for themselves. Yesterday he gave valuable instructions to party organization secretaries that their main task today is to organize civic accord and the reconciliation and consolidation of forces. I would be grateful to Comrade Nenashev if he would show us this being done on Central Television. And if he achieves civic accord with Nevzorov, I am prepared to achieve civic accord with—I do not know—Afanasyev, say. And if he cannot reach accord with Nevzorov, let him at least try with the people from "Vzglyad," who are liberals and social democrats, after all, not monarchists, and in any case are a bit more intelligent.

Yesterday there was a great deal of talk about the press and criticism of the mass media, and I fully subscribe to it, but best of all let us impose order in the press that belongs to the party. Tell me, if you will, which paper carried the following lines: "We adults are passing on to our children a country where there is a shortage of everything from socks to fresh ideas; where neither work nor education are revered; where many of the 35 million citizens who have served sentences behind barbed wire are prepared to implant the morals of the wolf pack. We did not ask our children whether they wanted to be born in such a country." Which paper said: "People's Commissar for Education Lunacharskiy, who has been exalted by our propaganda,... was a liar..." Might this have been written in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI? It was in fact written in PRAVDA as recently as the day before yesterday.

And another example from the day before yesterday: Both MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and PRAVDA published brief commentaries which, in addition to the question of private ownership of the land, also made positive assessments of the draft ownership law submitted for examination by the Russian Supreme Soviet. I realize that this is a very sensitive and delicate question and one should not intensify confrontation, but I would like to offer you a few sentences from the explanatory note attached to this document:

"The application of the law will require a substantial change in the status of social organizations, including political parties. The essence of the matter is that the draft law deems legal only social organizations which have been registered as legal entities with declared statutory property. Therefore from the moment the law comes into force all social organizations, including political parties, lose the chance of owning property and carrying out economic activity on its basis. Legalization of their property status is possible only on the basis of a revision of their statutes and their subsequent reregistration with the organs of state power."

Let me now put myself in the place of a Communist who is a Russian Supreme Soviet deputy. After reading the commentaries in PRAVDA and MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA what attitude should I take to the ownership law? Should I vote for it?

What I have read to you is a quotation from the official explanatory note; this is not something I have made up.

Therefore it primarily up to us ourselves to identify where we stand politically.

I fully agree that in implementing strategic decisions and determining the principles of economic reform we must rely on the 28th CPSU Congress decisions; decisions we all adopted together. Let me say outright that these decisions are pretty elastic and their limits are set broadly—this is precisely why many people are critical of them; but let us at least fit into this framework! Because the ownership question is the main question.

The 28th congress' program statement talks about the acceptability of precisely workforce private property.

Tell me, if you will, has any of you heard the term "workforce" private property since the congress—in statements by our leaders or the press? No? No. By contrast, did we hear the word "privatization" at the 28th congress? No, we did not.

The need to develop collective ownership of the means of production, ownership by labor collectives, is written into the 28th congress decisions. Instead of this Grigoriy

Alekseyevich Yavlinskiy, whom I very much respect as a very intelligent person—I do not know whether he is here today—wrote frankly in the "400 days" program: "It is necessary to discard illusions about various forms of so-called collective ownership in industry and transport, including the leasing of enterprises by labor collectives. Leasing of enterprises to labor collectives is practised only if it is impossible to sell them to persons or legal entities." This was subsequently toned down in the "500 days" program and then transformed into 10 percent of shares in the Shatalin program and to collective ownership of 23 billion rubles-worth of property in the government program—which is less than 2.5 percent of the value of industrial fixed capital.

The 28th congress decisions say the following about state ownership: "State ownership must be transformed from formalistic bureaucratic ownership into public ownership administered by working people themselves on the basis of existing legislation." But what do we see? We see proposals for state ownership not to be transformed into public ownership but essentially to be liquidated, because the "500 days" program leaves in state ownership a minimum number of sectors, including the defense and power industry complexes, 49 percent of which are subject to stock flotation.

I would like to say that there is no going back to the old system, either. It is dead. It is impossible to go back to a rigid, centralized, bureaucratic, antidemocratic system where all decisions come only from the top downward. But the question of the market is equivalent to the question of the state. It is indeed unavoidable. The question is: What kind of state and what kind of market? This is what people are arguing about. But the way the question should be put is: Surely the market in the United States today is not the same as the market in Bangladesh or Sweden? Even within the framework of the same system there are dozens of variations of market relationships. And it is absolutely wrong to link the question of the market with the question of ownership. Who said that a market can exist only if private property is involved? Why can the participants in a market, fully responsible for their economic performance and with a vested interest in its results, not be enterprises based on decentralized ownership—not only collective, incidentally, but Union, republic, and municipal ownership alike bearing responsibility for end results?

I would like to say that I support the Law on Ownership in the USSR adopted only recently—this year—which envisages the decentralization and democratization of ownership.

And a last point. Mikhail Sergeyevich, you will excuse me for the figurative comparison, but it is not so unflattering. Throughout recent months I have constantly compared your strategy both on the Baltic republics and on our own rightists—social democrats, liberals, and anticommunists—with the strategy of Field Marshal Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov. But the battle of Borodino has already been fought!

Kalmyk's Bamayev Sees 'Emergency'

PM1510162990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 First Edition pp 4-5

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by V. Kh. Bambayev, secretary of the Kalmyk Republic Party Committee]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Comrades! Today the truth about the situation in the country is bound to be dependent on who this truth is called upon to serve. We have a duty to tell people honestly that it is defined as an emergency. It is simply dangerous for the country to go on, not to say lurch on, as before.

It is clear that some forces allergic to communism who loudly describe themselves as democrats have long since turned into the godfathers of chaos and anarchy.

A legislative harness of irresponsibility is being strapped around the political life of society, and the shadowy noose of speculation is being slung around the economy. What do the people's real interests matter when whole republics have become hostages to political ambitions and disputes in the struggle for power. Immoralism—the denial of moral foundations and generally accepted norms of conduct in society and a nihilistic attitude to any moral principles—is beginning to grow in the country, criminal and economic crime is mounting, and speculation is assuming unprecedented dimensions. [passage omitted]

The transfer of the economy to market relationships means unswerving compliance with the economic laws of society's development. It is another matter that for a long time we rejected commodity-money relationships whereas now we recognize them. New laws are also needed here. The present moment is so serious that, although we may not be weather forecasters, we have a duty, comrades, to tell the people which way the wind is blowing. It is my conviction that the time has come to provide Communists, the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the entire Soviet people with an explanation of the situation in the country in connection with the economy's transition to market relationships. [passage omitted]

Our perestroyka will only be worth anything if it is able to defend itself not only against slander and misrepresentation but also against direct calls for physical reprisals against undesirables. To offer a rebuff today the party needs more than ever not functionaries but intellectuals, leaders, and enterprising people. [passage omitted]

The most serious question that, let us say, scares people is the specter of famine and increases in prices for food, particularly meat, milk, bread, vegetables, and so forth. In such conditions the party Central Committee plenum will be doing the right thing, I believe, if it provides all the citizens of the country and the soviets of people's deputies with an explanation of the situation that is taking shape and adopts measures to immediately allocate city dwellers land for truck gardens and dachas so that every yard not only in the countryside but also, where possible, in the city, is not left without livestock, sheep, or poultry. The question is as follows: Either people have to provide their own meat, milk, vegetables, and potatoes or they have to buy, say, meat in the shops at 10 rubles and more a kilogram, not to mention the prices on the kolkhoz [collective farm] market.

I understand the Sverdlovsk Oblast party committee first secretary, who spoke before me. A delegation from there is already at work in our republic trying to find 18,000 tonnes of meat, but I think that Sverdlovsk people could do a great deal for themselves today.

This is a program for today, even without recalling that we have fallen behind. In every city, region, and soviet of people's deputies it is necessary to decide how much land, feed, livestock, and poultry need to be allocated to the population to offset the upcoming food difficulties. Disagreeable though we may find it, ration cards or coupons for basic foodstuffs will probably have to be introduced in Kalmykia too. Hitherto we have held back from this. But it has become obvious that measures to protect our own consumers must be taken.

In 1990 the republic has produced more than 2,700 kg of grain per capita, and last year alone we produced 171 kg of meat per person. And these results did not produce themselves. The whole point is that back in 1987, after the situation was given coverage in "Perestroyka Spotlight," the republic began to adopt leaseholding, cooperatives, and family and peasant farms on a broad front. Today de facto all plowland and livestock are leased or in cooperatives. [passage omitted]

The prevalent view in the republic is that there must be cooperative and collective farms and property belonging to the collective. Nor is there any particular concern about private ownership of the means of production, denationalization, or privatization. The one thing that cannot be privately owned is land. It is evident that in Kalmykia land will be the people's property and will not be an object to be bought and sold. It will be made available to people to hold and use on a limited- or unlimited-duration, heritable basis. This is the view of the people living on it.

The same conclusion was reached by the republic supreme soviet commissions which examined the draft Kalmyk ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Law on Land. Incidentally, these commissions heard what seems to me to be a sensible proposal meriting attention in the context of the republic state sovereignty decisions currently being adopted. On 18 October Kalmykia will also be adopting such a declaration. Its point is, while developing horizontal relations in every way, to no less persistently strengthen the vertical structure—that is, the transfer upward by the republic of certain rights, including on fundamental questions of the elaboration of legislation. The settlement of fundamental legal principles in the form of fundamentals of legislation will be delegated to the USSR, the elaboration of specific laws on the basis of USSR legislation will be delegated to the Russian Federation, while Kalmykia will adopt normative enactments on certain features of the application of these laws in the conditions of the republic. An increasing number of people are leaning toward proclaiming the republic a free economic enterprise zone within the context of sovereignty.

In conditions of market relationships it is difficult to develop without capital investments from outside. Not only will there be contacts with foreign firms—we are already developing these—but there are also good opportunities for ties with individual regions of the country. People in the republic understand their responsibilities to the country. It fulfilled its plans for deliveries to the Union-republic fund both last year and this. But where, one wonders, is their reciprocal responsibility?

Tomsk's Pomorov on Market Decision

PM1510113490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Oct 90 First Edition p 2

["Text" of speech delivered at 9 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by A.A. Pomorov, first secretary of Tomsk Oblast Party Committee]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! It seems to me that we should devote this afternoon to a very detailed discussion of the concluding document we are to adopt. When we get home we will have to tell people about the position we are to formulate today. Otherwise it will be impossible to address the party public after the plenum. On the key questions, we must formulate our own positions and our approach to the public. We must think about the historic role that today's plenum will play. If we leave here without a position on fundamental questions, the plenum will have a negative impact on the party in our future work. If we leave here with firm positions, then the plenum will play its part and bring about a breakthrough in our party work.

We are already accustomed to phrases like: most crucial period, last safe turning point, cannot go on like this, fateful times. And these phrases do indeed reflect the state of the country, society, the party, and the economy. But all the same, they reflect it, as people say nowadays, inadequately. Destiny is on the doorstep, and we must talk with her. But it is she who chooses the topic of discussion. How did it come about that everything is on the brink of collapse? And what must be done to avoid destroying the country, the party, the parties? In the most general terms, the answer is, I think, as follows: Perestroyka has had too many superintendents and very few craftsmen. And as a result the building is not being reconstructed, but for the most part is collapsing. Democratization, glasnost, politicization—these are the results of six years of perestroyka. Important results, bringing into being those great forces, the motive forces of revolution in combination with people. But the areas of application and the general direction of movement are poorly defined, and the different thrusts are leading to destruction. And we are wrong to reassure ourselves that everything is going according to plan, that all this has to be gone through, that our compass is reliable enough. Let us tell the truth, we had and still have only one desire—not to go on like this any longer.

But theoretical ideas have not yet been formulated on the methods of transition from one state to the successive subsequent phases of the next. And we have destroyed our accustomed system of power. We named the people the guarantor of perestroyka and of the irreversibility of events, yet we never once consulted with them, but constantly called on them not to think, but to demonstrate in the squares, showing them only the tip of the measures being implemented from above. So it was with the laws on the cooperative system and on enterprises, and so it is, in the end, with the very fate of the USSR, with the transition to the market system. History will not tolerate this. It seems we can only define historical changes of direction. We changed direction in 1917 and in 1985. Honor and praise to those Communists who brought about those changes. Between 1985 and 1990—a little more. But it transpires that between changes of direction you have to be able to hold onto the helm, otherwise you are swept in the opposite direction. And that is why we are now drifting almost uncontrollably.

As a result democracy took to the squares. And the democracy of the squares has always been destructive. The mechanism for bringing democracy into action proved poorly developed. It seems to me that from the outset the official party structures monopolized the process of analyzing the state of society and defining its paths of development, thereby excluding hundreds of thousands of scientists from this process. Social scientists are now receiving an official directive on the end of propaganda work. This weakened the influence of the ideas of perestroyka and deprived those ideas of sufficient content. The process of increasing social entropy began.

I think that the shortage of time in reserve must now be mentioned not for the sake of making a political point, but for the sake of preventing collapse.

First, the market. I have already asserted, at the conference at the party Central Committee, that we are at least two years behind with the transition to the market. Nonetheless we are again making the mistake of not consulting with people. The reform must not be an academician's reform, or the president's, or the chairman's, even if it originates from them. The reform, intelligent, realistic, and radical, must be the working person's reform. Otherwise it will not be comprehended. How many measures have been rejected in the past because they were not comprehended.

The radicalism of the reform should be determined not by how far it changes the accustomed shape of life, but by how surely it leads society to prosperity and how clearly it states what still has to be endured, how much, and for what reason. Here life itself must be taken into account. The majority of discussions of ownership take insufficient account of psychology, traditions, and the mechanisms of realization of ownership. It has traditionally been realized through the benefits and opportunities proceeding from it. For a long time, however, we promised people ownership of property—machine tools, plants, real estate—but not the environment in which they live, not the output which they produce. But if, even before any radical or less radical reforms, the collectives had been allowed to enjoy absolutely the benefits of part of their output, I am sure that not only would the store counters not have emptied, but this measure would itself have acted as a catalyst for any reforms.

Please tell me, are our state enterprises today free, and have they ever been so? In general, we have been too far removed from the people.

I do not think we have fully grasped the question of sovereignty, either. We must absolutely respect the natural freedom of every people, their history, traditions, culture, language, and future. But historical gathering together and unforced unification way back in time cannot be disregarded. That policy is without historical roots. That is one thing. But history is continuous. It continues for every people, to this day. So the peoples' destinies can also change now. And this too must be taken into account.

But on the winds of populism, as is now the case in many respects, only artificial sovereignty can be born. Numerous meetings show that at the present stage of history, the only just sovereignty is sovereignty for unity. That is a facet of economic autonomy and of the delegation of rights to the Union. Many wise people in Russia claim that truth and life are on the side of such a sovereignty.

A CPSU Central Committee plenum met today. We should concern ourselves with its main component—the primary organization. Local party committees bear their own responsibility, their share of the blame for the fact that many primary organizations are inactive and some have ceased to exist, while confusion reigns in a significant proportion of them. A week ago, at the second stage of our report-and-election party conference, we discussed the tasks of the primary organizations. But this confusion is fostered by the inconsistency and weakness of the top echelon of the party leadership. The necessary unifying impulses, the protection of the socialist choice, the organizational principles are not being issued from here, from the Secretariat, the Politburo, and the CPSU's scientific centers. I think we should be talking not only about the primary organizations and the paralysis of state power, but also about the need for a radical revision of the work of the highest elected party organs. There is a vital need for the publication of a partywide journal PERVICHNAYA ORGANIZATSIYA [PRIMARY

ORGANIZATION], perestroyka in the training of party cadres, and a change in the role of the party's scientific institutions.

The Russian Communist Party Central Committee has completely isolated itself. In this connection the negative attitude toward us is growing in the party organizations. A law on political parties is needed. The uncivilized struggle that has broken out among them helps to whip up instability in society. The conviction has grown that the party's fate depends on the resolution of these questions. The question "to be or not to be" is not yet at issue, but the danger must be seen. The lack of power will ruin everything. Here it is damaging to describe this phenomenon as objective. We are constantly increasing its nominal level. Presidential authority, the Presidential Council, additional presidential powers. The trouble is that power is not a matter of self-expression. The mechanisms for its implementation, the boldness, are lacking. The president issues decrees as if they were consultative, nonbinding appeals. Sanctions are entirely lacking. Thus the decrees are devalued and have no force. This has created a threat to radical economic reform, there is no mechanism for its implementation.

People are waiting for presidential power, a number of enterprises, in their opinion, should work according to a regime defined by the president. For instance, leaseholders should be given machinery, and equipment should be released to save the harvest from ruin, to process it. Many destabilizing processes are fostered by the lack of sufficient effectiveness: the struggle for party property, interethnic strife, the ineffectiveness of the struggle against the mafia. The KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs allude to their own weakness. Are they really as weak as that, or is something else at work here? I think the Presidential Council was set up not for academic discussions, but for action. So there has been enough maneuvering and drifting, it is necessary to accept the market, which the people understand, to stop emitting rubles, to put imports to rights, and to revive power.

Two final points. If the members of the party Central Committee Politburo and the presidents and chairmen of the Union republic Supreme Soviets express the will of their peoples and Communist Parties, we must tell them that the lack of a decision on the Union treaty is, more than other processes, destabilizing society, and that the blame for this rests specifically with those political structures. The lack of this fundamental decision gives rise to a mass of other imperfections, weaknesses, and contradictions, which condemn the country and the republics to remain in a state of chaos and see a steady deterioration in people's lives.

The crisis over the Union treaty cannot objectively go on after the end of 1990. That is the limit that cannot be passed.

Finally, I would like particularly to mention the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat. Since the congress, the party has found out who it is. The highly contentious discussion sheets in PRAVDA are not enough for it now, it needs real contact with the leaders. Congresses have drawn up documents, identified the new vision, outlined the reforms. But that is not action. What is needed is major contributions on questions of theory, not multifaceted, disorganizing, and disorienting, but fundamental, answering the main questions of the socialist choice in our history and organizational practice.

It is a strange thing. Former "dissidents" are defending Russia's history—both powerfully and sincerely. But where are the archive studies, the objective view of existing science, the party's ideological corpus?

I would like to end how I began. We must all think very seriously and discuss today the decision we are to adopt today. Because it will be truly fateful.

Buryat Leader on 'Gravest Period'

PM1610101990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Oct 90 Second Edition p 4

["Text" of speech delivered at 8 October session of CPSU Central Committee Plenum by L.V. Potapov, first secretary of the Buryat Republic Party Committee]

[Text] Comrades! The Soviet people and the Communist Party are experiencing the gravest period in their history. It cannot even be compared with the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. In the catastrophic situation the party and state systems acted more confidently and purposefully then than they are now doing. Moreover, the economic and financial crisis in the country is deepening still further and is leading to a further decline in the people's living standards. There is also an advancing sociopolitical crisis.

In this situation Buryatia's Communists regard it as their main task to master as rapidly as possible forms and methods of specific work making it possible to make the fullest use of the accumulated potential in order to implement the paths of development outlined by the 28th party congress. Any delay, organizational slackness, or ideological disarmament for the party are criminal and pernicious. Active participation in elaborating the program for switching the republic to market relations, the evaluation of options, cadre training, and the molding of public opinion—today this constitutes one of the republic party committee's spheres of work. And here we have quite a clear idea that the market economy is not some kind of radiant paradise and that it is not free from shortcomings. It is inevitably accompanied by rising prices, unemployment, and unevenness among the incomes of members of society.

For Buryatia, as for many other Siberian and Far Eastern regions, the switch to market relations is a problem of unprecedented complexity verging on the danger of a socioeconomic upheaval unless special additional measures are taken. For a number of reasons, like our country's other eastern regions, Buryatia lags considerably in its socioeconomic development behind the average Union and average Russian indicators, especially with regard to the social infrastructure. And in order to even out this large difference, we will require a subvention from both the Union and the Russian governments for a certain period. Today Buryatia is in 60th to 70th place in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] in terms of many most important indicators of living standards. Moreover, over half the industrial enterprises make a loss or are only marginally profitable.

Matters are no better in the agro-industrial complex.

The profitability of production is affected not only by the excessively worn-out state of industrial plant but also by the considerable increase in the cost of fixed production capital and expenditure because of the high seismic activity and the special regime for the use of nature in the Lake Baykal basin.

In our view, a radical means of rectifying this situation would be to adopt a declaration on the republic's state sovereignty whereby it would itself determine the extent of its autonomy in managing the economy in the Union and Federative Treaties.

In exercising its economic sovereignty, our republic will be able to make thrifty and independent use of its national wealth: land, mineral resources, fur, and timber. The republic's working people greeted with great satisfaction the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers resolution in August 1987. This resolution, which you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, and you, Nikolay Ivanovich, signed, establishes a long-term state program for the comprehensive development of the productive forces of the Far Eastern Economic Region, the Buryat ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], and Chita Oblast for the period through the year 2000. A relevant RSFSR Council of Ministers decree was also adopted under this program. Moreover, a CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution was adopted on measures to ensure the protection and rational use of the natural resources of the Lake Baykal basin. We call it the Baykal program. The fulfillment of these two state programs accords with the vital interests of Buryatia's working people since they contain measures to eliminate the autonomous republic's lag in socioeconomic development. They also contain the minimum necessary conditions for the switch to market relations.

The old apparatus is now being demolished, especially the USSR and RSFSR ministries and departments that were entrusted with the responsibility for fulfilling these two state programs. Moreover, opinions questioning the future fate of these programs have become widespread. This greatly alarms us. We believe that continuity must be preserved with regard to the program pledges and decisions of both the Union and Russian governments. We are also hoping for firm support from the Central Committee.

We do not shirk responsibility in forming our own financial and other resources. The program for switching the republic's national economy to the market envisages creating free enterprise zones on part of its territory. We believe that the Baykal-Amur Railroad zone could be included in such a zone. It is necessary to send the best economists there and and to attract foreign investors by creating the necessary conditions for them, then life on the Baykal-Amur Railroad will begin a new round. Thousands of people on the railroad who have firmly linked their lives with our Siberian region, have put down roots on Siberian soil, and do not want to leave here—indeed, many of them have nowhere to go—are awaiting this. Given that kind of approach, the Baykal-Amur Railroad is a serious reserve for developing the country's economy and its viability.

Substantial changes must occur in relations between the center and autonomous formations along with an equalization of the rights of all autonomous formations. However, autonomous formations virtually do not feature in Academician Shatalin's program, as though they do not exist at all, along with their problems, features, state and economic sovereignty, and national awareness. This is astonishing. The autonomous republic's place in the program as a subject of the union and a subject of the federation must be defined.

I constantly wonder why we, the Central Committee, still the only political organization with an overwhelming majority in all organs of power, are discussing such an important issue after the event, when all the main decisions have already been made without us. And why the CPSU has been excluded from the process of elaborating and adopting a decision on a most important political question. If the party once again is not asked about such an important question and the Central Committee leadership and the general secretary, while proclaiming the principle of the omnipotence of the party masses, express personal convictions without verifying them against the opinion of the entire party, how is the situation in the party any different from that which existed before the perestroyka of the party which we have proclaimed? Today's plenum has been assigned the role of taking note of effectively adopted decisions, although it ought to have been convened during the Supreme Soviet session or some other acceptable form of participation by Communists in elaborating these decisions should have been found.

We must reach agreement on where the point lies beyond which talk of our socialist choice and our commitment to the communist prospect becomes empty rhetoric. It is necessary to impose restrictions on the size of private ownership [vladeniye] in general and of land in particular and on the use of hired labor. Unless this happens, the party will be discredited once and for all in working people's eyes as a political organization of the Marxist-Leninist type. Something incomprehensible is happening to the process of the consolidation of Communist deputies in the parliaments of the country and of Russia. Having adopted as one of the main forms of party activity in program documents parliamentary struggle and influence on the decisions adopted by all levels of soviets via party groups, the CPSU Central Committee and the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee are not putting this into practice. Why, Ivan Kuzmich [Polozkov] and Mikhail Sergeyevich, do you not organize this work by Communist deputies in the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets? Where are the party groups of which we spoke at the congress and the need for which is stipulated in the documents adopted by the congresses? If this decision were fulfilled, there would clearly not be confrontation between the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Supreme Soviet. Many decisions would be made in a more considered and well-founded way.

We are being asked all these questions in primary organizations and labor collectives. As they do not receive answers to them, people are losing faith in the party and in the 28th congress decisions and are leaving the CPSU.

The plenum must provide answers to all these questions which perturb Communists, otherwise the process will become uncontrollable. This cannot be allowed to happen.

Central Committee Apparat To Be Cut by 603

LD1310174890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2235 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Report by D. Kiselev from the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] [Kiselev] The second reduction during the perestroyka years in the apparat of the Central Committee will soon be imminent.

[V.I. Chuprunov, director of a sector of the CPSU organizational department] Six hundred three people must be cut, must get another job, and exactly 890 people remain in the Central Committee.

[Kiselev] That is, you mean that 603 people will no longer come to this building?

[Chuprunov] Yes, without question.

[Kiselev] Will they require some kind of system of professional reorientation? Where will they work?

[Chuprunov] The point, you see, is that as a rule the Central Committee apparat has been manned by quite highly qualified and trained people. They have not only been professional people who have worked in public office all their lives. They have been people possessing certain qualifications and specialized knowledge, and, incidentally, are great experts in this sphere. Therefore, they will switch to various branches of our national economy and will continue to work. I think that this will not present a great problem for many of our employees.

[Kiselev] But will those being laid off transfer to managerial posts, or will they perhaps be able to work as practicing engineers, for instance?

[Chuprunov] You know, it varies, because as a rule the people who have come to the Central Committee apparat have come from high managerial posts, and it would be inexpedient to use them as some kind of ordinary employees.

Supreme Court Rescinds Kalugin Court Ruling

LD1210164690 Moscow TASS in English 1615 GMT 12 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Igor Gvritishvili]

[Text] Moscow October 12 TASS—The Russian Supreme Court today rescinded a decision by the Moscow City Court to reject former KGB Major-General Oleg Kalugin's application to institute proceedings against Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, who stripped Kalugin of his rank.

On August 28, a member of the City Court rejected Kalugin's application on the grounds that the decision to strip Kalugin of his rank had been taken by the USSR Council of Ministers, which is a collective body, and hence any complaints against only one official were "illegitimate".

The Russian Supreme Court decided that the Moscow City Court's actions were incorrect. Referring to the Soviet law on the order of appealing against illegitimate actions by officials who infringe on citizens' rights, the Supreme Court decided that appeals can be lodged against a particular official's personal actions, as well as his actions on behalf of the body he represents.

In his application, Kalugin noted that Ryzhkov made a one-man decision, when signing a resolution on behalf of the Soviet government.

In early August, the former general filed two more complaints at the City Court, one against President Mikhail Gorbachev, who stripped him of his awards, and the other against KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, who denied him his general's pension.

Earlier this month, the Moscow City Court began hearings on Kalugin's complaint against Kryuchkov. The hearings will continue on October 23, after the court receives additional information including a reply from the government to the court's question.

The court has yet to take action on Kalugin's complaint against Gorbachev.

After the Supreme Court announced its decision, Kalugin told TASS he was satisfied with it, saying it was a "step towards justice".

Supreme Court Ruling Detailed

LD1310020690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2235 GMT 12 Oct 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Kalugin appealed to the Moscow court in August, protesting being stripped of his rank. The decision to strip him of his orders was taken by the Union Council of Minister in collegium, and therefore the Moscow Court, without going further into detail, rejected Kalugin's personal accusations against Ryzhkov.

These details have attracted the attention of the Russian Supreme Soviet. It turns out that at least 14 members of the USSR Government were not present at the sitting where Kalugin's fate was decided and did not receive an invitation to it. A document about this was provided by [name indistinct] Kuznetsov, the Chekist's representative.

Did a sitting take place? If it did, then who was present? After all, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held on the same day, and many of the members of the government were in the Central Committee, including the prime minister himself. Why, finally, did a whole number of ministers not know anything at all about the sitting?

Kalugin considers that the decision on stripping him of his rank was taken by Prime Minister Ryzhkov personally at the request of the leadership of the KGB:

[Begin Kalugin recording] I have the impression that it is not Ryzhkov who is managing the government, but that Comrade Kryuchkov is managing Ryzhkov. At least, I have grounds for thinking this. What kind of secret decision is this when the minimum required is a decision by the court and a decision by the Council of Ministers? There was neither one nor the other. [end recording]

The government's position was not elucidated. Representatives of the Council of Ministers did not come to the court. In fact, the hearing of the case took up 16 minutes. After sitting for almost 1 and a half hours, the court announced its decision. Kalugin's accusations against Ryzhkov will be considered.

The case is being returned to the Moscow city court.

Kalugin Previews Work as Supreme Soviet Deputy

LD1610091290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0835 GMT 16 Oct 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov and Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow, 16 Oct (TASS)—Former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin, who was recently elected as a USSR people's deputy, intends to take part in the work of the parliamentary committee on issues of defense and state security. He received a mandate from the electorate of Krasnodar Kray to replace Ivan Polozkov who resigned from his obligations as a deputy in connection with his election as first secretary of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party.

In conversation with TASS correspondents, Oleg Kalugin reported that he has already received an invitation to take part in the committee's work. "I think that if I become a permanent member of the committee this will facilitate more competent work by this parliamentary body," Kalugin said, explaining that he hopes to aid in the discussion of various issues in the committee "from rather critical and more objective positions."

Oleg Kalugin reported that he has received a number of proposals from Moscow, Leningrad, and Ulyanovsk to stand as a people's deputy for the Russian Federation. "But I have not yet decided because this will inevitably divert me from work with the electorate in Krasnodar Kray. For this reason I would prefer it—if such an opportunity should present itself—if I could also be a people's deputy for Russia from this region," he said.

Nazarenko Discusses Union Treaty Preparations

LD1310223290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Interview with Arnold Filippovich Nazarenko, USSR Supreme Soviet deputy and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, by unidentified correspondent; from the "Vremya" newscast—live or recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] The preparatory committee for preparing a new Union treaty, on which representatives of all Union republics serve with the participation of the USSR president, continues work in Moscow. Rafik Nishanov has said there are already over 200 drafts of a new Union treaty. According to him, this is good news. Still, the question of future economic relations, economic ties, between the subjects of the federation will evidently make up the main content of the new Union treaty. We have in the studio Nazarenko, Arnold Filippovich, a USSR Supreme Soviet member, and a member of the Committee for Legislation of the Supreme Soviet.

Arnold Filippovich, the first question: How does the new Union treaty interpret future economic relations between the republics?

[Nazarenko] Everything depends on what this will be. If it is, as you said, a federation, this means that these ties will be similar to those we have had in the past. If it is to do something different, a mixture, for example, partially a federation and partially a confederation; or if it is based simply on some sort of confederative principles, then there will be the appropriate economic ties. This means that some of the members could be associates, while other members of this Union could have ordinary trading relations, such as take place between different countries. That is, more or less, the sort of range these relations could have.

[Correspondent] At any rate, the relationship will be mutually advantageous.

[Nazarenko] Of course. No one will trade or enter into ties that are detrimental to himself.

[Correspondent] According to my information, Arnold Filippovich, several republics do not intend to sign the new Union treaty. This is, I repeat, according to my information, which may not be very accurate. How will the supreme authorities, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and perhaps the president, act if republics fail to sign the new Union treaty?

[Nazarenko] Well, this is a very problematic issue. Of course, if several republics fail to sign the Union treaty, then, in the first place, there can be no question of any market, of any joint movement to a market. That is absolutely obvious. Because one cannot cope with these problems on one's own. It is, generally speaking, a delusion if some people think this can be done independently. I might simply say that we are not simply a state, not just republics with closed economic cycles, but, above all, we are the workshops and plants of a large general factory, an enterprise which was called the USSR. As soon as it happens, that is, if a whole series of people refuse to participate in this coproduction and technology, then they will fall into intolerably difficult circumstances. People who are engaged in production matters can easily imagine this. I do not even want to develop this topic. It would just be completely hopeless. To say nothing here of the international aspect. No one will keep their treaties with us. No one will be prepared to fulfil the demands of SALT II. You yourself understand that if there are no subjects of the federation, if there is no center, so to speak, then no one is going to keep any obligations to those with whom they have not signed treaties. No one has signed separately with the republics, neither with the Ukraine nor with Georgia, nor with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

[Correspondent] People say that establishing borders will be a serious issue.

[Nazarenko] Undoubtedly. This is, all in all, the prime issue, which could lead to an unbelievable exacerbation of interethnic relations. This can easily be seen when one recalls, for example, the affair in Moldava, which blew up between the Moldovan part and Gagauz-Ukrainian-Russian part.

[Correspondent] It is suggested, Arnold Filippovich, that the drawing up and signing of a new Union treaty could take place at the end of this year, or at the beginning of next year. Do you not think that we are evidently late in doing this?

[Nazarenko] We are very late indeed. We are a year too late. This should have been done after the first congress, then everything would have been different. At that time, the question of seceding from the federation had not even arisen. It would have been possible to find very convenient solutions, even for the Baltics. We could have preserved the Union, in general, and our opportunities for moving to the market would have been, in general, more successful. Our future would have been more, so to speak, well....

[Correspondent, interrupting] Well, we shall hope that everything is not lost. Thank you, Arnold Filippovich, for finding the time to come to our studio.

Democratic Platform Constituent Conference Opens

LD1310191390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 13 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today is the first day of work of the constituent conference of the Democratic Platform. This is the name of another party that does not like the state of our society. Many of those who have come here are former members of the CPSU; others have (?officially) set up their own parties. The Democratic Platform is a parliamentary party, with an extensive program of democratic reforms. But it lays no claim to a monopoly of parties.

[Unidentified speaker] The question of a multiparty system plays a very great role, and a multiparty system actually makes it possible to democratize society more sucessfully, because there will be various opinions, various positions, various actions in implementing these positions.

Pugo Reports to Central Control Commission 10 Oct

PM1510154190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Oct 90 Second Edition pp 2-3

[TASS report on speech by B.K. Pugo, chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission, to the 10 October CPSU Central Commission plenum: "On the Main Areas of the CPSU Central Control Commission's Work Stemming From the 28th Party Congress Decisions"]

[Text] As has already been reported, a plenum of the CPSU Central Control Commission was held on 10 October. B.K. Pugo, chairman of the Central Control Commission, delivered the report. He said:

We all participated in the CPSU Central Committee plenum which adopted crucial decisions. Participation in its work broadens our potential as the party's top control organ and enables us to comprehend in greater depth the tasks facing us.

It is already clear today that the deepening of the reform of the political system and the switch to a market economy are opening a new page in the history of Soviet society. A fundamentally different situation is arising, which requires the party to master innovative forms and methods of activity without delay. It will only be able to fulfill its role as the political vanguard of society by realizing its creative and intellectual potential in full. Of course, this difficult process of comprehending the truth, which the whole party is now going through, could not fail to affect its control organs too.

Proceeding from the Leninist principles of party control, the 28th CPSU Congress formed the CPSU Central Control Commission, which is accountable only to a party congress or conference. Active Communists and plenipotentiary representatives of the party masses were elected to it. More than half of the Central Control Commission members are workers, peasants, or national economic specialists. All this really ensures the independence of the Central Control Commission and enables it to control the work of the party's central organs and their apparatus on behalf of Communists and party organizations.

Of course, the party's top control organ, like the control commissions locally, does not have any monopoly on control or seek it. This is the function of the whole party, of all its organs, and of all Communists. The chief task of the party's control organs is to stimulate in every possible way control "from below," direct and immediate control by the party masses themselves. Ordinary Communists must at last have the opportunity to really control and really influence the entire vital activity of the party's central organs.

How, on a principled plane, do we want to see party control today? Above all, as effective and democratic.

This means the participation of the broadest masses of Communists in control. It means ascertaining really urgent questions in the life of the party. It means the ability to ensure the timely realization of the decisions being monitored and to suggest, where necessary, ways to correct them. In short, control must be a very important component of the protective system which we are now creating to guard the party against fortuities and arbitrariness.

At this plenum it is necessary to define the Central Control Commission's main tasks stemming from the principled guidelines of the 28th CPSU Congress and to resolve a number of organizational questions. There is also a need to consult each other on our operating methods. In this we must clearly proceed from the premise that we will be working under complex and rapidly changing political and economic conditions, when we will have to take prompt measures to renew the party and strengthen its positions in society.

The first steps in any matter are always difficult. There is a great temptation to prescribe everything down to the smallest detail and to construct some rigid schemes. Embarking on this path would mean ruining a living thing. In defining the tasks of the Central Control Commission, it is necessary to proceed from real life, from the real needs of Communists and party organizations, from the decisions collectively elaborated at the congress.

Yes, comrades, we can no longer delay over fulfilling these decisions. The people are simply tired of waiting. Their discontent at the state of the economy could overflow at any moment. Extremist forces have become extremely active, speculating on objective difficulties and on our mistakes and miscalculations. They are deliberately fueling passions, planting confusion in people's minds, and pushing them into directly violating the law. The country needs stability as it needs air. Political, legal, and economic stability. What is needed is order, without which all reforms are doomed.

The situation really is extremely complex. Still, we must not give in to emotion. As a real political force in the country today, the Communist Party can and must take its historic opportunity and become a party of civil concord. But for this it must, above all, consolidate its ranks.

I agree with the playwright Mikhail Shatrov, who said in pain at the USSR president's meeting with cultural figures: "Conservatives and democrats in the party have seized each other in a mortal grip and virtually paralyzed themselves and are doing nothing but disgorge thousands of new words, platforms, statements, and half-positions, which nobody reads or wants to read any more."

Another danger also cannot fail to be seen. According to the new statutes, the Union republic Communist Parties are independent in their actions. But there is no question in the congress decisions of keeping aloof from each other and dispersing to their own national apartments. Is it not clear that the destruction of our party's international essence will inevitably lead it toward political death?

So, comrade Communists, maybe we have had enough of seeking guilty persons, breaking off relations, and separating? For we agreed at the congress on the main questions of party politics and arrived at a common agreement. What is needed now is united action. Our party can straighten itself out only as a party of action.

Under these conditions what is the role of the Central Control Commission and the party's other control organs? I wish particularly to emphasize that we are not a party inquisition, not an organ to combat dissidence in the party. Our task is both more complex and more constructive. To analyze the state of affairs in party organizations, forecast the course of events, prevent needless conflicts and disagreements—this is what the party masses expect of us. The entire authority of the control organs and the powers granted by the Statutes must be used to ensure that the debates and arguments which are natural in our country take place within the framework of party comradeship, with the norms of party ethics being observed. In short, we must do everything to preserve and strengthen party unity. This is the chief task that the congress set us.

Furthermore, comrades, the congress delegates sharply criticized party committees, right up to the CPSU Central Committee, for the mistakes made in the course of perestroyka. We must devote paramount attention to control over ensuring that the correct lessons are drawn from these mistakes. I will dwell just on some aspects.

Having initiated very profound transformations in the life of Soviet society, the party was not in all cases ready for them. Far from full use was made of its potential for influencing society or its intellectual and organizational potential in mounting political campaigns. Many party committees have not yet become aware of the role and significance of the renewed soviets or found constructive ways to cooperate with them. The party's position with regard to new forms of the workers and peasant movement has been defined very belatedly. An effective, integral youth policy has not been formulated.

And yet modern social life will place more and more new questions on the agenda. Acute, unexpected questions which cannot be brushed aside. And every party committee and every control organ will have to resolve them independently, under conditions of a severe shortage of time, vigorously ridding themselves of ideological blinkeredness, dogmatism, political flabbiness, and confusion. The time has come to analyze in earnest how the party utilizes the possibility of Communists elected to soviets at all levels. Above all, they need our comradely support. It is right here that things are "hot" today, and it is right here that nonstandard situations arise and stereotypes are broken.

Previously party control organs would protect Communists mainly from bureaucrats, petty-minded officials, petty tyrants, and suppressors of criticism. Their protective functions must now be expanded considerably. As is known, in the Baltic republics and a number of other parts of the country Communists on elected organs of power are in the opposition. This is perfectly explicable under conditions of a multiparty system. But serious concern is aroused by the fact that the process of political struggle frequently goes beyond civilized limits. On acceding to power, new forces repeat mistakes which cost us so dear in past years. They cannot tolerate the very existence of communist ideology or the existence of the CPSU. They cannot tolerate the fact that there are people who have linked their life with this party. The Central Control Commission Presidium expresses solidarity with the statement of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee, which regards the law on political parties adopted in the republic as undemocratic and infringing human rights.

The Communist Party is ready both for political dialogue and for political argument. In this we firmly advocate respect for human rights and freedoms and recognition of the equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of their political convictions and views. Only on this basis is the process of the democratization of Soviet society guaranteed, and the successful transition to a market economy guaranteed.

Reports of cases of victimization for Communist Party membership are reaching the Central Control Commission. Unfortunately, such a thing has proved possible not only in the practice of a number of foreign countries. Statements by certain politicians and the actions of individual leaders of establishments and even organs of power show that the "ban on professions" and "discrimination on grounds of political convictions," directed against Communists, are becoming a reality in our country too.

It is the duty of our party—as is known, it is the ruling party, and Communist deputies constitute a majority on the country's Supreme Soviet—to create the necessary legislative guarantees and to do everything to safeguard our society and its citizens against sliding toward political intolerance and victimization for ideas on the threshold of the 21st century.

At the same time we must be ready to come to the defense of the Communist's honor and dignity in every instance of illegal persecution. In this connection people propose creating corresponding juridical services within the framework of party structures.

Numerous proposals associated with asserting the power of the party masses and enhancing the role of primary party organizations were expressed during the all-party debate which preceded the congress. They were practically all adopted by the congress and enshrined in the Statutes. Party committees at various levels are now freeing primary party organizations from the daily regulation of their work, hardly interfere in their internal life, and do not limit initiative.

At the same time the party masses have sharply increased exactingness toward the center. They are displeased with the state of organizational and ideological work in the CPSU and criticize the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat for tardiness and indecisiveness in defining positions on particular questions. This is also reported by members of the Central Control Commission. To put it briefly, Communists await action from the party leadership. Many note with concern that the full-blooded link between the center and local organizations is being lost. And this really is so.

But what is the party center in the modern, democratic interpretation, if not the expresser of the unified will of the party masses? Another question also arises: Has it, this will, taken shape, or is the process of achieving the political unity of Communists on a new basis still only taking place? Hardly anyone would quibble that the principle of bureaucratic centralism which operated for decades in the CPSU virtually led to primary organizations' being debarred from party politics. And it is not surprising that, having gotten freedom for independent action, they do not always see clearly where and how to direct their forces, still awaiting instructions from the center.

No, it is not a matter of a "crisis of the center" or of "freeloading by the provinces." There is a real, objective difficulty connected with the redistribution of roles between them and with the shifting of the bulk of party politics to grass-roots organizations. The task of the

CPSU's central organs evidently consists in accelerating this process and guaranteeing its necessary consistency by helping party organizations to become aware of and master their new role. Unfortunately, we have not made much progress in resolving this task. The period of reorganization of the party's executive organs and their apparatuses has been protracted. Even our plenum could have been held considerably sooner; this fact must be stated frankly.

Comrades, the country is on the threshold of radical transformations in the economy. The 28th congress spoke out unequivocally: The transition to market relations must be the chief substance of the economic reform and of an improvement in the state of affairs in the national economy. At the same time some people still argue over whether we need the market or not, as though the congress decisions did not exist at all. It is another matter to seek optimum ways to make the transition to market relations and to comprehend the party's role under the new conditions and the forms and methods of its practical work. The CPSU Central Committee plenum held a few days ago was devoted to precisely this.

Today we must define the place of party control organs in resolving these very important tasks. Of course, any interference in the activities of management organs is inadmissible. But can we really stand aloof when Communist leaders essentially slow down the perestroyka of the economy by their inertia, sluggishness, and even irresponsibility? Here actions must be principled and very decisive. Otherwise we cannot avoid charges against the whole party.

It is also worth thinking about how to help party organizations to really express the interests and needs of labor collectives. It is clear that indifference to man's vital aspirations and to violations of his legitimate rights will not enhance, to put it mildly, the prestige of party organizations. So we will never be able to shape a public demand for our social policy. What is more, we ourselves will push people toward the conclusion that the party is not needed in production at all. Obviously, the responsibility of party organizations and party committees which take such a stand of noninterference must be seriously enhanced.

Permit me now to brief you on the progress in fulfilling the direct instructions of the Central Control Commission congress. Work has been begun on each of them. The party's normative-methods documents are being drawn up in conjunction with the CPSU Central Committee. As you know, some of them have already been adopted. A search is being conducted for ways to make the most efficient use of the party's property, including by developing commercial activity.

A number of Central Control Commission members are on the Commission for Benefits and Privileges in the Party, which was set up by the congress. As is known, this was discussed at the last CPSU Central Committee plenum. Unfortunately, it has to be said that not all the "i's" have yet been dotted. And yet there were opportunities to finish the matter within the time laid down by the congress. On the question of privileges, probably as on no other, Communists need complete clarity. We ask the Central Control Commission members working on this commission to display greater persistence and initiative.

We are faced with considerable work in connection with the appeals and letters addressed to the 28th CPSU Congress. Over the past three months the Central Control Commission Presidium has examined approximately 160 appeals, with more than 300 still to come. This is an extremely crucial matter. What is needed, above all, is different approaches to assessing Communists' actions. In the past some of them were severely punished essentially for an active political stance, economic enterprise, etc. What labels were not attached to them. It is necessary to really get to the bottom of all this. And it is you, comrades, above all, who will have to do this by traveling to the provinces, meeting and talking with the claimants, and carefully checking facts.

The nature of appeals to the Central Control Commission has been changing recently. The writers of many letters ponder on ways to strengthen the party's ideological and organizational foundations and share their anxiety at the fact that many active, committed people are quitting its ranks. Demands are being heard increasingly persistently for an intensified struggle against crime, the shadow economy, and the raging of speculation. At the same time there has been a sharp reduction in the mumber of letters about shortcomings in production activity. Fewer reports are being received of violations of party principles in the selection of cadres, of an incorrect attitude toward criticism, or of abuses of their official position on the part of officials. Anonymous letters have virtually disappeared from the mail. Of course, we are certainly not thinking of elevating these trends to an absolute. However, a study of the mail enables us to plan our work more specifically and to see the real results of perestroyka in the provinces. The Central Control Commission's reception office has begun operating, and anyone may turn to it.

We cannot ignore a single alarming report. Particularly if it is a question of Communists who undermine the party's prestige by their actions. And there are such letters. A check of one of them was headed by Comrade V.M. Vasin, member of the Central Control Commission and installation workers team leader at Saransk House-Building Combine. After examining his memorandum, the Central Control Commission Presidium voiced serious concern at the facts set forth in it of gross violations of legality and the CPSU Statutes committed by a number of senior officials of the Mordovian obkom [oblast party committee] and by Communist leaders of law-enforcement organs in the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Of course, the Central Control Commission Presidium could itself have made an assessment of the facts revealed and resolved the question of the Communists' party responsibility. However, under the present conditions we deemed it inexpedient to bypass the republic party organization. The question will soon be examined at a Mordovian obkom plenum. We have a clear-cut position, and we will firmly uphold it at the plenum.

Special mention should be made of problems of party rehabilitation. Without exaggeration, there is a wealth of work here. In Donetsk Oblast alone, for example, approximately 4,000 people were expelled from the party in connection with the repression of the thirties, forties, and early fifties. The control commission of the oblast party organization is now in a position to examine no more than 20 cases a month. There are many regions where the situation is still more complex. Thus, at this rate it could take dozens of years to resolve the problem. Clearly, this is absolutely inadmissible. In our view, what is needed is either a political decision by the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission on the party rehabilitation of all persons who suffered repression or the granting of the right to resolve these questions to the party committees and control commissions of city and rayon party organizations. In short, comrades, let us consult one another.

The situation in the country and the party and the congress resolution "On the CPSU's Budget and Property" demand new approaches to the organization of auditing work.

Analysis shows that the income side of the party budget and, thus, also the possibilities of funding the party's activity have been more than halved as a result of the introduction of a new scale of membership dues, the reduction in the CPSU's ranks, and the raising of taxes on its publishing activity. We could find ourselves in a situation where the party budget will be running a deficit and there will be an acute shortage of the monetary funds necessary for party work both at the center and in the provinces.

Under such conditions is it possible to tolerate the fact that more than one million CPSU members are in arrears with their membership dues, tens of thousands more do not pay them on their full earnings, and a significant number of party organizations willfully keep membership dues for their own needs? And these processes are growing in the party. In the first half of this year alone the party budget had a shortfall of 7.4 million rubles. Party committees at all levels, right up to the CPSU Central Committee, are not yet making a proper assessment of these phenomena. The Central Control Commission Presidium believes that decisive measures are needed to strengthen Communists' discipline and to overcome negative trends. Well-considered steps are needed to enhance the efficiency of publishing activity, to develop enterprise, and to seek new sources of income. The congress entrusted control commissions with resolving these tasks in addition to party committees.

It has to be taken into account that, simultaneously with the fall in the income side of the budget, expenditure is increasing in connection with the increase in wholesale prices and rates and in deductions for social insurance. Expenditure of which there was previously no question is appearing. I mean the payment of rent for premises needed for the activities of party committees and bureaus in enterprises and organizations and compensation for the cost of ensuring the work of the party's elected organs. This creates great budget tension, demanding of all party organs an austere policy of thrift and a reduction in the complement of full-time workers.

The question of the party's property has recently been aired increasingly acutely. Demands are being advanced for its confiscation from the party, and the legality of the very existence of party property, which has been created by many generations of Communists and with their funds, is being disputed. The matter has reached the point where a number of local and republican organs of power have adopted decisions alienating the CPSU's property. These decisions are totally devoid of legal force. The Law "On Ownership in the USSR," adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, protects the rights of any owner, including a sociopolitical organization such as the CPSU. The party's executive organs must take a principled, firm stand on these questions. Of course, the Central Control Commission too will not avoid resolving these problems. We simply do not have the right to passively observe lawless actions being committed.

It is generally necessary to overcome the underestimation of auditing work which existed in the party for many years and to make fuller use of its potential for strengthening the CPSU's material base.

Of course, all these problems which have been discussed today must be resolved jointly with the party's Central Committee. Right from the start we must adopt the right tone in relations with the Central Committee and with its subdivisions and apparatus. Confrontation, arrogance, and harassment with trifles are inadmissible. The party's interests are the highest criterion here. And they, these interests, demand businesslike cooperation on a comradely yet principled basis.

Comrades, I wish particularly to emphasize that the Central Control Commission and control commissions locally fulfill strictly defined control functions. And, of course, common sense and a sense of moderation must prevail in all cases. For conflicts sometimes arise out of nothing, you might say. The commission dissipates its energy, above all, on checking the activities of the apparatus of a rayon or city party committee, striving here to "catch" and to hit as hard as possible, and it considers itself such a "supreme" controller. Thus, wait for a needless conflict.

Relations between the new control organs and the corresponding party committees should also be viewed from the other side, so to speak. We possess information attesting to a lack of understanding and, to some extent, even a refusal to accept the new role of control organs. Certain leaders of party committees are even now inclined to regard these organs as structural subdivisions subordinate to themselves, to which they can send Communists' appeals which are inconvenient to themselves. Sometimes the matter even goes so far as interference in the selection of cadres of control commissions.

As you realize, this is a very sensitive question. But if its resolution is not channeled in the right direction now, right at the start, it could escalate into a problem fraught with undesirable consequences.

Another complex question. As is known, the CPSU Statutes granted Union republic Communist Parties themselves the right to decide the question of creating control organs of republican party organizations. Such organs, accountable only to the party forums that elected them, were formed at the congresses of the Communists of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Latvia, and Lithuania. This has not yet been done in other republican party organizations.

Of course, we would not want to impose our own viewpoint on anyone. At the same time the Central Control Commission Presidium is convinced that the independent, democratically elected control organs of the Union republic Communist Parties could realize far more efficiently the powers of the party masses delegated to them. We believe that time and life will put everything in its proper place here.

Regarding the control commissions of the party organizations of autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, etc., according to the CPSU Statutes they must be elected everywhere at corresponding conferences. But in fact this point in the statutes is ignored in many party organizations in the Ukraine, in Kazakhstan, and in certain other regions. This can hardly be regarded as normal. We believe that party organizations are in a position to correct earlier adopted decisions.

Today we must also approve the structure of the Central Control Commission. Proposals on this score have been distributed to the members of the Central Control Commission. The Presidium deems it expedient to form three standing commissions in the main areas of the Central Control Commission's activity: control over the fulfillment of the party's program documents, the CPSU Statutes, and decisions of congresses and conferences; control over the implementation of the CPSU budget and the auditing of financial and economic activity; the examination of addresses and appeals.

The commissions are to work in close connection with the standing commissions of the party's Central Committee and with the Central Committee departments. Businesslike relations should also be established with Communists working on the USSR Supreme Soviet commissions and committees.

In accordance with its statute, the Central Control Commission has the right to maintain an apparatus necessary for work. A proposal to approve its structure and size is submitted for your consideration. It is proposed to have 39 senior officials. This is less than half the number on the party's two control organs which existed previously—the CPSU Central Auditing Commission and the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee.

At the plenum we must reach agreement on the main principles for planning the work of the Central Control Commission. The chief thing, it seems, is not to get lost in trifles nor to try to embrace what cannot be embraced, but to concentrate on major, fundamental questions, on "sore" points, so to speak. And, of course, not to abandon things half way but to strive to eliminate the shortcomings exposed.

Under the present conditions control can only be effective if it is competent and relies on the conclusions and recommendations of science. Receptiveness to the latest studies by political experts, economists, sociologists, and psychologists is not lip service to fashion but an urgent, vital necessity. It is necessary to constantly ascertain, analyze, and promptly disseminate fragments of everything new in the work style and methods of the party's control organs. Here, of course, we cannot manage without the assistance of the party press, the link with which must be constantly deepened and improved.

The main work on the party's new control organ must be performed by the Central Control Commission member, who has received his powers directly from the congress and is called upon to champion all-party interests above all. You all know life well and are capable of assessing realistically how the party's central organs take account of the interests of Communists and working people and which results are produced by the decisions they adopt.

It has already been stated at our first plenum that the Central Control Commission member must not simply carry out instructions. Without your constant initiative, without your personal interest in curing all the diseases from which the party suffers, the work of the top control organ will be rather ineffective. Figuratively speaking, we must overturn the organizational pyramid of the former control system. Otherwise nothing will work out for us. Otherwise the hopes which the congress delegates and Communists pin on the new control organ will not be justified.

And the last point I would like to make: The creation of new control organs is one more step in the perestroyka of the party's activity, a turn toward control "from below." By upholding and asserting the principles of democratization, party control is itself becoming increasingly democratic, open, and mass control. In their work control organs must rely widely on the initiative and activeness of Communists and party organizations. Only through joint efforts is it possible to ensure the health of our party and its purity, unity, and cohesion. Only in this way is it possible to ensure that the party really preserves and strengthens its political leadership.

Ivashko, Other Leaders Attend Komsomol Plenum

LD1410130190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1836 GMT 13 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Galina Vinitskaya]

[Text] Moscow, 13 Oct (TASS)—The two day Komsomol (VLKSM) Central Committee plenum ended here today. The topic of discussion was Komsomol measures for protecting the interests of young people under conditions of the USSR transition to the market and the further renewal of this largest organization of young men and women in the country of the soviets, numbering 30 million.

Vladimir Zyukin, VLKSM Central Committee first secretary, in a report recalled that one and a half years ago at the 21st congress the Komsomol embarked on a path of radical reorganization. From being previously united it has become a federation of independent republic unions. Today the Komsomol represents an association of youth unions, professing communist, socialist, anarcho-syndicalist, and other principles. These unions are not consolidated by an ideology but by the social function which they have set as the main task—the protection of the interests of young people under the conditions of the transition to the market.

The plenum participants adopted a decision on the formation of a state-public information system the "Social Youth Service". This is not the latest huge structure governed from the center but a network of complexes in the republics, oblasts, and rayons where there will be a youth labor exchange, a career center, a legal advice bureau, and services to reinstate the physical and social status of the disabled. One hundred million rubles will be allocated for this from the budget of the VLKSM Central Committee.

In addition to this the speakers noted that a further reduction in Komsomol numbers is now being observed an "extinguishing of life" in many primary organizations. (Let us recall that since 1985 the number of VLKSM members has decreased by 10 million). The revival of the VLKSM, in the opinion of the plenum participants, will be aided by the decision adopted in accordance with which enterprises and other facilities constructed at the expense of Komsomol resources will be handed over to the primary organizations. (As is well-known, until the 21st VLKSM congress only the VLKSM Central Committee had at its disposal the property of a youth organization).

Plenum participants adopted a program of action and the editorial rules of the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper. From now on this is a mass daily sociopolitical newspapers, the founders of which are the VLKSM Central Committee and the publication's labor collective. A decision has also been adopted on holding the 22nd VLKSM Congress in the spring of 1991. This will summarize the results of the republic Union congresses which are taking place now.

Vladimir Ivashko, CPSU Central Committee deputy general secretary, Aleksandr Dzasokhov and Galina Semenova, CPSU Central Committee Politburo members and CPSU Central Committee secretaries, and Valentin Kuptsov, CPSU Central Committee secretary, met participants of the VLKSM Central Committee plenum. They informed them about the results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum which took place and explained the party's position in relation to the economic reforms and the introduction of market relations and the Union treaty and they answered the questions of VLKSM Central Committee members.

Moscow TV's 'VID' Program Premiers 5 Oct

LD1310115490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1937 GMT on 5 October broadcasts the premier of "VID," "View (Vzglyad) and Others" variety program, incoporating the "Vzglyad" program.

"VID" lasts three hours and is hosted by I. Krillov.

Krillov opens the program with video highlights from the program, accompanied by lively music, and reads the following "VID" program schedule:

"Today—Program 500: the law of equal chances. We are preparing for the market. Will everyone be able to eat caviar? What awaits us in one year to 18 months;

"'A Musical Window on Europe': New music for you;

"The 'Vzglyad' program is on the air again: New times, a new reading;

"'Vedi': A film chronicle tells no lies—news from the film archive;

"'El Dorado': Unusual events and phenomena, a program that is not for everybody, new discoveries by the program;

"'MTV,' partner of 'VID': 60 minutes of the best video music in the world.

"This is the 'VID' television company lineup for you today."

At 1940 GMT, Krillov is shown seated in an armchair, saying:

"Good evening, dear friends. Yes, today and every Friday at about this time the 'VID' television company will join you on the first program of central television, and we hope that you will be with us, too. You can do a lot in the nearly three hours we are on the air: watch two films at the cinema, or switch to another channel and watch an entire ice hockey game, or lots of other things. But, I can assure you that you will miss a lot if you do not spend these three hours with us, because the 'VID' television company is prepared for good, healthy competition with any television and cinema production.

"Our television company admittedly does not guarantee that our time on the air will simply be to entertain you: times are not like that. But, there will be entertainment, too. The most important thing that the 'VID' television company guarantees is that the time spent with us will not be useless to you. That truly is the most important thing, probably.

"But, that is all to start. Now, please make yourselves a bit more comfortable. I think a small cup of hot, strong tea will not do us any harm.

"On we go: Program 500 awaits you."

At 1942 GMT, "Program 500" begins with video clips from interviews with several members of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Council of Ministers bodies on the 500 days program and the future, saying people must train for their future and take responsibility for themselves and their families since no one will provide for them now.

Petr Grishchenko, one of the authors of the 500 days program, then discusses the program's effect on agriculture, noting peasants will receive land from the state and begin to work for themsleves.

An unidentified correspondent then interviews an unidentified man who is preparing to set up a Moscow stock exchange, who mentions the stock exchange will adopt the slogan: "Capitalism is the Highest Form of Goods Production." The interviewee says speculation is not a crime but merely a way of thinking and suggests anyone can become a broker.

A film showing broker trainees at a Moscow institute follows.

At 1952 GMT, "Program 500" ends.

"VID" follows "program 500" with advertisements, MTV music videos, and a review of what is to come.

Shortly before the "Vzglyad" program, Krillov advises that, although some people do not like "Vzglyad" because it often shows the dark side of life, "Vzglyad" merely reflects the present situation.

At 1957 GMT, "Vzglyad" begins with two announcers recounting the program's past record and all the letters its producers received, followed by a commentary on changes in recent years and on views of the future.

"Vzglyad" continues with a historic review of the 1915 Armenian massacre by the Turks and mention of tragic events recently in Baku. Video clips follow of interviews with Suren Petrosyan, member of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau; Armenian Internal Affairs Minister Karlos Kazaryan; and Vladimir Markaryants, Armenian Council of Ministers chairman, who discuss Armenia's declining crime rate, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia's gas needs. An unidentified Armenian militiaman discusses his tasks under the state of emergency, affirming that continued shooting makes the atmosphere tense.

At 2002 GMT, "Vzglyad" airs music videos, followed by a picture of a UN list ranking countries in terms of "humane development." The USSR is shown in 26th place on the list.

At 2010 GMT, "Vzglyad" carries a report on Konstantin Smirnov-Ostashvili, a Pamyat member being tried on racism charges. The report includes an interview with the public prosecutor, who says such people must be tried to prevent the events in Germany in the 1930s from repeating themselves.

At 2013 GMT, "Vzglyad" interviews the author of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA article headlined: "An Iron Hand Is Necessary." The author says there is no chance of an authoritarian Union government being installed since power has been dispersed among the republics, where authoritarianism may indeed develop. He notes that the nationalist consciousness is rising, forcing Russians to flee their homes and return to Russia. He stresses Gorbachev must have strong powers to ensure power is delegated to democratic hands and says that the Army is the only institution that stabilizes the country. He concludes the interview by predicting that democracy will not prevail in the republics.

At 2019 GMT, "Vzglyad" airs a report on the money and staging problems facing Goskontsert, including interviews with musicians and mention of a new music magazine that will not be published due to paper shortages.

At 2024 GMT, "Vzglyad" broadcasts a report on Germany's role in the Russian Revolution, including an interview with two Russian historians. One of the historians says that, while the Bolsheviks received money from the Germans beginning in 1917, Lenin did not. He points out that the Germans invested heavily in Lenin only after he returned to Russia. The historian discusses the Bretsk Treaty, suggesting the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was one of the negative effects of Bretsk. He then asserts that Lenin accepted the Bretsk Treaty to retain control in Russia. The second historian ends the interview by casting doubts on any connection between the Bretsk Treaty and the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

At 2034 GMT, "Vzglyad" carries the music video "Give the People Beer."

At 2036 GMT, "Vzglyad" reports on food shortages, noting 80 percent of Soviet towns are rationing food this harvest season. The report also mentions the possibilities of importing food and using emergency food stored in case of war to relieve the situation.

At 2039 GMT, "Vzglyad" reports on a new book on the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies that gives behind-the-scenes details, including details on Boris Yeltsin's rise to power in the elections.

At 2041 GMT, "Vzglyad" reviews a RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA article entitled: "Program for Civil War?!" The article includes the text of the Russian Democratic Forum's Action Program-90, which calls for "anticonstitutional actions." The review points out that a special commission of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is investigating details of "Action Program-90."

At 2042 GMT, "Vzglyad" reports: "The Satanic Verses" will be published in Lithuanian; the Tolyatti Memorial Society will hold a 25-27 October meeting of gulag prisoners who built Kuybeshev hydroelectric plant; joint enterprise news; forthcoming rock concerts nationwide; comments by observers at the recent Azerbaijan elections; Sylvester Stallone's mother is visiting the USSR; reports from Lubyanka self-defense classes; and comments by a Magadan gold prospector.

At 2047 GMT, "Vzglyad" airs a Beatles video, followed by nationwide concert information.

At 2049 GMT, "Vzglyad" report on an unidentified man who was so annoyed by corruption in the state sector that he started his own cooperative. He justifies his high food prices by showing how he gets food from farm to shop and notes the shops must be privatized.

At 2051 GMT, "Vzglyad" reviews the fruit and vegetable prices at Moscow's central market.

At 2052 GMT, "Vzglyad" carries an interview with an unidentified literary critic who discusses the intelligentsia's role in society.

At 2058 GMT, "Vzglyad" report on Azerbaijan election results, citing INTERFAX news agency throughout, and noting there were not elections in Nagorno-Karabakh.

At 2059 GMT, "Vzglyad" broadcasts central television news headlines.

At 2102 GMT, "Vzglyad" reports Yeltsin's complete recovery after an early automobile accident.

at 2104 GMT, "Vzglyad" opens the phone lines to viewers' questions and requests and the "Vzglyad" segment of the "VID" program ends at 2106.

"VID" follows "Vzglyad" with a review of the rest of the program, advertisements, and the announcement that "VID" is registered at Moscow Ispolkom.

At 2110 GMT, "Vedi" begins with video clips from several historic films, including footage of Trotskiy without commentary.

At 2120 GMT, "Vedi" reviews famous events that took place on 5 October in the past.

At 2125 GMT, "Vedi" ends.

"VID" follows "Vedi" with INTERFAX reports on: USSR Supreme Court workers gathering potatoes near Moscow; a PRAVDA party meeting; and an expected presidential decree devaluing the ruble.

At 2128 GMT, "El Dorado" begins with a report on Yakutia volunteer nurses, followed by footage of an unidentified man injecting himself with needles.

At 2135 GMT, "El Dorado" details reports on a 1989 UFO sighting in Georgia, including an interview with a man who claims he was controlled by aliens; sustained mysterious scars that disappeared; and was told that, although aliens think people on Earth are more attractive than themselves, the aliens find people on Earth to be spiritually unattractive.

At 2140 GMT, "El Dorado" previews future editions of the program, including a report on a man whose presence alone affects electronic equipment.

At 2143 GMT, "El Dorado" ends.

"VID" follows "El Dorado" with Krillov warning viewers to turn down their television sets since the MTV music videos will appear next.

At 2144 GMT, "VID" broadcasts MTV music videos.

At 2237 GMT, "VID" ends.

Railroad Operational After 14 Oct Accident

LD1510181590 Moscow TASS in English 1436 GMT 15 Oct 90

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Amayev]

[Text] Tver October 15 TASS—Traffic is completely back to normal on the Moscow-Leningrad line, Russia's oldest railway, after Sunday's train crash.

A special commission is not investigating the cause of the accident, which took place at 4:30 Moscow time outside Kulitskaya Station.

Railway experts told TASS that the accident involved a Leningrad-bound goods train and a passenger train following three minutes behind.

In order to make way for the passenger train, the goods train began leaving the trunk line for a side track after passing Kulitskaya.

What happened next is still a mystery—either the switch was activated ahead of time or something malfunctioned.

The last carriage, a tanker, was derailed even before the [word indistinct] and dragged several more wagons off the track as well. As the stray tanker ground to a halt, the passenger train plowed into it.

Experts believe that the passenger train's driver, now in hospital in a grave condition, saw the accident, applied the brake, but was unable to prevent the collision.

One woman conductor from the passenger train was killed in the crash, and twelve other people were injured.

An electrical locomotive and nine goods vans and tanks were damaged beyond repair. The accident also did serious damage to the track.

Economic

Shatalin Interviewed on 500 Days Plan

SK1610101090 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean 14 Oct 90 p 5

["Exclusive" interview with Stanislav Shatalin, senior adviser to President Gorbachev, in New York by correspondent Song Hye-ran; date not given]

[Text] [Song] What is the main point of the 500 days plan?

[Shatalin] The "500 days plan" is not merely an economic plan. This plan calls for promoting a market economy by allowing private sectors to control 70 percent of all enterprises and 90 percent of retailers in 500 days. This plan, at the same time, calls for strengthening the president's power to minimize side effects that may be caused in this transitional period. Unlike similar previous programs, the 500 days plan is not for the government but for the people. I, a son of peasants, attach the greatest significance to the people's lives.

[Song] Do you think the "500 days plan" will succeed?

[Shatalin] We have no alternative. We are at the crossroads of life or death. The "500 days plan" symbolizes hope for the Soviets who have been frustrated and exhausted.

[Song] It is reported that resistance by Premier Ryzhkov and other conservatives has grown.

[Shatalin] A compromise between Premier Ryzhkov's (slow) economic plan and my "500 days plan" is like mixing different types of blood. Heated discussions are under way in the Soviet Union on the 500 days plan, the "Ryzhkov plan," and a compromise proposal that President Gorbachev is thinking of.

(It was learned that, even though Gorbachev agrees to the "500 days plan" in principle, he is opposed to such radical plans as a plan to allow private sectors to control farms and state land—editor's note)

[Song] Do you think the "500 days plan" is perfect?

[Shatalin] I do not think this plan is absolutely perfect. I personally am carrying a heavy load. When I walk along Moscow streets, some citizens threaten, "If this plan fails at this time, we will cut your throat."

[Song] Would you point out some of the problems of the "500 days plan".

[Shatalin] The 500 days plan itself is not a perfect market-economy plan. It's a program for transition to a market-economy system. The biggest problem is to build a new political and economic structure, the most appropriate in promoting relations among the 15 republics.

If economic reforms are to succeed, cooperation among the republics is absolutely necessary. In other words, the republics must independently manage their own resources and also must cooperate in mapping out and implementing united economic plans for writing austerity budget programs, implementing strict monetary control, and controlling consumer prices. This is the first task.

Second, the ruble must be convertible. Money is in short supply in capitalist countries. However, money is overflowing in the Soviet Union. It is urgent to make the ruble convertible to develop a market economy and introduce foreign capital.

The third is land reforms. We have learned the lesson that kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the Soviet Union are inefficient. Therefore, private sectors must be allowed to own land. This issue stirs much controversy in the Soviet Union. People could talk about the private ownership of land just a year ago. However, open discussions are under way. This shows how rapidly changes are taking place. An environment is being promoted within the government to accept this plan.

The fourth task is how to quickly commercialize the Soviet economy. Cooperation from "Western Europe" is necessary to commercialize the Soviet economy. "West Europe" includes the ROK and Japan.

Fourth, political reforms are necessary if economic reforms in various fields are to success. In this way, we can win the people's support, which is necessary for making reforms. A democratic rule-of-law country is another goal of the "500 days plan".

[Song] What are conservatives opposed to most?

[Shatalin] My plan to introduce West European capital and to allow the private ownership of land. They (conservatives) insist that I am trying to sell out the Soviet Union. However, my genuine intention is to give the Soviet Union a chance. Allowing private ownership is, of course, a difficult task. It is unreasonable to expect that the Soviet economy will become dynamic in merely 500 days.

[Song] When will you visit the ROK?

[Shatalin] I am scheduled to visit the ROK from 25 October until 10 November. The ROK and the Soviet Union have actively contacted each other in an effort to promote practical economic cooperation. Diverse projects can be carried out if the ROK's capital and technology and the Soviet Union's natural resources are combined. If I may add one more thing, I heard that, in an effort to introduce foreign capital, President Gorbachev will make an important announcement on allowing foreign enterprises to own 100 percent of Soviet enterprises and giving them power to manage them.

[Song] Do you have any advice for Korean companies dreaming of advancing into the Soviet Union?

[Shatalin] I would advise them to advance cautiously into the Soviet Union after understanding the characteristics of Soviet society and its unique culture and tradition. That is, it is necessary to well understand Soviets who have different philosophy and sentiments from Westerners. You must also know that it is not easy to do business with indifferent and inefficient Soviet officials. However, Soviets admit that they are uninformed and they are trying to learn from foreign countries.

If the two sides cooperate first in areas where mutual cooperation is possible, they will be able to create more profit in the Soviet Union than anywhere in the world.

Foreign Assistance in Market Transition Viewed

PM1510145590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Commentary by I. Demchenko: "Foreign Countries Will Help Us. But When and How?"]

[Text] The first stage of consultations organized by the IMF and the EEC to discuss possibilities for supporting the Soviet Union's transition to a market economy has come to a close.

Some 100 experts have been in the USSR. They met representatives of Soviet political and business circles and visited Union republics, enterprises, and organizations. Using the material they have gathered as a basis, they will be preparing reports to be submitted to a summit-level conference of Common Market countries in Rome at the end of October and a conference due to be held within the IMF framework in November.

According to I. Ivanov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Foreign Economic Commission, it is hard to say at present what forms assistance to our country could take. Evidently it will not just be financial assistance but intellectual assistance as well: in the form of conveying experience, holding consultations, training cadres, making technology available, and so forth. In this regard, experts from both organizations have stressed it will not be assistance for the Soviet economy or the Soviet Union in general, but, if it may be termed as such, specially targeted assistance to establish and strengthen the institutions and mechanisms of a market economy.

I formed the impression during conversations with experts from both organizations that the energy and raw materials complex, for example, can count on priority support. It goes without saying that this sector is feeling the effects of the Near East crisis, which is heightening interest in alternative energy sources for Europe. Discussing this problem, experts stressed that, in addition to investment, assistance could take the form of measures to modernize the complex to bring down the cost of extracting and comprehensively processing raw materials, such as energy resources, timber, and metals.

The second sphere of the economy indicated by the experts is the development of light industry, the food industry, the agro-industrial complex, and the production and social infrastructure which is working for the saturation of the consumer market. But they particularly emphasized that they are not talking about credits for the import of consumer goods, which are snapped up in a flash and have absolutely no impact on our development. I. Ivanov believes that direct assistance in this sphere can be provided through specific projects submitted by ministries, departments, enterprises, their territorial or sectorial formations, and by republics. These "applications for assistance," as he calls them, will be selected on a competitive basis with the participation of Soviet representatives and the patron concerned.

To be frank, I personally have grave doubts that this system of selecting would-be beneficiaries of assistance was conceived by the IMF or the EEC. I somehow find it hard to imagine experts from these organizations sifting through a mass of technical and economic data provided by our plants and factories to determine who merits support and who does not. This project puts me more in mind of the workings of our own State Planning Committee, which—there is no point in hiding it—loves to gather leaders of enterprises from all over the country under its roof at least twice a year. A similar system was used, incidentally, to collect applications in 1987, when a West German consortium led by Deutsche Bank offered credit of 3 billion marks to modernize our light industry and food industry. But where is that money now? Skepticism aside, I feel it is necessary to mention these latest "applications for assistance," because they are being collected now.

Another two spheres in which the West has shown great interest are the conversion of defense sectors—primarily aeronautics and electronics—and the development of the economic infrastructure: transport, communications, port and customs services, and the creation of working conditions for businessmen.

What preliminary conclusions can be drawn from these consultations? The first point all of our representatives abroad remarked on to a greater or lesser degree is that we do not devote enough attention to the question of how our country is seen in international circles and on the world market and how the various steps we take are assessed. Virtually every conversation, including those held during these consultations, began with a question about the future state structure of the Soviet Union: Will it be a federation, a confederation, a union of sovereign states, or something else? In other words, the West is looking for an answer to the question of who it will have to deal with in the future. The delay in demarcating the powers of the Union and the republics is creating difficulties for our own central bodies, republics trying to get involved in dialogue, and Western business circles.

Having been given the right to direct access to the foreign market, many of our enterprises have been quick to knock down the price of the goods they are offering. An antidumping investigation has been started against us concerning commodities such as electric motors, carbamide, and squid—11 charges in all, and the 12th is about to come up. Coal miners, for example, could set their affairs to rights by trading on the world market, but at the moment they too are actively knocking down their prices, "outbidding" one another for clients and competing amongst themselves.

In my view, the slight indulgence with which my interlocutor talked about these episodes, assuring me that "this kind of thing happens" and "they will learn with time," is inappropriate, to say the least. Our enterprises are certainly not to blame for the fact that they do not know how to behave on the world market, trade in a hit-and-run fashion, and are unable to divide up spheres of influence and reach agreement on the protection of their own interests. You could say that this is the fault of the entire system under which their economic activity has been conducted and is still conducted now. It is not surprising that everyone has rushed onto the world market as soon as they have received permission to trade, without first stopping to even consider their strategy and tactics: The inconstancy of the policies implemented by our leading bodies simply leaves no time for thought.

Foreign experts who have visited our country are bewildered as to why we have such a poor standrad of living when we possess such vast resources. They cannot understand why we doubled our grain purchases from the United States this year, when we were expecting an excellent harvest, which subsequently turned out to break all records. All this is no idle speculation: It has to do with the question of whether it is advisable to give us assistance, particularly material assistance.

Considering our weaknesses of character, I would like to add that none of this has anything to do with charity, gifts, or such like. Everything we receive—if we do, indeed, receive it—will be given as credit on more or less favorable terms. But, in any case, the scale and nature of the assistance we can count on will be decided at the end of this year and the beginning of next year.

Western Investment in Soviet Economy Discussed

LD1310215690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 13 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast—passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] After decades of rejection, the Soviet Union has stated its readiness to join the IMF and the World Bank. This would open up access to Western credits for our country.

[Finance Minister V. Pavlov] "I think we need $80-120 billion in aid."

[Correspondent] Purchases of food, medicines, and equipment—funds are needed for all of this, but would you lend money to someone if you were not sure you would get the loan back? As the economic situation in the USSR worsens, potential investors ask themselves this question more and more.

[J. Phelan, chairman of the New York Stock Exchange] "Only when companies are convinced that they can regain money invested and can obtain and easily transfer profits to their accounts, only then will they be able to invest their funds in the projects of both the Soviet Government and individual sectors of your economy."

[Correspondent] So far, only a few Western companies have invested their capital in the Soviet Union. At a meeting of the leaders of the West's seven leading industrially developed countries in Houston, United States, this past summer, the United States stated that granting aid to the Soviet Union at present, prior to economic reform, would be a waste of money. A similar position was taken by Britain and Japan. But in the view of West Germany and France, credits are actually needed to support the reforms. But what about our foreign debt, about $60 billion?

[O. Mozhayskov, head of the currency and economic directorate of the USSR State Bank] "The issue founders not so much on the size of the actual debt as on our country's economic and political situation, along with the instability we have encountered in recent years during the period of perestroyka. For foreign creditors, and even more for foreign investors, there is nothing more important than confidence in the stability of the economic and political regime."

[Correspondent] "So, what are our prospects? Do they exist at all?

[V. Spandaryan, adviser to the director of the United States of America and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences] "In transferring to a market economy, in achieving a certain economic effect, in extricating ourselves from the serious economic situation in which we now find ourselves, the Soviet Union's credit-worthiness will rise sharply."

[Correspondent] By all accounts, the West's readiness to grant economic aid to the Soviet Union depends primarily on the Soviet Union itself, on what sort of Union we will have.

Banking Official Cited on Ruble Devaluation

LD1210225190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Interview with Aleksandr Andreyevich Khandruyev, director of the Credit and Finance Scientific Research Institute of USSR Banks, by Aleksandr Khandruyev; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Recent reports about plans to devalue the ruble have led to stormy debates and comments on inevitable price rises which will result from this. For this reason, our correspondent Valeriy Kiosa met with Aleksandr Andreyevich Khandruyev, director of the Credit and Finance Scientific Research Institute of USSR Banks, and asked him what a ruble devaluation involves and what its consequences might be:

[Khandruyev] Devaluation, which is a tried and tested method of monetary policy, is extensively used throughout the world. During the days of the gold standard, devaluation simply meant a reduction in the gold content of the national currency. Nowadays, when the link between money and gold has been severed, devaluation means a reduction in the exchange rate of the national currency in respect of other currencies.

[Kiosa] In other words, a change in the exchange rate of the ruble in foreign economic transactions—nothing more, nothing less?

[Khandruyev] Yes, that is absolutely right. That is precisely what it means. Here it is very important to understand why our country is faced with the need to devalue the national currency. If the ruble is to become convertible, one essential condition is that its exchange rate should be realistic and determined by the interplay of supply and demand. But our country is not ready for this at the moment. Therefore, we have to gradually bring the exchange rate of the ruble closer to the point where its value really is determined by supply and demand.

The ruble is not just nonconvertible. Its exchange rate is also artificially inflated. For this reason, all calculations based on the ruble lead to endless misunderstandings and hold up the process of integrating the Soviet economy with the world economy. The devaluation of the ruble, just like any other economic phenonemon, has a double impact on economic life. On the one hand, devaluation stimulates exports and, for this reason, strengthens the country's export position. On the other hand, devaluation really does lead to a rise in the price of imported goods and, for this reason, constitutes an inflationary factor.

[Kiosa] But people are now saying that devaluation will lead to an inevitable and instantaneous takeoff of prices on our internal market. Is this so?

[Khandruyev] This is absolutely incorrect because there is no direct link between devaluation of the national currency and increased prices for imported commodities. This process develops gradually. Furthermore, the scale and pace of this process are determined by the degree to which the national economy is integrated in the world economy. Here, it is very important to bear in mind that the Soviet economy is in in fact isolated from the world market. For this reason, devaluation of the ruble will not have a marked influence on the dynamics of domestic prices. The rise in prices, which has been gathering pace in recent years, is not connected in any way with any ruble devaluation. The real reason for increased prices is to be found in our own internal problems, including the top-heavy structure of the national economy, the inefficiency of public-sector production, low productivity, and the monopolistic position of producers. All this tends to increase prices.

[Kiosa] By how much will our ruble be devalued?

[Khandruyev] The size of the devaluation is a complex question. As you know, there is an official exchange rate for the ruble, an exchange for non-trade payments, and, finally, the market rate for the ruble. In other words, the ruble exchange rate which is set by supply and demand on the so-called black market. It would be a mistake to think that we could go over straight away to a ruble exchange rate adjusted on the basis of market value. The devaluation of the ruble is expected to be quite a modest one, roughly two rubles to the dollar.

Joint Stock Commercial Bank Founded in Moscow

LD1210223590 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Text] A joint stock commercial bank was founded in Moscow today. It endorsed its charter and elected a monitoring council, board, and auditing commission. Thirteen organizations are cofounders of the bank with investment assets of some 180 million rubles. Investments are welcome from individuals. The bank's leadership intends to coordinate its activity for meeting the commercial interests of clients as much as possible and contribute to the financial stabilization of the Soviet economy.

Commentary Reviews Declining Oil Production

LD1310181890 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 13 Oct 90

[Commentary by Sergey (Sunsov)]

[Text] Three East European countries—Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary—are said to be among those worst hit by cutbacks in Soviet oil supplies. Sergey (Sunsov) writes:

Oil production in the Soviet Union is falling. Experts say it was down three percent last year, and the prospects for oil output for the early 1990's are grim. Soviet car owners have already been made to feel the squeeze after fuel was rationed at the petrol stations. At the height of the harvesting season this year, farm machinery had to sit idle in many parts of the country because of scant fule supplies. The country's older oil fields are near exhaustion, but the cost of prosepcting for new ones is too high because these are locted in remote areas.

With settling of accounts to be made in hard currency and world prices as of 1 January, Czechoslovakia will have to pay from three to four times more for a ton of Soviet oil than this year. The Institute for Economic Studies in Vienna feels that East Europe's annual bill for Soviet oil supplies would be up $12 billion. But there will be no reversal to what happened 10 years ago when this country had helped blunt the effect of two oil shocks for its partners by delivering oil at prices 50 percent below what it cost in the world market.

Professor (Ninel Bautina) of the International Center for Economic Studies, explains She says that there is no place for philanthropy in a market-led economy which is run on harsh economic realities. The sooner this country parts with its former illusions, she said, the better. The economic plight of those three countries has worsened further by their foreign debt, low competitiveness of export products, and inconvertible currencies. Professor (Bautina) again: She recommends that three measures should be taken. One is to carry foreign exchange operations where they make sense, but no more than 30 percent of their total trade, mostly in more promising areas. The next measure is to use clearing payments in dollars. And finally, the national currencies must be realigned to market rates. All of this could help ease the mutual settling of accounts, social tensions, and consumer shortages, concluded Professor (Bautina).

Conversion Leads to Krasnoyarsk Linoleum Plant

PM1510140390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 10 Oct 90

[Report by Ye. Kozlova; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Kozlova] This is Krasnoyarsk linoleum. By our standards it was produced in record time. Only two years passed between the conception of the idea and its embodiment.

How did you manage to start up the production line so quickly? In less than two years?

[V.A. Nemkov, deputy chief engineer of the Yenisey chemical combine] We put our initiative to the city party committee. At our request, the committee gathered representatives of the biggest machine building plants in the city, construction workers, and suppliers. Having discussed all the questions, we set up production-sharing, detailing what equipment should be produced and by whom.

[Kozlova] And so conversion promoted a good cause and united Krasnoyarsk plants—Krasmash, the television, radio, and shipbuilding plants, and the truck trailer enterprise—by means of production sharing. Construction workers did their bit. Some produced dye, others drying equipment, and yet others the cooling drums. The initiative born during the times of the party's management of industry gained support and bore real fruits. Six million square meters of linoleum per year will come off the production line. In any event, that is the rated capacity. [passage omitted]

Agricultural

Moscow TV Reports on Status of Grain Harvest

LD1410160290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 14 Oct 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] This year's harvest totals 300 million tonnes of grain. But that is what is in the fields. The gross grain harvest so far amounts to 215 million tonnes, and the pace of grain purchases remains low, particularly in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. [passage omitted]

Tselinograd Oblast Completes Grain Threshing

PM1510133190 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 12 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent V. Savelyev: "Virgin Land Grain"]

[Excerpt] Tselinograd Oblast—After completing the threshing of grain crops, Tselinograd Oblast farms have switched the transport released from attachment to the combines to moving grain to the elevators. The task now is to transport by the middle of October almost as much grain as used to be transported in just over one month. It is a question of 1,338,000 tonnes—60 percent of the state order. Can the grain-reception enterprises cope with such a load?

"Prior to this, on fine days, we were receiving up to 75,000 tonnes of grain with a moisture content of 16-25 percent," Rashid Kakimov, general director of Tselinograd Grain Products Association, shared his calculations. "We are now gearing up for 100,000-120,000 tonnes a day. We have the ability to dry half of this grain right here. I believe we will succeed." [passage omitted]

Smolensk Still Working To Save Potato Crop

PM1610091990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 11 Oct 90

[Report by V. Vengrzhnovskiy and I. Grinenko; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] For the money the state forfeits annually as a result of the loss of one percent of the vegetable harvest, 1,740 large-scale potato storage facilities could be built. Yet we waste at least 30 percent of the harvest annually. This year's losses will beat all records.

[Reporter] A very good crop lies here, in this waterlogged ground. Sixty percent of the entire potato crop, and approximately the same amount of vegetables. Thousands of hectares of grain, now lost, are still standing, or rather lying, in the fields. The flax harvest has not gotten started. The Smolensk Oblast Soviet declared an emergency situation as regards the harvest back at the beginning of August. Measures were proposed that looked likely to save the rich harvest. A task force set up at the Oblast Soviet Executive Committee is adopting emergency measures, but they all get bogged down in this water-logged ground which cannot take any more moisture.

The situation resembles a natural disaster. This silent calamity has reduced all the Smolensk Oblast inhabitants' hopes to nothing. Some 42,000 city dwellers from labor collectives, institutions, design bureaus, and scientific research institutes, plus students and school children are helping daily on nearby farms. Despite everything, the potatoes on sale in the market are imported. Couriers have been dispatched from Smolensk to buy if not potatoes, then at least seed potatoes.

Tell me, does this mean that Smolensk Oblast is changing from a potato producer into a potato consumer?

[A.I. Borshchevskiy, deputy chairman of the Smolensk Agro-Industrial Complex] No, I would not say that, not even now. After all, a good potato crop has been grown. You can see that even in this field. We still have a chance to wrest enough potatoes from the elements to provide ourselves fully with seed potatoes. We are lifting potatoes at the moment. Where the combines cannot go we are using plows and cultivators, and where even that is impossible we dig by hand. We have introduced material incentives. We let people have free of charge between 20 and 30 percent of the potatoes they lift. And we have told all city dwellers: Comrades, if you want to supply yourselves with potatoes for the winter, come and help in the fields and we will give you full scope. Incidentally, thousands of Smolensk inhabitants have already responded.

Agricultural Developments for 9-13 Oct Reported

LD1410105290

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 9-13 October, unless indicated otherwise. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parentheses at the end of each item.

9 October

"Belgorod Oblast fulfilled its five-year plan for sugar beet sales to the state with deliveries now totalling 17 million tonnes. The reconstruction of the oblast's 11 refineries is in progress." (0700)

"As of today, Uzbekistan will have delivered 4 million tonnes of cotton this season, the fastest pace that has ever been reached by the republic. Material incentives, such as the higher purchase prices introduced by the republican government, have helped the republic reach this level. Even so, the pace could have been even higher if all machineryhad been in proper working order." (0700)

"Peasants from Tselinograd and Kokchetav Oblasts have completed the harvest and handed over 2.859 million tonnes of grain to the state." (1200)

"Kirghiz farmers have fulfilled their plan for cotton sales to the state by delivering over 70,000 tonnes of cotton to the ginning works." (1200)

"Turkmen cotton farmers have gathered 1 million tonnes of raw cotton in less than six weeks." (1200)

"Farmers in Kazakhstan have harvested 30 million tonnes of grain to date." (1600)

10 October

"More than 4,824,233 tonnes of cotton have been harvested since the start of the season." (Tashkent Domestic Service in Russian) (1300)

11 October

"Ukrainian farmers are close to completing the harvest of late crops. Potatoes have been harvested from three-quarters of the area, with more than 4 million tonnes recorded. Sugar beet has been harvested from two-thirds of the area. However, the potato and sugar beet harvests are a little lower than last year." (0900)

"By 8 October, potatoes will have been harvested from 75 percent of the country and from 72 percent of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The pace of harvesting valuable vegetable produce has increased considerably." (Moscow Television Service in Russian) (1800)

"The situation in the Bryansk Oblast potato fields continues to be serious. However, in the past two weeks, the state of affairs has improved substantially. To date, the harvest has been gathered from 78 percent of the plantations, and some 40-50 percent of the potatoes have been sent to the country's industrial centers. Of course, the slight improvement in the weather has helped; however, the soil, drenched from the constant rain, does not yet allow the full-scale use of potato harvesting combines. Combine operators' wages were raised 30-50 percent to alleviate the situation. The oblast's collective and state farms are using the most diverse incentives. At last, a sufficient number of residents has come to the rural workers' aid. Potatoes in some places are being harvested by hand, but at least it is being done. Some farms, as an incentive, share the potatoes: If you pick one pail of potatoes for the state, you can pick a pail of potatoes for yourself. It can be said that the state of emergency declared in the oblast is having an effect." (Moscow Television Service in Russian) (1800)

12-13 October

No significant developments reported.

Military

Officers Working To Dispel Military Coup 'Myth'

PM1610102990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Oct 90 Second Edition p 2

[Report by special correspondent N. Belan: "The 'Military Coup': Dispelling the Myth"]

[Text] "I regret what happened. Now that I have studied all the information and documents, I am convinced that these were exercises. I honestly and sincerely tell you this. I was confused, emotions prevailed over reason. I reiterate: Normal exercises were being held, and the people whom I confused must know this."

"Mikhail, could it be that your seniors pressured you, forced you to retract what you asserted a few days ago?"

"Nobody has pressured me, believe me. And, what would have been the point, seeing that we are now dealing with facts? I found them convincing; all is clear in my mind now."

This was a brief interview I got from Major M. Pustobayev, who is familiar to readers from his letter published by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the "Vzglyad" television program—both statements by the officer appeared last Friday. Our article entitled "The Mythical Jackboot" in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's last issue was devoted to them. Those who saw "Vzglyad" may recall that RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputy S. Shatalov visited Maj. M. Pustobayev together with the program's anchorman. Let us hear his opinion.

"Yes, I am convinced: This really was a scheduled snap inspection of units and subunits," Sergey Dmitriyevich told me.

"And why did you not contact the regimental commander to find out? Or was he not available on the spot?"

"I did not contact him. Believe me: I was very perturbed by the information I received and I took immediate action. I probably got too worked up. I was told to contact the command—and I should have taken this step."

These were my conversations with RSFSR People's Deputy S. Shatalov and Maj. M. Pustobayev. They took place immediately following their meeting with the Air Force and Airborne Troops command on Monday 15 October. The meeting was also attended by mass media representatives, including representatives of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and the "Vzglyad" program. According to Colonel General Ye. Shaposhnikov, Air Force commander in chief, and RSFSR People's Deputies Colonel General V. Achalov, Lieutenant General G. Benov, Colonel A. Rutskoy, and S. Shatalov, the conversation was frank, convincing, and useful and it clarified the situation around the so-called "puzzling movements of troops near Moscow" in September this year.

But why did all the absurd rumors about "secret schemes" by the military circulate? Sergey Shatalov and Mikhail Pustobayev believe: Because of the lack of sufficient information; because nothing would have happened if the military had announced what it was planning to do. There is another view. Russian People's Deputy and Hero of the Soviet Union A. Rutskoy, for example, believes that this is not a matter of a lack of sufficient information but rather of a lack of sufficient responsibility by those who let loose their personal conjectures and stories and agitated public opinion.

Let us not go into arguments. One point is important: The myth about "strange military activeness" and a "coup" seems to be on the way to being dispelled.

I asked the Air Force commander in chief another question: What will happen to Maj. Pustobayev after all this?

"Nobody will punish him unfairly, let alone exact vengeance," he replied. "We have to investigate whether he disclosed any secret information. There will obviously be also a discussion at the regimental officers' assembly...."

Supreme Soviet Committee Analyzes Sub Sinking

91UM0034A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by V. Litovkin: "After the Tragedy in the Norwegian Sea"]

[Text] **The USSR Supreme Soviet continues to analyze the causes and circumstances of the loss of the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets.**

No single ship in the last two years has received so much attention in newspapers and journals and in radio and television broadcasts as the submarine Komsomolets (IZVESTIYA also wrote about it three times this year—the last article was published in No. 252). No single tragedy on the sea or on dry land (42 sailors were lost along with the unique ship) has evoked so many contradictory and irreconcilable judgments and so much emotion as the catastrophe of this submarine. Even the report of the governmental commission that completed its investigation of the circumstances and causes of the loss of the vessel has not managed to bring peace.

Many specialists, including representatives of the Navy, the shipbuilding industry, and the public, without calling into question the conclusions of the governmental commission, believe that it did not tell the whole truth. A number of serious problems that did not receive a comprehensive and objective examination remained beyond the bounds of the efforts of the specialists, and as a result there are no guarantees that a tragedy similar to the one that occurred on 7 April 1989 in the Norwegian Sea will not be repeated.

Participants of a "roundtable" meeting conducted by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs spoke of this with alarm. Submarine officers, Navy veterans, representatives of the shipbuilding industry and design organizations, relatives of the lost sailors, members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Defense and State Security, USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies, specialists on international maritime law, and L. Rezunov, USSR deputy minister of the Shipbuilding Industry, took part in the work of the meeting.

Official invitations were also sent to the leadership of the Navy and to sailors who survived the Komsomolets tragedy, but for various reasons none of them made it to the high-rise building on Kalinin Prospect. V. Minin, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs, opened the meeting.

"Our goal," he said, "is not to confront official organs or to search for the guilty, although that is important, too, but to analyze and eliminate those causes that led and can still lead sailors to catastrophe."

What kind of causes? One of the first is a lack of reliable information. The report of the government commission is so short that it does not present an opportunity for serious analysis and correction of the mistakes that were tolerated or for a fundamental change in relations between the Navy and the military industry. It does not say anything about what lessons were learned from the tragedy or what specifically and at what scale has been undertaken by the leadership of the Navy, shipbuilders, and designers of fighting ships to increase the safety and reliability of the equipment, especially rescue equipment, to ensure that it is used, and not to allow the deaths of sailors.

The reliability of combat equipment is one of the basic problems that played an important part in the speeches and reports. Industry has not eliminated some defects in 20 years. Today, as well, there is a need to adopt urgent measures to improve the design of ships, construct them better, and increase the reliability of the equipment aboard them—to introduce modern automated systems to detect and extinguish fires, to provide vessels with fire-extinguishing systems and rescue supplies that are nontoxic and not harmful to the equipment, and to create a unified search-and-rescue service.

Another complex problem is the need for basic changes in the training of military sailors. They must be supplied quickly with modern simulators, which should duplicate the Navy's equipment even as ships and systems come on line. Here is a representative example cited by Captain First Rank (Reserve) A. Khrabtovich: They are ending production of a line of submarines that have already been sailing for 15 years, and there are still no simulators for teaching operations aboard them.

Of course it is time to end the practice of pulling submarine specialists away for outside management work.

"It is not the fault but the misfortune of the lost crew," declared Vice Admiral (Reserve) Ye. Chernov, Hero of the Soviet Union, at the meeting, "that despite their courage and heroism they were not trained to function in a critical situation on such a unique submarine as the Komsomolets. As a result they could neither save her nor preserve their own lives. And the leaders of the Navy bear direct responsibility for this."

It is a pity no one was at the meeting from the leadership of the Navy. As a result, the meeting's participants did not receive a direct answer to the obvious question, what kind of lessons were learned from the tragedy?

The meeting's participants addressed a letter to the country's parliamentarians. It was suggested that the latter use the means at their disposal to organize an additional, in-depth investigation of the causes and circumstances of the loss of the nuclear-powered submarine Komsomolets, taking into consideration, of course, the materials of the governmental commission as well as those of the investigation carried out by the participants of the "roundtable," and to monitor all practical efforts to implement measures planned by the Navy to lower the accident rate aboard ships.

They also proposed that comprehensive expert groups of independent specialists be formed under parliamentary committees with the goal of studying and analyzing the actual situation in the Navy and that their proposals be examined in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Work over the mistakes continues. The dialogue between specialists and the public continues. Its goal is not to permit the loss of our military men and to increase the reliability and qualitative parameters of our combat equipment and, consequently, of the country's security.

Costs of Dismantling Krasnoyarsk Radar Assessed

91UM0035A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 9 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by military observer N. Panyukov in response to reader's letter: "Using a Sledgehammer on a Secret Installation"]

[Text] **This "operation" will cost us hundreds of millions of rubles. And, after expending them, we will not receive anything, other than a pile of debris and a feeling of bitterness.**

Complying with a treaty with the Americans, we are scrapping the Krasnoyarsk radar which was supposed to have gone into operation this year. It pains me to hear about this also because, in my time, I dedicated almost two years of my military life to the erection of this very same radar. Why did this new installation, which cost the country hundreds of millions of rubles of the people's money, end up being scrapped? How did the Americans respond to this step of ours? And, most important: Will the world be any safer without the Krasnoyarsk radar?

[Signed] *V. Ivashov, builder. Sverdlovsk.*

Through a gap in the wall, where there used to be a door, soldiers were hauling cumbersome cargo carts filled with all kinds of odds and ends, which until very recently constituted the "heart and nerves" of the radar. But now these condensers, which look like canisters, of which there are many, the heavy sections of cable with copper wiring that look like fat boa constrictors, the endless number of rustproof pipe fragments with shocking inscriptions, and all of the other things, in the words of the owners of the dismantled station, are nothing more than rubbish to be used as salvage or scrap metal.

"Yes, yes," sighs Lieutenant Colonel N. Soldatov, who heads the work here. "None of this is suitable any more for reassembly..."

Nikolay Pavlovich is one of the radar oldtimers. And, of course, he knows what he is talking about. Everything here was set up before his eyes. With difficulty and torment. Nikolay Pavlovich remembers 50 degree frosts and ordeals in getting the equipment ready. He simply could not watch how the gas cutters hack up the robot mechanical arm mounting (one of the more intricate units of a radar complex) with the fiery jet of a blowtorch.

"The work was awful.... Everything for the first time, everything by feel. I am not talking about material expenditures. Millions were lost before this robot began to 'run' with modules in the antenna field."

It is painful to watch the sledgehammer and the blowtorch on a spree at the expense of the keen and delicate creation of human hands. It is painful to watch how right before your eyes the hundreds of millions of rubles of the people's money invested in the radar are being turned into ashes. What is more, this dismantling, this "Sisyphean toil" will also not be cheap: According to the most modest calculations it will come to no less than 50 million rubles [R].

And questions cannot be avoided here. How did this happen? Why was something built which, as it turned out, should not have been built?

Of course, no one thought that within four years of the start of the radar site construction U.S. President Reagan would suddenly come out with the SDI program, and that the "Krasnoyarsk secret installation" would become the U.S. Administration's trump card in disarmament negotiations. However, this reasoning is not very comforting. Both because it does not make it any easier for the state treasury, and because the ABM (antiballistic missile) limitation treaty, as we know, already existed at that time, and, of course, it could have been predicted that its violation would not be greeted with "loud cheers."

Yes, naturally, we did not have any malicious intent. Yes, we began to build the radar near Krasnoyarsk and not in the Far North only because this was supposed to have been three times cheaper (in truth, the tightwad pays double). Yes, we do have arguments on this score, that due to its technical characteristics the Krasnoyarsk radar cannot be considered to have all of the features of an ABM system... Well, what of it? The radar is being dismantled. And the money has vanished.

And how many similar installations with built-in doom have we created throughout the country? The Crimean AES [nuclear electric power station], the plant for destroying chemical munitions in Chapayevsk, the Mukachevo radar... You cannot count them all.

True, with respect to the Krasnoyarsk radar this doom, I understood after consulting with specialists, was not entirely irreversible. Given the desire, it could have been defended nonetheless. And the main argument for this is that no matter how paradoxical it appears, the danger of nuclear catastrophe is not reduced but is increased as a result of the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar. For without it the northeastern missile-attack sector for our country remains virtually unmonitored.

The fact is that, in comparison with the radar, the so-called outer space echelon (several ESV's—artificial Earth satellite vehicles), gives a very low reliability of correct decisionmaking. Possessing the capability of monitoring the movement of missiles only in the boost phase when the jet engines are emitting heat, it also issues false alarms very frequently. The ESV's can interpret conventional man-made space objects that are deorbiting and falling into the thick layers of the atmosphere as ballistic missiles attacking us. There is no denying that it is a dangerous situation.

Nonetheless, this is the reality. And the dangers of errors in it will continue until such time as we replace the Krasnoyarsk radar with two warning stations, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. But this, the specialists believe, will cost not less than R2 billion. Where do we get this? And even given the resources it will hardly be possible to put these stations into operation any earlier than the year 2000. This, then, is the deplorable result.

The people working on the dismantling are puzzled as to why the Americans demanded that we pull down even the walls of the former radar.

"We should have told Bush and Cheney not to taunt us," a crane operator said angrily, interrupting operation of the controls for a minute. "Why remove eight floors from the structure?"

And if you consider that the USSR and the United States are not alone in possessing nuclear weapons, and that there is a danger of so-called unsanctioned launches from other regions, then you think to yourself: Is this dismantling not damaging to the whole world?

Incidentally, as B. Surikov, candidate of technical sciences and a senior consultant at the United States and Canada Institute, told me recently, American experts are also beginning to understand this. They are bewildered by the fact that the U.S. public did not receive timely exhaustive information on the actual role of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Does this mean that our politicians and military specialists did not do their work right? It appears that they should have been more persistent in showing that the Krasnoyarsk radar was not so dangerous to peace that only one word should be pronounced: Destroy...

However, what is the point of blaming the politicians now? They had their own logic for their actions, and their own high idea and good motives: Once and for all remove whatever suspicions of us there might be and unblock one more obstruction on the road to normal relations between the USSR and the United States. It is possible that our politicians also counted on the infectiousness of a good example, calculating that the United States will also dismantle, or at the very least mothball, some of its own radars, for example in Greenland and Great Britain. Unfortunately, nothing came of this. And all the American radars, in contrast to our own, are continuing to carry out their service in good working order, and we, according to the official military-political strategy of "rivalry" now prevalent in the United States, continue in the meantime to remain their main enemy until the year 2000. An enemy that has to be economically exhausted and politically discredited...

While we are celebrating a "funeral banquet" for the Krasnoyarsk radar today, we cannot remain silent about how the dismantling of such an expensive installation is being organized, and about what the people are saying about this. It is bad that it is not entirely clear to this day: What will there be in place of the radar?

Various rumors are making the rounds: Some people are scaring taiga neighborhoods that there will soon be a housewarming here for a new prison, and some try to convince you that there are plans for the construction of a giant furniture combine here. But it seems to me that the most rational idea on this score was expressed by 75-year-old taiga resident Roman Yegorovich Nebylitsa, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War. He lives in the taiga, not far from the radar operators' compound. The old man heard that the radar may be converted into a relay station.

"Then, they say, you will be able to hear Moscow and America over the receiver," Roman Yegorovich said pensively. "The old woman and I bought a good radio set, but all it receives is Krasnoyarsk. It is boring. Klavdiya and I are now left here by ourselves..."

It is sad, but as I understand it, it is fated that the hopes of Roman Yegorovich and Klavdiya Ivanovna, along with thousands of Siberians who dream of saturated airwaves, will not materialize.

"Representatives of the Ministry of Communications also came here 'to consider a relay station,' as did 'buyers' from other departments, but no one, apparently, really liked the 'commodity,'" explains Lieutenant Colonel V. Maksimov, acting chief engineer. "They sigh and they sigh, and they are all enraptured by this, as they all say, 'miracle on the Yennisey highway,' but then they leave without anything. You see, it is a little far from civilization... At present, only the Ministry of Internal Affairs is not refusing. But does this ministry have enough imagination to put something other than a regular correctional labor establishment here?"

It is amazing... We are talking so much now about conversion. On this question we frequently waver over trifles. And here a multimillion-ruble facility is being left to the mercy of fate. Is it possible that excellent industrial premises are not needed by even one ministry for the organization of a new effort that would be useful to the entire state, and is it possible in the final analysis that no one needs an entire compound with multistory dwellings and well-built apartments?

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA is prepared to submit for public review, with the participation of foreign experts if necessary, projects for the reasonable utilization—within the framework of negotiations—of the "remains" of the Krasnoyarsk radar.

Write, call: 257-25-20.

Missiles May Be Converted for Civilian Use

PM1510121790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 First Edition p 4

[Letter from reader and response by Major M. Arkhipov under the "Briefing for Readers" rubric: "Is It Worth Destroying the Missiles?"]

[Excerpts] It is well known that Titan-2 ICBM's are used in the United States to launch payloads into space and that it is planned to use MX ICBM stages in the future Taurus carrier rocket. Is similar work being carried out in our country?

[Signed] Senior Lieutenant L. Shimanovskiy

Major M. Arkhipov, senior officer of the press group of the chief of Defense Ministry space units, says: "[passage omitted] Our specialists are also carrying out work in this direction. At a difficult time for the country there is no point in destroying enormous material values by blowing them up or crushing them. The technical side of things requires that a number of structural modifications be made to the ICBM stages, and that a cycle of ground and flight tests be carried out to confirm the effectiveness of these modifications.

"Within the framework of the conversion of strategic offensive arms it may be that with us too new carrier rockets will appear which are capable of resolving scientific and national economic tasks.

Briefing Held Concerning Fall Military Draft

91UM0009B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Oct 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Major A. Vorobyev and Major M. Syrtlanov: "Briefing in the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center": "The Draft—a Concern of the Entire Country"]

[Text] In accordance with a decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 25 September, the next draft into the active military service is under way. Many thousands of youths will join the ranks under the battle standards of defenders of the Motherland. The draft is always a lot of work for the soviets, party organs, military commissariats, commanders, and political workers, particularly in today's rather complex sociopolitical situation.

A briefing that was organized by the USSR Ministry of Defense press center was devoted to problems of the fall draft. It was held on 2 October in the Central Soviet Army Club. Representatives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, and the Main Staff of the Ground Forces answered journalists' questions.

"It is not necessary to convince anyone of the fact that the Army is needed not only by the Army," noted Colonel General D. Grinkevich, chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces. However a number of local, republic, and even Union organs at times do not go any farther in acknowledging this truth. Moreover, there are cases of a local approach to the resolution of questions of manpower acquisition and the performance of military service which have been reported more than once in the press.

Specific figures were given at the briefing that characterize the results of last year's draft and this spring's draft. Unfortunately, the figures are alarming. The number of those who evade the draft is increasing, and this does not always receive a thorough assessment. For example, the figure 462 was heard. This is how many criminal cases were instituted in Moscow involving cases of draft evasion. Legal proceedings were brought against only 14 persons. It is clear that we cannot resign ourselves to such permissiveness. This is made even more apparent by the fact that many republics, krays, and oblasts are successfully resolving all draft call tasks and that valuable experience has been gained in the preparation of youths for Army service. This applies for example to Stavropolskiy Kray and to Voronezh, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, and some other oblasts of Russia; to the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; and to a number of other autonomous republics. The spring draft call plan has been fully met in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. Belorussia is furnishing an adequate replenishment for the Armed Forces.... In a word, there are a lot of places where employees of the mass media could find good examples of organization of the effort and people who are doing their duty, including among officers of military commissariats where there are many conscientious workers. Unfortunately many publications, as was noted at the briefing, do not report on this.

Answering the questions of journalists, Major General A. Gorbachev, chief of the Directorate of Organizational-Party Work of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; Lieutenant General N. Ter-Grigoryants, deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces; Major General V. Nikitin, chief of a department of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; and Major General V. Bespalov, Moscow City military commissar, threw light on a number of questions associated with organizational, ideological, and legal provisions of the draft.

It was emphasized that the military patriotic education of the youth can be improved only with the participation of the public at large with the involvement of the participants of the Great Patriotic War. It is important that our youths get to know about the heroism and deeds of the older generation. Combat and revolutionary traditions must always be in the arsenal of educational work.

The attention of the public was also directed to legislative acts that contradict the USSR Constitution which were adopted in a number of republics and are aimed at pulling the Army apart into national headquarters, limiting the geography of a draft call to the territory of one or another region or even an oblast. This route is fraught with a breakdown of the foundations of the country's security.

The problems of the Fall draft that were examined at the briefing are inseparably linked with the implementation of military reform which is called on to give the Armed Forces a new quality status. There was frank talk about the sources of nonregulation behavior and other negative phenomena.

It was our civilian colleague who asked about the draft: What is especially significant about it? We answered: Everything, including the send-offs which are solemn, with parting words by parents and veterans, for the lads are off to serve the Motherland.

After the briefing its participants met with representatives of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers and answered their questions.

Army General I.M. Voloshin Dies 'Suddenly'

PM1510124990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 Second Edition p 8

[Obituary: "Army General Ivan Makarovich Voloshin"]

[Excerpts] The eminent Soviet military commander Army General Ivan Makarovich Voloshin has passed away suddenly. A loyal son of the Soviet people and participant in the Great Patriotic War, who devoted all his waking hours to selflessly serving the motherland and the cause of the Communist Party of which he became a member in 1944, has departed this life.

I.M. Voloshin was born 27 May 1923 into a peasant family in the village of Podmogilnoye in Kirovograd Oblast's Kirovogradskiy Rayon. He served in the Armed Forces from 1941, rising from infantry school student to army general. [passage omitted]. In 1985-1989 he was first deputy and then commander in chief of a forces sector, accomplishing great work in improving troops' combat proficiency. Latterly he was a military inspector and adviser to a USSR Ministry of Defense group of inspector generals. [passage omitted]

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, A.I. Lukyanov, N.I. Ryzhkov, D.T. Yazov,

M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, N.I. Shlyaga, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, V.N. Chernavin, V.M. Shuralev, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, V.F. Yermakov, Yu.A. Yashin, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, N.V. Ogarkov, V.I. Petrov, S.L. Sokolov, B.P. Bugayev, O.A. Losik, Ye.F. Ivanovskiy, A.D. Lizichev, I.G. Pavlovskiy, A.N. Soshnikov, D.S. Sukhorukov, I.N. Shkadov, M.M. Zaytsev, A.I. Gribkov

Baltic Republics

Baltic Education Ministers Sign Agreement

LD1510164790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] It is reported from Jurmala that as a result of a two-day meeting, a treaty on cooperation has been signed here by the education ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Joint work on putting together educational programs and supplies is envisioned. A regular exchange of information and the holding of conferences and seminars are planned.

Nordic Council To Open Offices in Baltic Capitals

LD1510185290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 14 Oct 90

[Text] As we have announced previously, the Nordic Council has decided to open information bureaus in the Baltic republic capitals of Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius.

In addition to this, the Nordic Council has adopted another unprecedented resolution: to permit participation by the Baltic representatives at various committee meetings of the council.

The final decision concerning permission for Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian representatives to participate in these meetings will be adopted by the appropriate Nordic Council commtitees.

Estonia's Lippmaa Discusses Relations With Moscow

AU1510182790 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 15 Oct 90 pp 200-202

[Unattributed interview with Endel Lippmaa, Estonian special minister responsible for talks on Estonia's independence from the Soviet Union; place and date not given: "Sucked Away Our Resources"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. Lippmaa, the governments of the three Baltic republics do not seem to be particularly pleased about German reunification. What bothers you?

[Lippmaa] We are very happy about German reunification for human and political reasons. However, we are not pleased by the fact that the treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany, which was initialed on 13 September, again sets down borders in Europe.

[DER SPIEGEL] Estonia's President Ruutel as well as government representatives from Lithuania and Latvia protested in writing to the U.S. Senate that the Soviet-German treaty "contains principles that violate international law." Why?

[Lippmaa] The Helsinki Final Act protects the borders in Europe against changes by force. But it is permitted to correct borders by peaceful means. However the Soviet-German treaty, Article 2, no longer envisages corrections of borders by peaceful means. There it is set down in writing that the borders in Europe are inviolable as of the signing of the treaty. This violates international law because it makes decisions on the rights of third parties that are not parties to the treaty. The Soviet Union considers the Baltic states as its territory. By signing such a treaty, Germany is joining the Soviet Union in the attempt to protect Soviet conquests.

[DER SPIEGEL] Baltic government members and legislators even compared the treaty with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939. Is this not a malicious insinuation. And why did the Baltic governments not protest immediately in Moscow and Bonn?

[Lippmaa] The text of the treaty was not known. In contrast to the "two-plus-four" agreement of 12 September, it was not published. We were able to protest only after a press agency had made the text available to us. Subsequently we went to the two German governments and the four guarantor powers.

[DER SPIEGEL] You mean Germany has a special responsibility for the Baltic states?

[Lippmaa] Yes because Germany was one of the signatories of the secret protocol of 1939. Germany at least owes us good will and the intention to correct the injustice that was done to us.

[DER SPIEGEL] What do you now expect Germany to do?

[Lippmaa] It would be great if the Germans dealt only with their own borders and not with those of other states. It is not particularly good that Germany makes decisions on the borders of all states in Europe in a treaty with the Soviet Union. This is all; we do not expect anything else.

[DER SPIEGEL] The rigid positions of the Baltic states, their adherence to treaties from the remote past, appear strange to the West.

[Lippmaa] Our interest in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact is easy to explain: This injustice hurt us in the Baltic states more than anyone else can imagine because it was always said that we voluntarily joined the Soviet Union. This propaganda lie is still used by the Soviet side.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are responsible for the talks with Moscow on Estonia's independence. How do you assess these talks?

[Lippmaa] They are neither serious nor substantive, and they are certainly not negotiations. Real negotiations in line with an agreed agenda took place only with the summit between Bush and Gorbachev in Helsinki. Afterwards, Moscow downgraded the meeting to consultations, claiming that the Baltic republics are sovereign republics but not states.

[DER SPIEGEL] Which obstacle was the most difficult one in the negotiations so far?

[Lippmaa] Our desire for independence, of course. The Soviets do not want to hear anything of this. They want to keep us in the Union in one way or another, in a federation or confederation or in whatever entity. But we are no longer interested in any form of union but only in independence; thus we are currently in a dead end without the slightest sign of a way out.

[DER SPIEGEL] And therefore the inhabitants of the Baltic states prefer to look back in anger instead of looking ahead?

[Lippmaa] We are certainly looking ahead, toward independence, in which we can solve our problems ourselves. Hoping that the economic conditions of the Baltic states can be improved within the framework of the Soviet Union is simply absurd.

[DER SPIEGEL] The government in Tallinn wants to close Estonia's borders to the neighboring republics. What for?

[Lippmaa] Look at Germany. In the former GDR there was a socialist planned economy with the corresponding miserable result. Now the new united Germany closes its borders to East Europe to a great extent. Why does the new border not remain as open and permeable as the border between the GDR and its eastern neighbors was in the past? Because in the poor part of the united Germany it is impossible to build up a sensible economy if there is a giant hole to the even poorer Poland. In the same way we cannot build a sensible economy in the Baltic states when we leave a whole to the East through which all our resources are sucked away.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is the border to Latvia also to be closed?

[Lippmaa] On principle, yes. But whether we have to do border checks on the border to Latvia depends on whether Latvia will have a real border with Russia or not. If Latvia agrees on efficient border checks with Russia, we can do without monitoring our borders with Latvia.

[DER SPIEGEL] What does Estonia want to achieve specifically with these new borders?

[Lippmaa] Our food and consumer goods are sold for worthless paper rubles [R]. And there are enormous amounts of these rubles in Russia. In our country one kg of beef costs about 6R, in Moscow it costs almost R30. Of course, some peasants and enterprises prefer to sell their goods there in one way or another.

[DER SPIEGEL] The border checks give weight to the suspicion that they are part of a new Estonian strategy on the march toward independence.

[Lippmaa] We have never denied that. We want to get out because we cannot survive in a socialist planned economy. There is the example of the former GDR again. There everything is being done now to get rid of the planned economy. We also want to get rid of it, but we cannot do so without borders, at least not until Russia has removed the socialist command economy.

[DER SPIEGEL] How do you see the chances for an economic recovery in the Baltic states?

[Lippmaa] First of all, we have to modernize our production. However, this is not possible at the moment, and in my view it is also not desirable at present because improving our economy would be something like suicide because it would lead to uncontrolled mass immigration and a flood of crime.

[DER SPIEGEL] What do you mean?

[Lippmaa] In the Soviet Union there is a well-organized mafia. This is always attracted to those places where the standard of living is a bit higher.

[DER SPIEGEL] You are pessimistic in every respect. Do you no longer have any trust in Gorbachev and his crisis management?

[Lippmaa] Actually, it is no longer important who rules in Moscow.

[DER SPIEGEL] Would you perhaps even be pleased if a dictatorial archconservative came to power in Moscow instead of Gorbachev?

[Lippmaa] This is no longer relevant to us, we have declared our independence. It is not our business who is in the lead in Moscow. But we certainly recognize that Gorbachev is an outstanding statesman.

Russian-Estonian Border Towns Fear Restrictions

PM1610085190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Leonid Levitskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Do Not Rush the Treaty Through"]

[Text] Tallinn—This was the request made to the Russian and Estonian Supreme Soviets by soviet chairmen in six Leningrad Oblast and Estonian cities. The appeal was also signed by Leningrad Oblast Soviet Chairman Yu. Yarov.

The six cities—Ivangorod, Kingisepp, and Slantsy in Leningrad Oblast and Narva, Kohtla-Jarve, and Sillamae in Estonia—are a kind of "free zone" established for decades. The cities and their populations have close links. The border between Russia and Estonia was a conventional, purely cartographic concept. Now that both republics have declared themselves sovereign states, the border becomes a reality. Its status and questions of the future coexistence of border cities will be determined by an interstate treaty between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and the Estonian republic. According to the press, it has already been prepared and is on the point of being signed. This has alarmed the cities' populations. Particularly as, according to the leaders of the cities' soviets, no one sought their opinion when the agreement was being prepared. "The signing of the treaty without considering the actual situation in the territories adjoining the border between Leningrad Oblast and Estonia could make the situation extremely complicated and lead to unforeseen consequences," the statement says. It stresses that "if the Supreme Soviets sign the treaty without considering our opinion, we will reserve the right to take concerted action to protect the rights and fundamental interests of our territories' inhabitants."

Estonia, Pskov Oblast Sign Cooperation Documents

LD1510173690 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 12 Oct 90

[Text] Today in Tallinn talks came to an end between the Republic of Estonia Government and representatives of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Pskov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies. For two days economic cooperation and organizing of trade were discussed, and this included import and export of goods. The protocol of the Estonian Government and Pskov Oblast soviet representatives was signed by Raivo Vare, minister of state, and Nikolay Nikolayev, first deputy chairman of Pskov Oblast executive committee.

A trade agreement for 1991 between the Republic of Estonia and Pskov Oblast was another document which was signed. It was considered necessary to continue close cooperation in the economic sphere as well as in developing the social sphere between Estonia and Leningrad city and oblast as well as with Pskov Oblast.

Estonia Bans Alcohol, Potato Exports

PM1610092090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

[Untitled item from PRAVDA-TASS-INTERFAX roundup]

[Text] Tallinn—On 5 October Estonia banned the export from the republic of vodka, liqueurs, brandy, champagne, wine, beer, and potatoes. The restrictions do not extend to goods obtained for personal consumption or to private producers of potatoes. These products can only be exported with special licenses.

Landsbergis Congratulates Gorbachev on Peace Prize

LD1510223890 Moscow TASS in English 2027 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Vilnius October 15 TASS—Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis said the Nobel Committee "had grounds" to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Landsbergis told the Lithuanian ELTA news agency that Gorbachev's "contribution to efforts to avoid destructive war is indisputable".

"Although Lithuania experienced the Soviet Union's ill-meaning and even hostile policy towards itself, there are things that are much more important than those that we can see from our land," he said.

Landsbergis said that he had sent a congratulatory message to Gorbachev.

Maslyukov Interviewed on Talks With Lithuania

LD1110230190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1630 GMT 11 Oct 90

["Topical Interview" with Yuriy D. Maslyukov, member of the Presidential Council and chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), by correspondent L. Khatayevich; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Khatayevich] On 2 October the first meeting was held of the delegations of the Soviet Union and Lithuania on matters we all know about, and before asking you, a member of the Soviet delegation, about the way it all went, I would like to ask you a purely arithmetic question. As we know, the Soviet Union set up its delegation immediately after the moratorium. It was on 9 July. The Lithuanian delegation was formed much later, and a meeting could only be held on 2 October. What was the matter? Why did it happen like that? Why could it not have been speeded up despite the fact that it would seem that both sides have an interest in accelerating this process?

[Maslyukov] We lost almost one-and-a-half months before the start of the talks. I think this is because of the situation in Lithuania itself. For our part, the absence of holdups in tackling these most important matters is a gesture of goodwill. And we must take into account, moreover, that all the economic restrictions that were introduced in connection with these actions of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet were lifted on the very day the moratorium was announced. I believe that there were some sort of domestic political reasons in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet itself.

[Khatayevich] In connection with this I would like to put the following question. Did typically Lithuanian domestic political problems affect the progress of the talks? How do you, as a member of the Soviet delegation, assess the meeting?

[Maslyukov] I think you have made a very subtle point because both the selection of delegation members and the way questions were formulated during the talks all showed that there was a previously agreed, fairly hardline position in determining the approach of the sides, ranging from the formulation of procedural matters to the terminology that should be used in the course of the talks, and even the language of the talks. All this could of course unquestionably be felt: that the Lithuanian delegation had not wasted its time, and that it had prepared very carefully for the talks.

[Khatayevich] Back at the Third Congress of People's Deputies, a fairly hard line was taken by the Congress about the legislative acts adopted in Lithuania. How has our position now altered at the talks, if it has altered in some way? Many of our viewers write in about this. They want to know about it.

[Maslyukov] I think that the directives and decisions of the Congress on matters to do with relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union remain immutable for us. We are religiously guided by them, and will continue to be guided by them. But at the same time, the situation that existed in Lithuania until the declaration of a moratorium on the legislative act of 11 March on the nonmembership of the Soviet Union had brought the whole of Lithuania's national economy to an extremely dangerous point. We saw and understood this perfectly, and on part of the Soviet government this was, if you wish, an act of goodwill in order to help the Lithuanian national economy rapidly restore its potential capacity.

[Khatayevich] And in connection with this, what specific issues were discussed on the October 2? What problems did you manage to resolve? Where is there progress, and where is there not? Where are the dynamics of the negotiations?

[Maslyukov] Look, the negotiations were considered by both parties as preliminary negotiations, as preliminary consultations which were to determine the main areas and conditions of the negotiations themselves besides those matters which I have already mentioned—language, the negotiation procedure, the organization of working groups, protocol matters etc. It was of course very important to establish the negotiation procedure, that is, the total of questions which are to be discussed.

For this it is necessary to set up a whole number of working groups. The basic delegations did not sort through these matters in detail, but each matter which gave rise to some doubts was immediately despatched to that working group which would deal with it.

In our opinion, there will be 8 or 9 such working groups which will discuss all the questions, beginning with rights and statehood and ending with matters of ownership and matters of the provision of decent conditions for all population groups living in Lithuania, including the Polish one, the Russian-speaking one and the population of other ethnic groups. Anyway, one must bear in mind that there are quite a lot of such people there. And besides this, the operation of laws which are now being introduced in the Soviet Union, especially the issues of social provision.

For instance, from 1 October a law has been introduced on the universal increase in pensions for participants in the Great Patriotic War. How will these matters be resolved? Besides this, a whole range of laws which are increasing the social level of provision of a whole range of other population groups... I will not talk about this, this is a subject for a separate conversation. So we have decided to set up a special working group which is to study human rights, matters of social provision, and especially matters of the social provision for invalids and participants in the Great Patriotic War which came into force from 1 October. On the part of the Lithuanian delegation, there was a moment when it attempted to place participants of World War II and participants of the Great Patriotic War on the same footing. This, obviously, is not merely a nicety; this is a stance. But we clearly agreed that a working group would be set up which would study precisely the matter of social provision for participants of the Great Patriotic War.

[Khatayevich] Yuriy Dmitriyevich. As I understand, many groups among the non-Lithuanian population demanded having their observers at this meeting during the period of preparation for this meeting. Was it possible to achieve some compromises in this matter?

[Maslyukov] We put this question to the Lithuanian delegation. Incidentally, in fact, not only you, but we also got very many requests and appeals. I would even perhaps pick out three such groups which demanded their participation, if only with observer status, at these negotiations. They are first and foremost the Lithuanian population which considers the secession of Lithuania as a negative action for their life and categorically disagrees with this. We proposed including two people from this part of the population. There is the group of the Russian-speaking population. We proposed including one person. There is the Polish population group. It is significant, particularly in Vilnius Oblast. We also proposed including one person. Bearing in mind that on the territory of the Lithuanian republic there are more than 150 enterprises which belong to all-Union ownership, there should be some kind of representative of these enterprises.

Our proposals met with a negative response from the Lithuanian SSR delegation, but nevertheless we agreed that without taking into account the opinion of these groups we could not conduct further negotiations. But as to the form of their participation, either as observers or as consultants or with a third status, a working group which was set up on the results of the first meeting should discuss this issue and find a form of participation and consideration of the opinion of other population groups besides those which the delegation at the negotiations represents.

[Khatayevich] As I understand it, you have mainly been discussing procedural questions which, as we have already seen, are very important to any negotiations. But what about economic questions? Have they also been discussed in a purely procedural manner up to now, or has there been a more specific discussion about them?

[Maslyukov] There was a more specific discussion on economic questions. The plan for 1991 is being prepared. This really cannot be put off any further because it is important to ensure the normal functioning of both Lithuania's national economy and also the Soviet enterprises which have ties with Lithuanian enterprises. These questions received understanding from both delegations and we obtained an assurance from Prime

Minister Prunskiene that a plenipotentiary representative of the Economics Ministry would come to discuss all these questions with us. They are not simple ones since quite a large proportion of Lithuania's national economy needs supplies from the Soviet Union, and there are also quite a large number of [Soviet] enterprises which need supplies from enterprises located in the Republic of Lithuania.

[Khatayevich] Well Yuriy Dmitriyevich, as I see it the first step is difficult. No doubt, that step has been taken. Well, the first step is always the most difficult. How is this process of consultation likely to continue?

[Maslyukov] We reached the following agreement, Leonid (?Yefremovich). We set up a special group headed by two deputy prime ministers—on our side comrade Doguzhiyev, Vitaliy Khusseynovich, and on the Lithuanian side Ozalas, the deputy prime minister. Their job is to draw up a list of working groups which must be created within two weeks, a list of the main questions which will be studied by these groups. Then, within two weeks of the meeting—on the 16th-18th evidently—there is to be another meeting which will also be regarded as consultative. But I personally attach very great significance to the fact that it is this meeting's task to fix a date for the start of the negotiations and, consequently, of the moratorium. This is a very important question. I think that everything is lasting longer and turning out to be somewhat more complicated than one would like for the sake of normal relations between Lithuania and the Union. Nonetheless, we are moving along this path. We are making progress.

Lithuanian General Procuracy Group Visits Poland

LD1510231290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Following an invitation by the Polish Republic's General Procuracy, a Lithuanian Republic General Procuracy delegation headed by Procurator General Arturas Paulauskas is visiting Poland 15-18 October. During the course of talks with Polish security organ workers, possibilities of closer cooperation in carrying out criminal prosecution of crime perpetrators will be established.

RSFSR

Coverage of RSFSR Supreme Soviet Proceedings

Ill Health Keeps Yeltsin From Session

LD1610095390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Report by A. Onosovskiy from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Opening the morning session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, Chairman Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov reported that, following five hours of work in the Constitutional Commission, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin had begun to feel a little ill. Doctors have recommended that he refrain from work today.

The deputies have started the agenda. It was decided that work on the draft law on the referendum in Russia should be completed.

Shakhray, chairman of the Legislation Committee, set out the new wording on certain articles. Discussion then began on each article of the legislation, taking account of the amendments proposed by the deputies. The law on the referendum in the RSFSR was passed as a whole. [video shows electronic scoreboard with 91 votes in favor, 6 against, and 5 abstentions]

Draft Laws Examined 15 Oct

LD1510215890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1800 GMT on 15 October carries a seven-minute report by correspondent Yuriy Korotkov from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Supreme Soviet session in Moscow.

Korotkov says that around 40 draft laws are currently being examined. The committee on economic reform and ownership issues jointly with the committee on industry and power engineering is completing work on the draft law on ownership in the RSFSR and on 16 October it will be submitted to a joint session of both Supreme Soviet chambers. A draft law on enterprise and entrepreneurial activities is also in preparation. It will be submitted to a plenary sitting next week.

The committee on issues of the work of soviets, people's deputies, and development of self-government detail today with problems of the activities of soviets and their executive bodies in implementing the program for transfer to a market system. The committee on issues of interrepublican relations, regional policy, and cooperation met with RSFSR people's deputies from Leningrad as well as Leningrad, Pskov, and Kalinin Oblasts. The progress of preparations for the treaty between the RSFSR and the Baltic republics was discussed. The committee on science and public education is working on a provision for basic principles of formation and organization of activities of the RSFSR Academy of Sciences. The committee on ecological affairs is completing examination of the draft law on public health inspection in the RSFSR. The committee on legislation today started work on the draft law on the concept of setting up an RSFSR customs system.

The committee for invalids, veterans of war and labor, social protection of servicemen and their families is working on social guarantees of this category of population. Aleksandr Vladimirovich Rutskov in an interview says that at present there is no social protection for invalids whatsoever. The current task of society is to ease the life of invalids. He says that it is necessary to take into account the interests of this group during the transfer to a market system. It is necessary to draw up three laws: on social guarantees for invalids, on social guarantees for war and labor veterans, and on social guarantees for servicemen and their families. These draft laws are being examined in detail at present.

Today Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, met a group of North American businessmen and representatives of pension funds of a number of companies. Issues of economic transformations in the RSFSR and ways of further cooperation were discussed, Korotkov concludes.

Economic Reform Debated 9 Oct

91UN0060A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by TASS parliamentary correspondents N. Kupriy and O. Kulikov under the rubric "At the Session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet": "A Plan of Practical Actions"]

[Text] The economic renewal of Russia was the center of the deputies' attention on 9 October at a meeting of the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. By tradition, the day began with an exchange of opinions on various problems.

Having touched upon the refusal of the Gorkiy automobile-builders to make four armored cars for B.N. Yeltsin and I.S. Silayev, the investigation of the causes for the loss of the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets," and other questions, the deputies returned to their discussion of the market.

Great alarm could be heard in the speeches. It was the essence of the thoughts on increased purchase prices and the reform of wholesale prices and the inevitable explosion of retail prices. The deputies also talked about increasing the interest rates on loans for members of housing construction cooperatives from 0.5 to 11. This means, for instance, that if an apartment costs 10,000 rubles [R], the monthly rate of payment on the loan is R90. Where is a family going to get that kind of money? And the fuel-and-energy complex.... An abrupt decrease in capital investment to that sector has called into question the competence of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers.

G.I. Filshin, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, gave an unscheduled report on the economic situation in the republic. He emphasized that the current situation in Russia is characteristic of the economy of the country as a whole. The administrative command system no longer functions, and the new economic levers are still not operating. This is the basic reason for our misfortunes. For the first time in the economic history of Russia, the national income has declined rapidly over the past nine months.

This day the deputies heard one more report: "On a Plan of Practical Actions for Implementing A Program To Stabilize the Economy and Move to Market Relations." It was presented by I.S. Silayev, chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers.

In particular, he informed the deputies that an international gathering of economists took place at the end of September in Washington. There the 500 days program was acknowledged as "the only viable" one.

At this juncture one cannot help but ask the question, who is to live according to this program? Foreign specialists or the Russian people? It seems to us that only the population of Russia can be the most authoritative expert in this matter. After all, many workers, intellectuals, and peasants do not have any idea what the program is about.

According to a report of the Russian Council of Ministers, a resolution was adopted. It contains a decision to approve, with several amendments, a plan of practical actions for a transition to market relations no later than 1 November.

It was declared at the session that the Adyge Autonomous Oblast has proclaimed itself an autonomous republic.

According to the agenda, the deputies again returned to an appeal of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to the citizens of Russia. As is known, this document was already discussed previously but it was not adopted because of numerous amendments and the absence of a quorum. There was also difficulty with a quorum at today's meeting. Several times it was necessary to conduct a count of the deputies and declare an intermission in order to find parliamentarians in offices and dining halls.

Eventually the appeal was adopted.

The session discussed a draft RSFSR law on relations between the soviets of people's deputies and the executive organs of power in a period when economic reform is being conducted. Even after the long discussion it was not adopted. Nor did a continuation of the second reading of the draft RSFSR law on the referendum take place.

Law on Property Debated 5 Oct

91UN0060B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Oct 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by TASS parliamentary correspondents N. Kupriy and V. Dzhibuti under the rubric "At the Session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet": "Property and Law"]

[Text] Moscow—The draft law on property ownership—the source and base document for a package of documents—was examined by the deputies on 5 October at the session of the Russian Supreme Soviet. A joint meeting of the chambers was conducted by S.P. Goryachev, deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet.

The draft law, more than two months in preparation, included an explanatory note which was distributed to the deputies. The note said that the law lies at the basis of legal guarantees to stabilize the economy of the republic, to move to legal market relations, and in particular to implement the concept of the 500 days program. The draft underwent examination at the department of economic law of the Sverdlovsk Legal Institute and the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet State Law, Drafting, and Legislation, and it received a positive evaluation. It was devised by a collective of authors.

One of them, V.O. Ispravnikov, secretary of the republic's Supreme Economic Council, briefly emphasized the principle provisions of the draft as he gave his report. Here is the essence of those provisions. Application of the law will demand a substantial change in the status of public organizations as well as political parties. Only those public organizations which are registered as corporate persons with declared, prescribed property will be recognized as legal.

V.O. Ispravnikov was convinced that "no one is speaking out against private property." And this is the heading of the Russian ship. All other paths to the market are considered illegal today.

Another speaker, N.T. Ryabov, also one of the authors of the draft and chairman of the subcommittee on legal provisions of economic reform, focussed the deputies' attention on the structure of property ownership: Private, state, and municipal. This is an important political aspect which must be introduced as quickly as possible to forestall the popular explosion which may take place under the slogan, "We have nothing to lose but our chains...."

It was the issue of municipal property that bewildered some deputies. They wanted to know just what that is because we do not have municipalities in our country. Such a formulation is completely incomprehensible to the people.

A deputy who is a specialist in agriculture expressed reasonable indignation concerning the fact that the document does not speak about the rights of kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] to property, as though such farms no longer exist in our country.

There were many conversations on legal topics: Do former owners have the right to claim everything that they owned before the October Revolution; what should be done with the property of victims of persecution; why is church property being allotted separately....

The deputies continued a more purposeful discussion of the draft law "On Property in the RSFSR" today in separate meetings of the chambers.

Council of Ministers Discuss 'Young Business'

LD1510230590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Ivan Silayev chaired a meeting of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers today. Attention focused on issues relating to ways to help young business and ways in which business can help government. Those participating in the meeting asked the representative of Russia's Council of Ministers for the introduction of a more flexible tax policy for young enterprises, and to search for a way to return part of the money they contributed to the state budget for the development of this movement and to set up an aid fund for it.

Drawing the meeting to a close, Silayev promised to support the many constructive proposals heard at the meeting, and welcomed the aim of young business people to actively cooperate with the government.

RSFSR Vice President Meets U.S. Businessmen

LD1610051190 Moscow TASS in English 2155 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Report by TASS parliamentary correspondents Pavel Ostrov and Yuriy Kozmin]

[Text] Moscow October 16 TASS—Russian parliament Vice President Ruslan Khasbulatov on Monday met a group of U.S. business leaders and employees of social funds of a number of companies. They are in the Soviet Union on the initiative of President of the Olympia and York Company Albert Reichmann.

The meeting was attended by Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, an author of the "500 days" programme of the transition to a market economy.

Khasbulatov spoke of economic reforms in the Soviet Union's largest Republic. He noted that the Republic's integration in the international community and the creation of the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade and the ensuring of freedom of activities to foreign businessmen are important directions of the reform.

Foreign guests said they were in Russia to learn where and how to invest capital. Khasbulatov said the Republic's leadership aims to "create favourable conditions for business". He noted that in order to improve the situation in the social sphere, it is necessary to develop agriculture and the light industry. He said he believed there were large opportunities for international cooperation.

Polozkov's Statements, Political Views Examined

91UN0034A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 36, 4-10 Sep 90 pp 22-24

[Article by Gherman Diligensky: "Gospel for the Party Apparat"]

[Text] *Ivan Polozkov: "The unattractive image created for me begins to crumble away when I meet directly with party members and the public."*

The ideological and political appearance of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is yet to be shaped. In the meantime, we can judge about it by the statements of its first secretary.

The formation of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPR) was described by its leader and many others as the redressing of a historical injustice. All other republics of the Soviet Union have their own Communist parties, whereas Russia, the largest of them, did not have its own Communist Party for nearly 70 years. That is why a constituent congress was held to found a new territorial (republican) organization of the CPSU. It is supposed to include automatically all the party members living on the territory of the Russian Federation. Why then raise a clamour and dispute the legality of the congress and its decisions?

This argument does not sound convincing to many people. In the runup to the second stage of the Constituent Congress of the CPR, the democratic section of the public and many party members have taken a guarded attitude. After the 28th Congress of the CPSU, which supported on the whole the course for sweeping reforms and the President's foreign policy, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation looks even less than before as merely a subdivision of the "greater" CPSU. One can also recall how its Constituent Congress was prepared (without the knowledge of party members and local organizations), as well as a fierce attack mounted at the congress by conservatives against the policy and philosophy of the CPSU leadership.

Polozkov Renounces Neo-Conservatism

Voluntarily or not, the founders of the CPR have imparted a personal character to it from the very outset. They hastened to elect the first secretary without determining the party's stand on basic political questions and adopting its programme documents. That is why we have to take it as the "Polozkov party." Whatever one thinks about Polozkov's previous activity, his views in the new capacity of leader of the Russian Communists need to be examined carefully.

In its comments on an interview with Ivan Polozkov, the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA describes him as a politician of "a new wave who has been formed in the crucible of perestroyka, at its forward lines where renovating thoughts and ideas are being translated into action." We scrutinize the interview, trying to understand what renovating thoughts and ideas the former secretary of the Krasnodar Territorial Party Committee is going to implement.

The impression is that Ivan Polozkov tries hard to justify the flattering testimonial given him by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. Unlike many [of] his party apparatus colleagues, he seems to understand that one cannot win in political struggle without creating an attractive image for himself.

He was elected first secretary by the votes of party functionaries and diehards opposed to democratic reforms which undermine the existing order. The reputation of an implacable enemy of cooperators, "informals" and other left radicals of every kind had won him popularity in this section of the party membership. As the first secretary of the CPR, Ivan Polozkov has to communicate with a much broader and diverse audience, including those for whom he is "an odious figure," to use the expression of Yuri Prokofiev, first secretary of the Moscow party organization. Polozkov in vain took offence at this expression, because it merely states an objective fact. It is not easy to be in the limelight on the all-Russia scene after many years of work in a territorial party organization and in the party apparatus, for it is important here to take the right position in the process of change.

Of course, the propaganda image a politician creates for himself seldom reveals the depth of his true intentions and goals. However, it shows at least the specific features of this tactics. From this point of view it is indicative with what persistence Polozkov is trying to destroy his reputation as a staunch conservative and build up the image of a moderate and sensible man prepared to extend his hand to his political opponents.

The Communist Party of Russia, he says, will send greetings to its opponents from the Democratic Platform when they found their own party. The public has learned that Polozkov is full of sympathy and respect for the leaders of perestroyka. He admires the democratism of Gorbachev and the bold and unbending character of Yeltsin and is ready to defend Abalkin. It seems we are urged to forget about quite different sentiments which could be heard in the earlier speeches of Polozkov, say, at the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, and to believe that he has never been a conservative. And, in general, Polozkov asserts, there is no conservatism in our country. The talk about it is "simply nonsense which is not even worth attention."

True, the first secretary himself does not follow this advice and spares no time to refute the "nonsense." He should not have tried to do that because the sense of moderation obviously fails him. For instance, those who followed the work of the 28th Congress of the CPSU will only smile at the contention that "at all (!) stages of the congress, the vast majority of delegates displayed political wisdom, rejecting extremes" and made "a profound analysis of the present situation."

The wisdom and analysis were apparently expressed in the booing of speakers objectionable to the majority, such as Prokofiev, Ulyanov and Aitmatov, in the angry and aggressive emotional atmosphere which prevailed at the first stages of the congress. As for progressive resolutions mentioned by Polozkov, the majority of delegates were compelled to adopt them because of the evident lack of an alternative to Gorbachev's leadership and the real alignment of forces in the country and the party.

The first stage of the 28th Congress of the CPSU showed what the majority wanted, and the concluding stage showed what it could, or rather could not, achieve. One of the results of this collision is the sad political fate of Yegor Ligachev which, incidentally, refuted the optimistic forecast made by Polozkov before the congress.

Polozkov Touches on Theology and Political Economy

One can understand the feelings of a SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reporter, A. Salutsky, when he asks Ivan Polozkov with admiration and surprise: "Do you read the Bible?" Polozkov replied that he reads the Bible and considers it "a well-spring of wisdom." From this well he drew the conviction that the Orthodox Church is "a natural ally of the CPSU in its efforts to establish morals."

We can see from other utterances, however, that Polozkov is unlikely to introduce Christian principles in politics.

While giving Polozkov the theologian his due, I, nevertheless, want to know more about him as an economist, political scientist and sociologist, because the party led by him will conduct its activity rather in these fields decisive for our society than in the religious sphere. True, judging from an interview Polozkov gave to PRAVDA, the economy is not separated from religion by a Chinese wall. In any case, he is inspired by the example of Jesus Christ, who cast money-changers and petty tradesmen out of the temple.

This application of the Gospel to present-day economic policy is especially interesting because Polozkov is far from dogmatic in the given case as well. Driving traders out of the temple, Jesus Christ told them: "Scripture says 'My house shall be called a house of prayer,' but you are making it a robbers' cave." Ivan Polozkov goes considerably farther: it seems he is going to banish money-changers and petty tradesmen not only from the temples, where you won't see them in our days, but from the market as well.

It is possible that this substitution of notions is not quite accidental, for under the system which Polozkov served for many years, the economy is also a sort of temple where the performance of a ritual, that is, reporting on the achievements and worshipping the sacred principles of Socialist Property and the Plan, is much more important than satisfaction of the people's day-to-day needs. The first secretary favours only that market that will be "subordinate to the interests of the working people," and objects to the labour market which is "connected with private property, hired labour, unemployment and, in the end, with a departure from socialism." Such a position implies that there is no labour market or hired labour in our country today. In other words, the Soviet worker does not sell his labour and is not a hired labourer. In spite of his dynamism, Ivan Polozkov remains completely under the influence of the antiquated Stalinist "political economy of socialism." It is not important, its advocates say, how much a "socialist" worker receives for his labour and what he can buy for his wage, in what conditions he lives and works, and what social position he has in the sphere of production. Since he works for his own state (be it a class state or a state of the whole people) he is not a hired but a free worker. Unlike the Western worker, who receives a considerably higher wage, the Soviet worker is not an object of exploitation. It is hardly necessary to prove now that the real position of a Soviet worker does not fit in with this rosy picture.

The call to prevent the appearance of a labour market virtually means an attempt to preserve the existing type of labour relations. The main feature of this type is that the conditions of selling labour are determined not by its production cost and price, as it is done on the market, but by the arbitrary rule of the state, the owner of the means of production. In other words, it is hired labour and labour market without such an essential element as free bargaining between those who sell and buy labour.

The experience of capitalist countries shows that precisely this bargaining enables hired workers to secure an appreciable growth of their living standards and broad social rights and put into practice what Karl Marx called "the political economy of the working class." Polozkov has no reason to think that by opposing a real labour market, he is defending the interests of the working people. On the contrary, the absence of a labour market, with the expansion of the consumer and capital market, will throw our country back, to use his expression, "to the backwoods of civilization, to wild capitalism of the mid-19th century," as a situation without any rights—similar to the past and, in many respects, present-day condition of our working class—was characteristic precisely of early capitalism.

Polozkov's Attitude to the Market

In the economic reasoning of Ivan Polozkov, one can see the features of a rather peculiar market model. It provides for an expansion of the consumer market, with the state retaining unlimited possibilities to interfere in its activity and sell all the agricultural and manufactured products. According to Polozkov, the guaranteed supply of the working people with all essential products will be ensured by the all-powerful state, not the market.

Essentially, such a model is a kind of compromise with the market helping to preserve the interests of the administrative-command system. Moreover, it has national roots. Let us recall how the town governor in Gogol's play "The Government Inspector" treated merchants. No, he did not ban trade and, in this sense, was not against the consumer market. But he liked to play the master in it: "He walks into the shop and takes anything he can lay his hands on. If he sees a piece of cloth, 'Hey, my dear man,' he will say, 'that's a fine bit of cloth, send that round to me.'" True, the town governor did not study at the Academy of Social Sciences and in that uncivilized time the idea of introducing a "guaranteed distribution" could not come to his mind.

I recalled the town governor also in view of Polozkov's intention to fight against black market dealers. Our conservatives do not give a clear interpretation of the word "dealers." In the interview given by Polozkov to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA they seem to be identified with money-changers and petty tradesmen mentioned in the Gospels. If this is so, the nascent stratum of entrepreneurs risks getting into serious trouble with Polozkov and the party led by him, because they are going to take away more than "a piece of good cloth."

If the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is going to fight the black market economy really operating under the present conditions, it is not clear how it can do that by strengthening the administrative-command system of "guaranteed" distribution. For in our country, the black market economy is engendered precisely by this system, by monopolism and the shortage of goods inherent in it, and the black market dealers are tightly connected with the corrupt bureaucracy.

Ivan Polozkov does not limit himself to economic matters only. He depicts the model of renovating socialist society. Polozkov the sociologist uses the same method as Polozkov the economist. Vigorously renewing the theory, he does not renounce the half-forgotten legacy of a former classic of Marxism-Leninism. In his concept, there is no room for monolithic unity and social homogeneity fashionable in the 1970s. However, one can feel in it the spirit of the 1930s, when, according to the Father of Peoples, an aggravation of the class struggle had to be expected. Polozkov predicts that we can also expect such a prospect in the near future.

Polozkov Defends Wage Workers Against the CPSU

In the opinion of Ivan Polozkov the intelligentsia is also a class. Stressing his "profound respect" for it, he reveals a stern truth: the intelligentsia also defends its class interests, though they are not common to all mankind. It appears that universal human interests have no place in society. Deprived of any social base, they hang poised in mid-air and can expect at most only neutrality on the part of class interests. In any case, Polozkov generously promises that the party led by him will not counterpose the class positions defended by it to universal human positions.

In the light of this sociological reasoning one again has to think over the political role of the CPR and its place in the process of transition to the market. On the whole, Polozkov evidently holds a bellicose-defensive stand in relation to this process. He regards the market as a danger rather than a blessing and is going to defend the wage workers from the market as such, not from black-market dealers only. But the all-round expansion of a regulated market is an official policy of the CPSU confirmed by its 28th Congress. It means that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, an integral part of the CPSU, will defend the working people...from the CPSU itself. All this is described as "consolidation" of the party ranks. A strange future is prepared for the party by a member of the Politburo of the CPSU.

True, Polozkov also talks about the balance of interests. However, he does not explain who will bring about this balance and by what means. It is not clear either from his interview whether there are above-class and above-party interests capable of uniting the whole of society. It is to be supposed that the balance of interests will be achieved by the same force that will distribute the boons and determine the content of this balance. In the opinion of Polozkov, the CPSU is apparently destined to carry out this function. It will engage in the "political education of the people" and teach them to "distinguish their genuine champions from demagogues."

As for the wage workers, they are supposed to play a rather modest role in Polozkov's programme. They will be an object of "education" and are expected to follow the first secretary of the party. Will the people obediently follow this way? The latest developments make a similar forecast very doubtful. One of the most tangible results of perestroyka is that the Soviet people, including wage workers, are increasingly inclined to defend their interests independently and more and more often go beyond the class limits. It is to be supposed that the Communists of Russia, whom the Constituent Congress, without their consent, transferred to the party founded by it, will seriously think what expects them in the new party. Polozkov's revelations will certainly play a truly educative part in this respect.

P.S. The article had already been written when the CPR published the draft of its programme of action. Unfortunately, this document adds little to Polozkov's platform. It contains the same gap between declarations in favour of perestroika and positions on specific problems of the reform. On the one hand, the programme calls for "explaining the need of the economic reform and overcoming the prejudice against the market." On the other hand, it simply avoids all difficult questions: the labour market, private property, free sale of shares, and price formation. It can even be said that the draft programme is less outspoken and less concrete than the speeches of the party leader. It represents mainly a set of general statements and does not explain how the party intends to attain its goal of improving the economic situation.

However, the simultaneously published theses of the Marxist Platform and the organising bureau of the Initiative (neo-Stalinist) Congress of the Communists of Russia are consonant with Polozkov's reasoning. It remains to guess how the conflict between ideological dogmas and party diplomacy will end.

Moscow Soviet Faces Economic, Tax Problems

PM1010152090 London MOSCOW NEWS in English No 19, 5-11 Oct 90 p2

[Article by Sergey Stankevich, deputy chairman of Moscow City Soviet: "Crop of Troubles for City's Bosses"]

[Text] The Moscow Communist Party committee recently held a meeting with the cumbersome title "On the declining political situation in Moscow due to unsatisfactory handling of several vital socio-economic issues".

Local paper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA tried to explain that the situation is "difficult and even critical at times" because the party branches are out of touch with ordinary people.

Now, at a time when the Moscow City Soviet and its executive committee are in a weak position, it is essential that communist deputies oppose the prevailing practice of words not being backed up by deeds. So the party bureau proposed that every communist work at least three days on a farm in the Moscow region.

But the fact is that we of the presidium of the Moscow City Soviet have refused to carry out this kind of forced mobilisation. We have embarked on an alternative plan and allocated 10 million rubles of our funds (another five million from the Moscow Regional Soviet) to pay volunteers. Last Saturday we sent 40,000 volunteers for a day's work in the countryside.

The political situation is declining because proposals by the government are constantly being rejected. But the Moscow party officials claim it is not the management system of state and collective farms which is to blame, saying: "The system was good, but the party whip has been removed and look what has happened!"

Ownership, particularly of the land, must be changed for the privatisation programme to succeed. This would cancel the need for emergency measures next year and pompous meetings about the state of the economy.

Because of the USSR Supreme Soviet's delay in deciding on the 500-Days programme, we went ahead and drew up a plan and a budget for Moscow according to the programme endorsed by the Russian Supreme Soviet. Our success will decide the future of the city.

We calculate the amount of tax revenue for the budget at 14 billion rubles, as long as taxes collected in the city remain there and are not handed over to higher official bodies.

Now that Moscow has lost some of its privileges the city authorities will incur serious expenses. As a double capital, of the USSR and of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Moscow deserves appropriate compensation.

Now a working group of representatives is being set up of federal, republican, city and regional bodies, on presidential instructions, to work out new procedures for the capital.

Kaluga Communists Criticize Anti-Lenin Actions

PM1510125790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Oct 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Communists' Appeal"]

[Text] Kaluga—Some 600 Communists, working people at the Telegraph Apparatus Plant, have expressed profound indignation at cases of the desecration of monuments to V.I. Lenin, the closure of museums, and the renaming of streets and squares named for him. They have appealed to the CPSU Central Committee, Communists, and people's deputies of all levels to make a principled assessment of these facts and to take urgent measures to defend the person of the founder of the Soviet state. In their appeal they urged Communists and all honest people to "struggle actively for Lenin's ideas and for the rebirth of Lenin's vision of socialism."

Western Republics

Poland's Skubiszewski Visits Belorussia

LD1510165490 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1500 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] [Announcer] Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the head of the Polish diplomatic service, is spending the day in Belorussia today. Our correspondent Andrzej Siezieniewski is in Minsk:

[Siezieniewski] In the seemingly smooth Polish-Belorussian relations there are many matters which require urgent attention. This particularly concerns the humanitarian sphere. Both during the meeting between Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and the Prime Minister, and during talks with members of the parliamentary opposition, both sides made accusations and complaints. Our hosts drew attention to cases of discrimination against the Belorussian minority in Poland. Members of the Polish delegation also pointed to the existence of many problems, starting for example with difficulties in carrying out religious practices. It was decided not to delay the solution of these problems, particularly because they could unfavorably influence Polish contacts in other areas.

In the near future Poland will certainly sign a trade agreement with sovereign Belorussia, the first document of this kind in our history. We will even increase the exchange of commodities this year. For example, there is nothing to prevent a Belorussian consulate from being opened in Bialystok. Working contacts at ministerial level were announced. All these decisions will be incorporated in a document which is to be signed today after the conclusion of the Polish-Belorussian talks. At this very moment these talks are taking place between Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Petr Kravchenko, the heads of their respective diplomatic services.

[Announcer] From Minsk Foreign Minister Skubiszewski will go to Moscow again, where he is to sign a declaration on good-neighborly relations with the RSFSR.

'Impasse' Develops in Talks

LD1510201190 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1800 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Excerpts] Ladies and gentlemen, our correspondent in the Soviet Union, Andrzej Siezieniewski, has got through to us by phone and he will transmit the most up to date information on Krzysztof Skubiszewski's trip.

[Siezieniewski] This is Andrzej Siezieniewski talking from Minsk. Poland and Belorussia did not sign a declaration today on the principles of forming mutual relations. Our partners were not prepared for that. They raised reservations over the formulation of the draft declaration, which spoke about the inviolability of the joint border decreed in the Polish-Soviet Treaty of 1945 to which, as it was claimed during the talks, Belorussia was not a signatory and its opinion was not sought. On the other hand, our partners agree to the statement on there not being any territorial claims. There is a logical inconsistency in this stance which proves that the Belorussian side needs time to sign a declaraiton or a document of a higher international level, for example a treaty forming the foundations of our future relations with full public approval. [passage omitted]

We expected talks on economic cooperation for which we were prepared. The attitude of the Belorussian delegation meant, however, that the subject will have to be deferred for the time being and that a joint analysis of the situation, which has arisen, and a search for ways out of the impasse be worked on. It was agreed today that the consultations would be continued.

Belorussian Government Withdraws Market Proposals

LD1510182390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Belorussia—The discussion of draft legislation to back up Belorussia's transition to market relations was unexpectedly interrupted today at the session of the Supreme Soviet. Deputies who had gathered for the evening session were amazed to learn that the republican Council of Ministers had withdrawn the whole package of draft laws which it had itself submitted. Kebich, chairman of the Council of Ministers, gave the reason for this as being that the documents need substantial amendment, taking into account the comments of deputies and commissions of the Supreme Soviet. A few minutes before this, deputies from the opposition, for the most part representatives of the Belorussian People's Front, had deserted the hall. This was to express their disagreement with the fact that not one of their proposals had been put to the vote. Deputies are expected on Tuesday to examine a set of temporary measures to protect Belorussia's consumer market.

Moldavian Parties Respond to Gorbachev Address

LD1610104890 Moscow TASS in English 1020 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Report by MOLDOVA PRESS-TASS correspondents Anatoliy Golya and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev October 16 TASS—The Soviet president's address to the people of Moldavia about the socio-political situation in the republic "fully coincides with the Moldavian Communist Party (MCP) Central Committee's stand, which is oriented towards a constructive dialogue and a search for ways leading to national accord," Yevgeniy Sobor, secretary of the MCP Central Committee, told the correspondents. "Such a stand is imperative today. There is no alternative to it. Mounting pressure is leading to a precipice," he said.

The social democrats, welcoming the Soviet president's address, which was published in the republican press today, regard the self-dissolution of the separatists-established alternative structures of power as an indispensable condition for the stabilisation of the socio-political situation in Moldavia.

The internationalist movement Edinstvo (Unity) supports Gorbachev's call for a constructive dialogue between all the sides concerned.

"However, the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the republic should be viewed as values of a higher order than keeping the integrity of the republic," Vladimir Solonar, member of the presidium of the Edinstvo movement, told the correspondents.

"The absence of political and social rights for ethnic minorities and thier lack of legal protection are the main source of tension in the republic.

"We shall not be able to get out of this impasse until we manage to secure radical changes in this respect and until movements representing the interests of ethnic minorities are recognised as full and equal participants in the political process," Solonar said.

Moldavia To Form 'Carabinieri' Units

LD1610083390 Moscow TASS in English 0807 GMT 16 Oct 90

[Text] Kishinev October 16 TASS—"The Moldavian Republic will begin drafting its citizens into carabinieri units from next spring," Moldavian Interior Minister I. Kostash told a news conference here on Monday.

Describing his position on the future of his ministry, he said that it should be subordinate only to the republican authorities. In his opinion, each sovereign republic should have its own national interior forces.

As for defence, it will be the prerogative of the future community of sovereign states.

According to Kostash, the ministry intends to resolve the personnel problem by opening a higher police officers' school, a specialised secondary school and a centre to train police sergeants.

Great hopes are pinned on training specialists abroad, including at the Romanian Police Academy.

The republican Interior Ministry which has the right of the legislative initiative, has drafted bills on police and on carabinieri to be submitted to the Moldavian parliament.

Coverage of Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Proceedings

Objections to Decision on Draft

PM1610091190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Dispatch by Sergey Tsikora under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Deputies Declare Hunger Strike"]

[Text] Kiev—There was an unexpected result to the examination in the Ukrainian legislature of two of the republic's "burning" issues.

First to be discussed was the mechanism for implementing the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet resolution on military service. First of all, I will note certain fundamental tenets that have radically changed mutual relations between the civil and military powers. The Army draft in the Ukraine will be carried out no longer through USSR Defense Ministry establishments but by republic, oblast, city, and rayon executive bodies.

The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has made it incumbent on the ispolkoms [executive committees] "as from the fall draft 1990, to ensure that the draftees perform compulsory military service in military units that are stationed on the republic's territory."

The same resolution orders the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers "to ensure that Ukrainian SSR citizens who are performing compulsory military service outside the Ukrainian SSR in units that are used for the resolution of interethnic and other conflicts and in military construction detachments are returned to the republic in October-November of this year."

Another fundamental tenet: That the dispatch of Ukrainian SSR citizens to perform compulsory military service outside the republic be suspended until a special agreement is adopted between the Union and republic organs. This refers to the necessary quotas of draftees in the recruitment for the "branches and arms of the Soviet Army and Navy forces which provide strategic defense in the republic's interests." A debate lasting many hours about whether these "quotas" should be recruited on a voluntary basis or not ended with by no means unanimous adoption of a resolution to the effect that the fall 1990 and spring 1991 drafts will be carried out according to the old rules.

The deputies then examined a renewed version of the Ukrainian government program for stabilizing the republic's economic situation. Deputies' opinions differed here. And although the measures proposed by the government were finally approved as a whole, Supreme Soviet commissions were instructed to elaborate them further.

On the same day the question of a vote of confidence in the republic government and its chairman was raised at the Ukrainian legislature session. The question was removed from the agenda by majority vote.

This turn of events did not please the opposition. On the question of the Army draft it insisted that service outside the republic should only be carried out on a voluntary basis. The opposition also upheld demands for the resignation of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers chairman. All this was reported in a statement made on republic television by opposition deputies. They declared that as a sign of protest they would be joining the students who are on hunger strike for political reasons and who have set up a camp on the Kreshchatik, in downtown Kiev. I visited the camp in the morning of 11 October. The parliamentarians who had declared a hunger strike were there.

Student Demands Debated

LD1510171190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] There were noisy scenes at today's meeting of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, where an unscheduled debate is being held on the demands of the students who have been on hunger strike for two weeks on Kiev's main October Revolution Square. A statement from the hunger strikers was read. They are insisting on five demands. They have already issued appeals for a Ukraine-wide political strike, which went unheeded and did not materialize. Two of the demands have already been looked into. It was decided that the question of the resignation of the Council of Ministers chairman should not be discussed at all, while the demand that conscripts should do their military service only on Ukrainian territory was taken into account in the Supreme Soviet decision on that issue.

The following decisions were made on the remaining demands at the morning session:
—the signing of the Union treaty by the Ukraine is considered premature before a new republican constitution is adopted;
—the issue of nationalization of CPSU and Komsomol property is to be referred for scrutiny to the State Arbitration Service, the Ministry of Justice, and the Economy Committee which must submit their conclusion to the Supreme Soviet by 1 December of this year.

A decision on the third demand of the hunger strikers—that the Supreme Soviet be dissolved—is being discussed at the evening session.

In the meantime, a student demonstration led by the hunger strikers has marched to the Supreme Soviet building from Kievsovet Station. They are demanding a public meeting with explanations from the republic's top officials, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the head of government, and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. The Supreme Soviet decided to continue its work, however, merely moving to the street, and to hold a roundtable meeting with student spokesmen. Opposition members went out to the rally, however, to endorse the students' demands.

Session Continues Despite Demands

LD1510171890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Today's work of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet session has turned out to be very difficult. The demands of the students who have been on a hunger strike on the main square of Kiev for two weeks already had to be considered out of sequence. Five demands have been brought by the students. Nearly all have been satisfied. However, the decision to continue the work of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet was taken after the hunger strikers' demand to dissolve the republican Supreme Soviet. The hunger striking students said they did not wish to negotiate with the present Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Caucasus

Bomb Destroys Railroad Car in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD1510151490 Moscow TASS in English 1419 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Baku October 15 TASS—A sleeping-car was blown up in Stepanakert, the capital of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, on Sunday night.

The car was used as a hotel for the heads of the Azerbaijani organising committee for the region. They had been sent on a mission from Baku. Fortunately, the carriage was empty on Sunday. The committee was set up in the end of 1989 in accordance with the Soviet parliament's resolution on measures to normalise the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

A spokesman from the emergency district commandant's office said another bomb was discovered and defused by military specialists near the car. An investigation has begun.

According to the operative group from the Soviet Interior Ministry, this is the third attempt to kill the committee heads over the past two months. The two previous attempts were averted, suspects have been detained and an investigation is underway. It is clear that some nationalist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh oppose the reconciliation policy, conducted persistently and steadily by the republican organising committee.

Inflammatory Leaflet in Nagarno-Karabakh Criticized

PM1510105390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Oct 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by Colonel L. Arshantsev under the "Direct Line" rubric: "A Forgery for Simpletons"]

[Text] On 5 September, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA told readers about the appearance in Nagorno-Karabakh of a certain "Officers for Perestroyka" committee that is trying to turn the oblast's population against servicemen with the help of anonymous leaflets and destabilize a situation that is already quite explosive. Major General A. Normanskiy, chief of one of the directorates of the USSR KGB's special departments, made it clear in the same article that there is not a single officers' organization appealing to officers not to obey instructions or demoralizing the men in the troops deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] or in other places in the Transcaucasus.

It would seem that the authors of such an obvious provocation, caught in the spotlight of glasnost, for decency's sake should not have alluded to a mythical committee—because if there is not one, you just have to do without it—but should have found something new with which to frighten the citizens. And all the same, there is still life in the old dog yet! Its latest opus is once again being passed around in Stepanakert and is even being circulated in military cantonments. As a show of bravado. Of course, the leaflet might not have been noticed had it not been for the clearly inflammatory nature of its content. This time the "restructurers" accuse the political department in the Stepanakert commandant's office of "indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of Armenophobia." The military—referred to as a "punitive force" in the leaflet—are reproached with the ill-intentioned blockade of the Goris-Lachiya-Stepanakert road since this, they say, makes it possible for "migrants from Azerbaijan to settle in NKAO."

Is this a "forgery" for simpletons for those who do not know that the road is blocked for one sole reason: To prevent the ceaseless smuggling of weapons and ammunition along this important transport route? The provocateurs were counting on one simple thing: To kindle hysteria around the NKAO at a time when attempts are being made along all channels, including through the clergy, to finally untie the painful knot and bring the participants in the old dispute to dialogue, bring calm and civil peace to this blossoming area, and determine the optimum power structures in the oblast.

Azerbaijan Premier Receives Iranian Minister

LD1510181990 Tehran IRNA in English 1435 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Text] Baku, Oct. 15, IRNA—Iran's minister of roads and transportation and prime minister of the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan have called for speeding up of efforts to expand economic and commercial cooperation between Tehran and Baku.

In a meeting here Sunday Premier Gasan Gasanov said the republic of Azerbaijan was eager to expand economic ties with the Islamic republic.

The meeting was also attended by Iranian ambassador to the Soviet Union Nematollah Izadi and the foreign affairs and foreign trade ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

[Roads and Transport Minister] Saidi-Kia reiterated Tehran's desire to upgrade cooperation with neighbouring Muslim states.

He said the meeting in Moscow in June 1989 between Hojjat ol- Eslam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev led to "a strong political will for promotion of such coperation."

Last Tuesday Saidi-Kia inked a protocol in Moscow for cooperation in the field of transportation.

According to the protocol, Iranian passenger trains are expected to make a total of 100 trips to the Soviet Union via Baku in 1991.

The minister, who reached Baku Sunday night from Moscow, said the protocol enables Iranian and Soviet trucks to cross the common border at Astara.

Azerbaijan is bound by religious, cultural and historical ties with Iran, and Saidi-Kia thanked the people of the republic for rushing relief aid to victims of the quake which devastated parts of northwestern Iran last June.

The Iranian minister and his entourage are to leave for Tehran Monday after visiting port facilities at Baku and meeting the people at a mosque.

Azerbaijan Election Results, Runoffs Reported

PM1510142590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Oct 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by Asim Dzhalilov under "Direct Line" rubric: "Elections Will Continue"]

[Excerpts] Baku—It was all of six days after the elections to the republic parliament and the local soviets of people's deputies before it became known that there would be runoffs and new elections in a number of districts. [passage omitted]

Candidates from the "Democratic Azerbaijan" bloc won 25 seats, although 231 candidates from the democrats participated in the fight for deputies' mandates. The number of ordinary employees, workers, and representatives of the peasantry, as well as teachers and journalists, in the lists of parliamentarians is small.

Runoffs and elections of deputies will be held 14 October and 16 December of this year in 109 districts.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet Meets 15 Oct

LD1510212190 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1500 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Excerpts] The second session of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] opened on 15 October in Alma-Ata's Hall of Sessions of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet. Taking part in the session are Nazarbayev; president of the Kazakh SSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee; members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan Central Committee; members of the Presidential Council; the government of the republic; and a group of USSR people's deputies from the Kazakh SSR. The session was opened with a brief introduction by Asanbayev, chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

A session secretariat was elected for the entire period of its operation, and then the deputies discussed the agenda. [passage omitted] Following a thorough discussion, the agenda was approved.

At the evening session the order of work for the session was adopted. The plenary session of the Supreme Soviet is set for 15 to 31 October. From 1 to 9 November there will be a break in the session's work, following which the Supreme Soviet session will continue.

Asanbayev made a speech on the draft declaration of state sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR, which was later discussed.

Kirghiz, Israeli Firms Sign Cooperation Accord

LD1510180790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0945 GMT 15 Oct 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Boris Maynayev]

[Text] Frunze, 15 Oct (TASS)—The Kirghiz "Feniks" business cooperation association and the Israeli company "Sandler Communications Ltd" signed a contract today on cooperation in the sphere of foreign economic ties and scientific, technical, and production activity. It has been decided to set up a joint trading enterprise and to organize an agricultural raw material processing plant. The enterprise will open its own shop selling Israeli goods for foreign currency and Soviet rubles in the Kirghiz capital of Frunze.

Perestroyka has stepped up Kirghizia's activities abroad. In the last few months cooperation contracts have been signed with firms in Italy, Turkey, Greece, and China.